FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1993

Should the West Go East?

Two Views on NATO

OWEN HARRIES

RONALD D. ASMUS, RICHARD L. KUGLER AND F. STEPHEN LARRABEE

Japan's Non-Revolution

KAREL VAN WOLFEREN

Germany's Divisive Unity

FRITZ STERN

Can NAFTA Change Mexico?

JORGE G. CASTAÑEDA

The Oil Shocks To Come

JOSEPH STANISLAW & DANIEL YERGIN

On 'The Clash of Civilizations'

FOUAD AJAMI, ROBERT L. BARTLEY, LIU BINYAN,
JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK & KISHORE MAHBUBANI

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ters the odds for East-Central Europe's political and economic reform. It also reduces the dangers of German-Russian rivalry, instability spilling west and rampaging nationalism. The first step is a new transatlantic bargain, one that balances changed U.S. and European interests, and recognizes that the concerns of Europe's periphery are central to the continent as a whole.

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NATO cannot move into Eastern Europe. It would greatly annoy the Russians, have little credibility, create splits within the alliance and require much in blood and treasure. But leaving aside the specific problems, beneath all these proposals to move NATO east, lies a relic of Cold War thinking—the concept of the political West. The West as a strategic entity was a product of the Cold War. The West has been and will remain a culture and a civilization. But the political unity of the past forty years will give way to differences of interests and strategies as each of the great powers of Europe and America searches for its own security.

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The articles in Foreign Affairs *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers will sympathize with all the sentiments they find here, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* Foreign Affairs *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. We do not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, that appears in these pages. What we do accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear.*

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Editor's Note

THE FUTURE OF NATO

With the Cold War over, is NATO dying? Is it, like a Gothic ruin, an impressive edifice no longer usable for its original purpose? Or can it be transformed to meet Europe's new security challenges? Finally, how much does NATO now matter to the United States?

These critical questions confront Western leaders as they prepare for upcoming NATO meetings. The answers are by no means self-evident. Two essays in this issue of *Foreign Affairs* present opposing views on what is feasible with NATO and what is important to the United States.

Three analysts from the RAND Corporation argue that NATO is the only potentially effective security organization for an enlarged Europe. Western Europe's ineffective response to the Bosnian conflict is, for these authors, but one illustration of the need for continuing U.S. participation in maintaining stability on the continent.

Thus Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee call for a phased incorporation into NATO of East-Central European states. Accompanying such enlargement, they would redefine NATO's mission and force structure to match up likely post-Cold War security tests. They argue that a transformed NATO, providing stability over a larger European expanse, is of vital importance to the United States and Russia. Both of them, not to mention the rest of the world, would suffer too much from an unraveling Europe.

Owen Harries in his essay is skeptical on all counts. NATO depends on Western cohesiveness, which Harries does not expect to continue. Experience suggests 'the West' is a sometime thing, coming into existence in response to major external threats and refracting into competing nation-states when the threat has passed. Nor would Harries expect Russia to view benignly an eastern expansion of NATO. And he finds no American vital interest in the regional-level conflicts that may boil up on the eastern and southern flanks of Europe.

IS JAPAN REALLY CHANGING?

The West, in its post-World War II conception of being a force for security and stability in key regions, has linked Europe, the Western hemisphere and Japan. Now Japan is experiencing unprecedented political disruption and unnerving economic difficulties. These upheavals are occurring amidst doubts about continuing cohesiveness in Asia as well as in Europe. Will the United States continue to bear the burdens of being the stabilizer in the Asia/Pacific region? And how will its key relationship with Japan be, cooperative or acrimonious? Many believe that Japan's wrenching political changes will bring to power a new generation—less insular, more comfortable

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with open markets and more ready to assume global responsibilities.

Karel van Wolferen warns against too quickly assuming that a politics of real choice is emerging in Japan. The commanding bureaucracy—the true locus of power in Japan—remains formidable. A succession of weak coalition governments might only strengthen the hand of the permanent government.

MEXICO'S STAKE IN NAFTA

Understandably, American discussion of NAFTA has focused on the trade treaty's effects on the United States. But what about Mexico? Is NAFTA the key to further economic development of our southern neighbor? Or will it primarily benefit elites and prop up Mexico's reigning political party, thus impeding the emergence of true democracy? To answer these questions, Jorge G. Castañeda recommends what actions must accompany the current version of NAFTA to achieve its avowed purposes.

Other essays in this issue analyze the profound market changes affecting the world's most strategic resource—oil; the growing instability in America's important Middle East ally—Egypt; the deep psychological fault lines in Europe's most powerful nation—Germany; and the struggle for a stable transition in South Africa.

THE CLASH CONTINUES

In the last issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Harvard's Samuel P. Huntington made the provocative argument that the main tensions and conflicts in the post-Cold War world will be between entire civilizations. The essay provoked much discussion, and we present in our Comments section a selection of stimulating responses by distinguished writers ranging from Fouad Ajami to Jeane Kirkpatrick. Professor Huntington will respond in the next issue.

BOOK REVIEWS AND LETTERS

Michael Howard and Robert W. Tucker supplement our regular book reviews with essays on recent books about Winston Churchill and on the memoirs of former Secretary of State George Shultz. We also welcome to our roster of regular reviewers Kenneth Maxwell, a Latin American scholar and Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Maxwell takes over from Abraham Lowenthal, to whom we are indebted for five years of wise and insightful reviews.

In letters, William Colby, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency, asserts that proposed cuts in the U.S. defense budget will leave the nation strong enough to meet likely security challenges. Several Ukrainian officials add their perspective to the debate over nuclear weapons in their country.

Foreign Affairs moves to a bi-monthly schedule with this issue. The increased frequency will allow for more topical analysis of a fast-changing world.

James F. Hoge, Jr.
Editor

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Comments

Responses to Samuel P. Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?"

IB OHLSSON

"Let us be clear: civilizations do not control states, states control civilizations."

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The Summoning

'But They Said, We Will Not Hearken.'

JEREMIAH 6: 17

Fouad Ajami

In Joseph Conrad's *Youth*, a novella published at the turn of the century, Marlowe, the narrator, remembers when he first encountered "the East":

> And then, before I could open my lips, the East spoke to me, but it was in a Western voice. A torrent of words was poured into the enigmatical, the fateful silence; outlandish, angry words mixed with words and even whole sentences of good English, less strange but even more surprising. The voice swore and cursed violently; it riddled the solemn peace of the bay by a volley of abuse. It began by calling me Pig, and from that went crescendo into unmentionable adjectives —in English.

The young Marlowe knew that even the most remote civilization had been made and remade by the West, and taught new ways.

Not so Samuel P. Huntington. In a curious essay, "The Clash of Civilizations," Huntington has found his civilizations whole and intact, watertight under an eternal sky. Buried alive, as it were, during the years of the Cold War, these civilizations (Islamic, Slavic-Orthodox, Western, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, etc.) rose as soon as the stone was rolled off, dusted themselves off, and proceeded to claim the loyalty of their adherents. For this student of history and culture, civilizations have always seemed messy creatures. Furrows run across whole civilizations, across individuals themselves—that was modernity's verdict. But Huntington looks past all that. The crooked and meandering alleyways of the world are straightened out. With a sharp pencil and a steady hand Huntington marks out where one civilization ends and the wilderness of "the other" begins.

More surprising still is Huntington's attitude toward states, and their place in his scheme of things. From one of the most influential and brilliant students of the state and its national interest there now comes an essay that misses the slyness of states, the unsentimental and cold-blooded nature of so much of what they do as they pick their way through

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chaos. Despite the obligatory passage that states will remain "the most powerful actors in world affairs," states are written off, their place given over to clashing civilizations. In Huntington's words, "The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations."

THE POWER OF MODERNITY

Huntington's meditation is occasioned by his concern about the state of the West, its power and the terms of its engagement with "the rest."[1] "He who gives, dominates," the great historian Fernand Braudel observed of the traffic of civilizations. In making itself over the centuries, the West helped make the others as well. We have come to the end of this trail, Huntington is sure. He is impressed by the "de-Westernization" of societies, their "indigenization" and apparent willingness to go their own way. In his view of things such phenomena as the "Hinduization" of India and Islamic fundamentalism are ascendant. To these detours into "tradition" Huntington has assigned great force and power.

But Huntington is wrong. He has underestimated the tenacity of modernity and secularism in places that acquired these ways against great odds, always perilously close to the abyss, the darkness never far. India will not become a Hindu state. The inheritance of Indian secularism will hold. The vast middle class will defend it, keep the order intact to maintain India's—and its own—place in the modern world of nations. There exists in that anarchic polity an instinctive dread of playing with fires that might consume it. Hindu chauvinism may coarsen the public life of the country, but the state and the middle class that sustains it know that a detour into religious fanaticism is a fling with ruin. A resourceful middle class partakes of global culture and norms. A century has passed since the Indian bourgeoisie, through its political vehicle the Indian National Congress, set out to claim for itself and India a place among nations. Out of that long struggle to overturn British rule and the parallel struggle against "communalism," the advocates of the national idea built a large and durable state. They will not cede all this for a political kingdom of Hindu purity.

We have been hearing from the traditionalists, but we should not exaggerate their power, for traditions are often most insistent and loud when they rupture, when people no longer really believe and when age-old customs lose their ability to keep men and women at home. The phenomenon we have dubbed as Islamic fundamentalism is less a sign of resurgence than of panic and bewilderment and guilt that the border with "the other" has been crossed. Those young urban poor, half-educated in the cities of the Arab world, and their Sorbonne-educated lay preachers, can they be evidence of a genuine return to tradition? They crash Europe's and America's gates in search of liberty and work, and they rail against the

[1]The West itself is unexamined in Huntington's essay. No fissures run through it. No multiculturalists are heard from. It is orderly within its ramparts. What doubts Huntington has about the will within the walls, he has kept within himself. He has assumed that his call to unity will be answered, for outside flutter the banners of the Saracens and the Confucians.

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THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Ayatollah, airborne.

sins of the West. It is easy to understand Huntington's frustration with this kind of complexity, with the strange mixture of attraction and repulsion that the West breeds, and his need to simplify matters, to mark out the borders of civilizations.

Tradition-mongering is no proof, though, that these civilizations outside the West are intact, or that their thrashing about is an indication of their vitality, or that they present a conventional threat of arms. Even so thorough and far-reaching an attack against Western hegemony as Iran's theocratic revolution could yet fail to wean that society from the culture of the West. That country's cruel revolution was born of the realization of the "armed Imam" that his people were being seduced by America's ways. The gates had been thrown wide open in the 1970s, and the high walls Ayatollah Khomeini built around his polity were a response to that cultural seduction. Swamped, Iran was "rescued" by men claiming authenticity as their banner. One extreme led to another.

"We prayed for the rain of mercy and received floods," was the way Mehdi Bazargan, the decent modernist who was Khomeini's first prime minister, put it. But the millennium has been brought down to earth, and the dream of a pan-Islamic revolt in Iran's image has vanished into the wind. The terror and the shabbiness have caught up with the

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utopia. Sudan could emulate the Iranian "revolutionary example." But this will only mean the further pauperization and ruin of a desperate land. There is no rehabilitation of the Iranian example.

A battle rages in Algeria, a society of the Mediterranean, close to Europe—a wine-producing country for that matter—and in Egypt between the secular powers that be and an Islamic alternative. But we should not rush to print with obituaries of these states. In Algeria the nomenklatura of the National Liberation Front failed and triggered a revolt of the young, the underclass and the excluded. The revolt raised an Islamic banner. Caught between a regime they despised and a reign of virtue they feared, the professionals and the women and the modernists of the middle class threw their support to the forces of "order." They hailed the army's crackdown on the Islamicists; they allowed the interruption of a democratic process sure to bring the Islamicists to power; they accepted the "liberties" protected by the repression, the devil you know rather than the one you don't.

The Algerian themes repeat in the Egyptian case, although Egypt's dilemma over its Islamicist opposition is not as acute. The Islamicists continue to hound the state, but they cannot bring it down. There is no likelihood that the Egyptian state—now riddled with enough complacency and corruption to try the celebrated patience and good humor of the Egyptians—will go under. This is an old and skeptical country. It knows better than to trust its fate to enforcers of radical religious dogma. These are not deep and secure structures of order that the national middle classes have put in place. But they will not be blown away overnight.

Nor will Turkey lose its way, turn its back on Europe and chase after some imperial temptation in the scorched domains of Central Asia. Huntington sells that country's modernity and secularism short when he writes that the Turks—rejecting Mecca and rejected by Brussels—are likely to head to Tashkent in search of a Pan-Turkic role. There is no journey to that imperial past. Ataturk severed that link with fury, pointed his country westward, embraced the civilization of Europe and did it without qualms or second thoughts. It is on Frankfurt and Bonn—and Washington—not on Baku and Tashkent that the attention of the Turks is fixed. The inheritors of Ataturk's legacy are too shrewd to go chasing after imperial glory, gathering about them the scattered domains of the Turkish peoples. After their European possessions were lost, the Turks clung to Thrace and to all that this link to Europe represents.

Huntington would have nations battle for civilizational ties and fidelities when they would rather scramble for their market shares, learn how to compete in a merciless world economy, provide jobs, move out of poverty. For their part, the "management gurus" and those who believe that the interests have vanquished the passions in today's world tell us that men want Sony, not soil.[2] There is a good deal of truth in what they say, a terrible exhaustion with utopias, a reluctance to set out on expeditions of principle or

[2]Kenichi Ohmae, "Global Consumers Want Sony, Not Soil," *New Perspectives Quarterly,* Fall 1991.

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belief. It is hard to think of Russia, ravaged as it is by inflation, taking up the grand cause of a "second Byzantium," the bearer of the orthodox-Slavic torch.

And where is the Confucian world Huntington speaks of? In the busy and booming lands of the Pacific Rim, so much of politics and ideology has been sublimated into finance that the nations of East Asia have turned into veritable workshops. The civilization of Cathay is dead; the Indonesian archipelago is deaf to the call of the religious radicals in Tehran as it tries to catch up with Malaysia and Singapore. A different wind blows in the lands of the Pacific. In that world economics, not politics, is in command. The world is far less antiseptic than Lee Kuan Yew, the sage of Singapore, would want it to be. A nemesis could lie in wait for all the prosperity that the 1980s brought to the Pacific. But the lands of the Pacific Rim—protected, to be sure, by an American security umbrella—are not ready for a great falling out among the nations. And were troubles to visit that world they would erupt within its boundaries, not across civilizational lines.

The things and ways that the West took to "the rest"—those whole sentences of good English that Marlowe heard a century ago—have become the ways of the world. The secular idea, the state system and the balance of power, pop culture jumping tariff walls and barriers, the state as an instrument of welfare, all these have been internalized in the remotest places. We have stirred up the very storms into which we now ride.

THE WEAKNESS OF TRADITION

Nations "cheat": they juggle identities and interests. Their ways meander. One would think that the traffic of arms from North Korea and China to Libya and Iran and Syria shows this—that states will consort with any civilization, however alien, as long as the price is right and the goods are ready. Huntington turns this routine act of selfishness into a sinister "Confucian-Islamic connection." There are better explanations: the commerce of renegades, plain piracy, an "underground economy" that picks up the slack left by the great arms suppliers (the United States, Russia, Britain and France).

Contrast the way Huntington sees things with Braudel's depiction of the traffic between Christendom and Islam across the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century—and this was in a religious age, after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks and of Granada to the Spanish: "Men passed to and fro, indifferent to frontiers, states and creeds. They were more aware of the necessities for shipping and trade, the hazards of war and piracy, the opportunities for complicity or betrayal provided by circumstances."[3]

Those kinds of "complicities" and ambiguities are missing in Huntington's analysis. Civilizations are crammed into the nooks and crannies—and checkpoints—of the Balkans. Huntington goes where only the brave would venture, into that belt of mixed populations stretching from the Adriatic to the Baltic. Countless nationalisms make their home there, all aggrieved, all possessed of memories of a

[3]Ferdinand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, Vol. II, New York: Harper & Row, 1976, p. 759.

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fabled past and equally ready for the demagogues vowing to straighten a messy map. In the thicket of these pan-movements he finds the line that marked "the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500." The scramble for turf between Croatian nationalism and its Serbian counterpart, their "joint venture" in carving up Bosnia, are made into a fight of the inheritors of Rome, Byzantium and Islam.

But why should we fall for this kind of determinism? "An outsider who travels the highway between Zagreb and Belgrade is struck not by the decisive historical fault line which falls across the lush Slavonian plain but by the opposite. Serbs and Croats speak the same language, give or take a few hundred words, have shared the same village way of life for centuries."[4] The cruel genius of Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, men on horseback familiar in lands and situations of distress, was to make their bids for power into grand civilizational undertakings—the ramparts of the Enlightenment defended against Islam or, in Tudjman's case, against the heirs of the Slavic-Orthodox faith. Differences had to be magnified. Once Tito, an equal opportunity oppressor, had passed from the scene, the balancing act among the nationalities was bound to come apart. Serbia had had a measure of hegemony in the old system. But of the world that loomed over the horizon—privatization and economic reform—the Serbs were less confident. The citizens of Sarajevo and the Croats and the Slovenes had a head start on the rural Serbs. And so the Serbs hacked at the new order of things with desperate abandon.

Some Muslim volunteers came to Bosnia, driven by faith and zeal. Huntington sees in these few stragglers the sweeping power of "civilizational rallying," proof of the hold of what he calls the "kin-country syndrome." This is delusion. No Muslim cavalry was ever going to ride to the rescue. The Iranians may have railed about holy warfare, but the Chetniks went on with their work. The work of order and mercy would have had to be done by the United States if the cruel utopia of the Serbs was to be contested.

It should have taken no powers of prophecy to foretell where the fight in the Balkans would end. The abandonment of Bosnia was of a piece with the ways of the world. No one wanted to die for Srebrenica. The Europeans averted their gaze, as has been their habit. The Americans hesitated for a moment as the urge to stay out of the Balkans did battle with the scenes of horror. Then "prudence" won out. Milosevic and Tudjman may need civilizational legends, but there is no need to invest their projects of conquest with this kind of meaning.

In his urge to find that relentless war across Islam's "bloody borders," Huntington buys Saddam Hussein's interpretation of the Gulf War. It was, for Saddam and Huntington, a civilizational battle. But the Gulf War's verdict was entirely different. For if there was a campaign that laid bare the interests of states, the lengths to which they will go to restore a tolerable balance of power in a place that matters, this was it. A local despot had

[4] Michael Ignatieff, "The Balkan Tragedy," *New York Review of Books*, May 13, 1993.

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risen close to the wealth of the Persian Gulf, and a Great Power from afar had come to the rescue. The posse assembled by the Americans had Saudi, Turkish, Egyptian, Syrian, French, British and other riders.

True enough, when Saddam Hussein's dream of hegemony was shattered, the avowed secularist who had devastated the *ulama*, the men of religion in his country, fell back on Ayatollah Khomeini's language of fire and brimstone and borrowed the symbolism and battle cry of his old Iranian nemesis. But few, if any, were fooled by this sudden conversion to the faith. They knew the predator for what he was: he had a Christian foreign minister (Tariq Aziz); he had warred against the Iranian revolution for nearly a decade and had prided himself on the secularism of his regime. Prudent men of the social and political order, the *ulama* got out of the way and gave their state the room it needed to check the predator at the Saudi/Kuwaiti border.[5] They knew this was one of those moments when purity bows to necessity. Ten days after Saddam swept into Kuwait, Saudi Arabia's most authoritative religious body, the Council of Higher Ulama, issued a *fatwa*, or a ruling opinion, supporting the presence of Arab and Islamic and "other friendly forces." All means of defense, the ulama ruled, were legitimate to guarantee the people "the safety of their religion, their wealth, and their honor and their blood, to protect what they enjoy of safety and stability." At some remove, in Egypt, that country's leading religious figure, the Shaykh of Al Ashar, Shaykh Jadd al Haqq, denounced Saddam as a tyrant and brushed aside his Islamic pretensions as a cover for tyranny.

Nor can the chief Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's rhetoric against the Americans during the Gulf War be taken as evidence of Iran's disposition toward that campaign. Crafty men, Iran's rulers sat out that war. They stood to emerge as the principal beneficiaries of Iraq's defeat. The American-led campaign against Iraq held out the promise of tilting the regional balance in their favor. No tears were shed in Iran for what befell Saddam Hussein's regime.

It is the mixed gift of living in hard places that men and women know how to distinguish between what they hear and what there is: no illusions were thus entertained in vast stretches of the Arab Muslim world about Saddam, or about the campaign to thwart him for that matter. The fight in the gulf was seen for what it was: a bid for primacy met by an imperial expedition that laid it to waste. A circle was closed in the gulf: where once the order in the region "east of Suez" had been the work of the British, it was now provided by Pax Americana. The new power standing sentry in the gulf belonged to the civilization of the West, as did the prior one. But the American presence had the anxious con-

[5]Huntington quotes one Safar al Hawali, a religious radical at Umm al Qura Univeristy in Mecca, to the effect that the campaign against Iraq was another Western campaign against Islam. But this can't do as evidence. Safar al Hawali was a crank. Among the *ulama* class and the religious scholars in Saudi Arabia he was, for all practical purposes, a loner.

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sent of the Arab lands of the Persian Gulf. The stranger coming in to check the kinsmen.

The world of Islam divides and subdivides. The battle lines in the Caucasus, too, are not coextensive with civilizational fault lines. The lines follow the interests of states. Where Huntington sees a civilizational duel between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Iranian state has cast religious zeal and fidelity to the wind. Indeed, in that battle the Iranians have tilted toward Christian Armenia.

THE WRIT OF STATES

We have been delivered into a new world, to be sure. But it is not a world where the writ of civilizations runs. Civilizations and civilizational fidelities remain. There is to them an astonishing measure of permanence. But let us be clear: civilizations do not control states, states control civilizations. States avert their gaze from blood ties when they need to; they see brotherhood and faith and kin when it is in their interest to do so.

We remain in a world of self-help. The solitude of states continues; the disorder in the contemporary world has rendered that solitude more pronounced. No way has yet been found to reconcile France to Pax Americana's hegemony, or to convince it to trust its security or cede its judgment to the preeminent Western power. And no Azeri has come up with a way the lands of Islam could be rallied to the fight over Nagorno Karabakh. The sky has not fallen in Kuala Lumpur or in Tunis over the setbacks of Azerbaijan in its fight with Armenia.

The lesson bequeathed us by Thucydides in his celebrated dialogue between the Melians and the Athenians remains. The Melians, it will be recalled, were a colony of the Lacedaemonians. Besieged by Athens, they held out and were sure that the Lacedaemonians were "bound, if only for very shame, to come to the aid of their kindred." The Melians never wavered in their confidence in their "civilizational" allies: "Our common blood insures our fidelity."[6] We know what became of the Melians. Their allies did not turn up, their island was sacked, their world laid to waste.

[6]Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, New York: The Modern American Library, 1951, pp. 334-335.

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The Dangers of Decadence

What the Rest Can Teach the West

Kishore Mahbubani

In key Western capitals there is a deep sense of unease about the future. The confidence that the West would remain a dominant force in the 21st century, as it has for the past four or five centuries, is giving way to a sense of foreboding that forces like the emergence of fundamentalist Islam, the rise of East Asia and the collapse of Russia and Eastern Europe could pose real threats to the West. A siege mentality is developing. Within these troubled walls, Samuel P. Huntington's essay "The Clash of Civilizations?" is bound to resonate. It will therefore come as a great surprise to many Westerners to learn that the rest of the world fears the West even more than the West fears it, especially the threat posed by a wounded West.

Huntington is right: power is shifting among civilizations. But when the tectonic plates of world history move in a dramatic fashion, as they do now, perceptions of these changes depend on where one stands. The key purpose of this essay is to sensitize Western audiences to the perceptions of the rest of the world.

The retreat of the West is not universally welcomed. There is still no substitute for Western leadership, especially American leadership. Sudden withdrawals of American support from Middle Eastern or Pacific allies, albeit unlikely, could trigger massive changes that no one would relish. Western retreat could be as damaging as Western domination.

By any historical standard, the recent epoch of Western domination, especially under American leadership, has been remarkably benign. One dreads to think what the world would have looked like if either Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia had triumphed in what have been called the "Western civil wars" of the twentieth century. Paradoxically, the benign nature of Western domination may be the source of many problems. Today most Western policymakers, who are children of this era, cannot conceive of the possi-

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bility that their own words and deeds could lead to evil, not good. The Western media aggravate this genuine blindness. Most Western journalists travel overseas with Western assumptions. They cannot understand how the West could be seen as anything but benevolent. CNN is not the solution. The same visual images transmitted simultaneously into living rooms across the globe can trigger opposing perceptions. Western living rooms applaud when cruise missiles strike Baghdad. Most living outside see that the West will deliver swift retribution to nonwhite Iraqis or Somalis but not to white Serbians, a dangerous signal by any standard.

THE ASIAN HORDES

Huntington discusses the challenge posed by Islamic and Confucian civilizations. Since the bombing of the World Trade Center, Americans have begun to absorb European paranoia about Islam, perceived as a force of darkness hovering over a virtuous Christian civilization. It is ironic that the West should increasingly fear Islam when daily the Muslims are reminded of their own weakness. "Islam has bloody borders," Huntington says. But in all conflicts between Muslims and pro-Western forces, the Muslims are losing, and losing badly, whether they be Azeris, Palestinians, Iraqis, Iranians or Bosnian Muslims. With so much disunity, the Islamic world is not about to coalesce into a single force.

Oddly, for all this paranoia, the West seems to be almost deliberately pursuing a course designed to aggravate the Islamic world. The West protests the reversal of democracy in Myanmar, Peru or Nigeria, but not in Algeria. These double standards hurt. Bosnia has wreaked incalculable damage. The dramatic passivity of powerful European nations as genocide is committed on their doorstep has torn away the thin veil of moral authority that the West had spun around itself as a legacy of its recent benign era. Few can believe that the West would have remained equally passive if Muslim artillery shells had been raining down on Christian populations in Sarajevo or Srebrenica.

Western behavior toward China has been equally puzzling. In the 1970s, the West developed a love affair with a China ruled by a regime that had committed gross atrocities during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. But when Mao Zedong's disastrous rule was followed by a far more benign Deng Xiaoping era, the West punished China for what by its historical standards was a minor crackdown: the Tiananmen incident.

Unfortunately, Tiananmen has become a contemporary Western legend, created by live telecasts of the crackdown. Beijing erred badly in its excessive use of firearms but it did not err in its decision to crack down. Failure to quash the student rebellion could have led to political disintegration and chaos, a perennial Chinese nightmare. Western policymakers concede this in private. They are also aware of the dishonesty of some Western journalists: dining with student dissidents and even egging them on before reporting on their purported "hunger strike." No major Western journal has exposed such dishonesty or developed the political courage to say

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that China had virtually no choice in Tiananmen. Instead sanctions were imposed, threatening China's modernization. Asians see that Western public opinion—deified in Western democracy—can produce irrational consequences. They watch with trepidation as Western policies on China lurch to and fro, threatening the otherwise smooth progress of East Asia.

Few in the West are aware that the West is responsible for aggravating turbulence among the more than two billion people living in Islamic and Chinese civilizations. Instead, conjuring up images of the two Asian hordes that Western minds fear most—two forces that invaded Europe, the Muslims and the Mongols—Huntington posits a Confucian-Islamic connection against the West. American arms sales to Saudi Arabia do not suggest a natural Christian-Islamic connection. Neither should Chinese arms sales to Iran. Both are opportunistic moves, based not on natural empathy or civilizational alliances. The real tragedy of suggesting a Confucian-Islamic connection is that it obscures the fundamentally different nature of the challenge posed by these forces. The Islamic world will have great difficulty modernizing. Until then its turbulence will spill over into the West. East Asia, including China, is poised to achieve parity with the West. The simple truth is that East and Southeast Asia feel more comfortable with the West.

This failure to develop a viable strategy to deal with Islam or China reveals a fatal flaw in the West: an inability to come to terms with the shifts in the relative weights of civilizations that Huntington well documents. Two key sentences in Huntington's essay, when put side by side, illustrate the nature of the problem: first, "In the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilization no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonization but join the West as movers and shapers of history," and second, "The West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values." This combination is a prescription for disaster.

Simple arithmetic demonstrates Western folly. The West has 800 million people; the rest make up almost 4.7 billion. In the national arena, no Western society would accept a situation where 15 percent of its population legislated for the remaining 85 percent. But this is what the West is trying to do globally.

Tragically, the West is turning its back on the Third World just when it can finally help the West out of its economic doldrums. The developing world's dollar output increased in 1992 more than that of North America, the European Community and Japan put together. Two-thirds of the increase in U.S. exports has gone to the developing world. Instead of encouraging this global momentum by completing the Uruguay Round, the West is doing the opposite. It is trying to create barriers, not remove them. French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur tried to justify this move by saying bluntly in Washington that the "question now is how to organize to protect ourselves from

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countries whose different values enable them to undercut us."

THE WEST'S OWN UNDOING

Huntington fails to ask one obvious question: If other civilizations have been around for centuries, why are they posing a challenge only now? A sincere attempt to answer this question reveals a fatal flaw that has recently developed in the Western mind: an inability to conceive that the West may have developed structural weaknesses in its core value systems and institutions. This flaw explains, in part, the recent rush to embrace the assumption that history has ended with the triumph of the Western ideal: individual freedom and democracy would always guarantee that Western civilization would stay ahead of the pack.

Only hubris can explain why so many Western societies are trying to defy the economic laws of gravity. Budgetary discipline is disappearing. Expensive social programs and pork-barrel projects multiply with little heed to costs. The West's low savings and investment rates lead to declining competitiveness vis-à-vis East Asia. The work ethic is eroding, while politicians delude workers into believing that they can retain high wages despite becoming internationally uncompetitive. Leadership is lacking. Any politician who states hard truths is immediately voted out. Americans freely admit that many of their economic problems arise from the inherent gridlock of American democracy. While the rest of the world is puzzled by these fiscal follies, American politicians and journalists travel around the world preaching the virtues of democracy. It makes for a curious sight.

The same hero-worship is given to the idea of individual freedom. Much good has come from this idea. Slavery ended. Universal franchise followed. But freedom does not only solve problems; it can also cause them. The United States has undertaken a massive social experiment, tearing down social institution after social institution that restrained the individual. The results have been disastrous. Since 1960 the U.S. population has increased 41 percent while violent crime has risen by 560 percent, single-mother births by 419 percent, divorce rates by 300 percent and the percentage of children living in single-parent homes by 300 percent. This is massive social decay. Many a society shudders at the prospects of this happening on its shores. But instead of traveling overseas with humility, Americans confidently preach the virtues of unfettered individual freedom, blithely ignoring the visible social consequences.

The West is still the repository of the greatest assets and achievements of human civilization. Many Western values explain the spectacular advance of mankind: the belief in scientific inquiry, the search for rational solutions and the willingness to challenge assumptions. But a belief that a society is practicing these values can lead to a unique blindness: the inability to realize that some of the values that come with this package may be harmful. Western values do not form a seamless web. Some are good. Some are bad. But one has to stand outside the West to see this clearly, and to see how the West is bringing about its relative decline by its own hand. Huntington, too, is blind to this.

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The Case for Optimism

The West Should Believe in Itself

Robert L. Bartley

On November 9, 1989, our era ended. The breaching of the Berlin Wall sounded the end of not merely the Cold War, but an epoch of global conflict that started with the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand on June 28, 1914. Now, with the twentieth century truncated, we are straining to discern the shape of the 21st.

We should remember that while there is of course always conflict and strife, not all centuries are as bloody as ours has been. The assassination in Sarajevo shattered an extraordinary period of economic, artistic and moral advance. It was a period when serious thinkers could imagine world economic unity bringing an end to wars. The conventional wisdom, as Keynes would later write, considered peace and prosperity "as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from [this course] as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable."

If with benefit of hindsight this optimism seems wildly naïve, what will future generations make of the crabbed pessimism of today's conventional wisdom? Exhausted and jaded by our labors and trials, we now probe the dawning era for evidence not of relief but of new and even more ghastly horrors ahead. In particular, we have lost confidence in our own ability to shape the new era, and instead keep conjuring up inexorable historical and moral forces. Our public discourse is filled with guilt-ridden talk of global warming, the extinction of various species and Western decline.

Even so hardheaded a thinker as Samuel P. Huntington has concluded, "A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways." The conflicts of the future will be between "the West and the rest," the West and the Muslims, the West and an Islamic-Confucian alliance, or the West and a collection of other civilizations, including Hindu, Japanese, Latin American and Slavic-Orthodox.

This "clash of civilizations" does not sound like a pleasant 21st century. The conflicts will not be over resources, where

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it is always possible to split the difference, but over fundamental and often irreconcilable values. And in this competition the United States and the West will inevitably be on the defensive, since "the values that are most important in the West are the least important worldwide."

Well, perhaps. But is it really clear that the greatest potential for conflict lies between civilizations instead of within them? Despite the economic miracle of China's Guangdong province, are we really confident that the Confucians have mastered the trick of governing a billion people in one political entity? Do the women of Iran really long for the chador, or is it just possible the people of "the rest" will ultimately be attracted to the values of the West?

Undeniably there is an upsurge of interest in cultural, ethnic and religious values, notably but not solely in Islamic fundamentalism. But at the same time there are powerful forces toward world integration. Instant communications now span the globe. We watch in real time the drama of Tiananmen Square and Sarajevo (if not yet Lhasa or Dushanbe). Financial markets on a 24-hour schedule link the world's economies.

Western, which is to say American, popular culture for better or worse spans the globe as well. The new Japanese crown princess was educated at Harvard, and the latest sumo sensation is known as Akebone, but played basketball as Chad Rowen. The world's language is English. Even the standard-bearers of "the rest" were largely educated in the West. Boatloads of immigrants, perhaps the true hallmark of the 21st century, land on the beaches of New York's Long Island.

This environment is not a happy one for governments of traditional nation states. In 1982 François Mitterrand found how markets limit national economic policy. A national currency—which is to say an independent monetary policy—is possible at sustainable cost only for the United States, and even then within limits, as the Carter administration found in 1979. In Western Europe and the Western hemisphere, the demands of national security have ebbed with the Cold War. Transnational companies and regional development leave the nation-state searching for a mission, as Kenichi Ohmae has detailed. Robert Reich asks what makes an "American" corporation. Walter Wriston writes of "The Twilight of Sovereignty."

These difficulties confront all governments, but they are doubly acute for authoritarians, who depend on isolation to dominate their people. Democracy, the quintessentially Western form of government, spread with amazing speed throughout Latin America and the former communist bloc and into Africa and Asia. In 1993 Freedom House reports 75 free nations, up from 55 a decade earlier, with only 31 percent of the world's population, and most of that in China, living under repressive regimes, down from 44 percent ten years ago. The combination of instant information, economic interdependence and the appeal of individual freedom is not a force to be taken lightly. After all, it has just toppled the most powerful totalitarian empire history has known.

It is precisely the onslaught of this world civilization, of course, that provokes such reactions as Islamic fundamentalism.

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The mullahs profess to reject the decadent West, but their underlying quarrel is with modernity. Perhaps they have the "will and resources" to construct an alternative, and perhaps so does the geriatric regime in Beijing. But they face a deep dilemma indeed, for Western civilization and its political appendages of democracy and personal freedom are profoundly linked with the capitalist formula that is *the* formula for economic development.

THE POWER OF PROSPERITY

If you list the Freedom House rankings by per-capita annual income, you find that above figures equivalent to about $5,500, nearly all nations are democratic. The exceptions are the medieval oil sheikhdoms and a few Asian tigers such as Singapore. Even among the latter, development is leading to pressures for more freedom. Under Roh Tae Woo South Korea has deserted to full democracy. Nor should the implosion of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan be comforting to advocates of some "consensual" model of democracy. Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew may be right to consider himself a philosopher king, but since Plato the species has been endangered and unreliable.

Perhaps Western values are an artifact of an exogenous civilization, but there is a powerful argument that they are an artifact of economic development itself. Development creates a middle class that wants a say in its own future, that cares about the progress and freedom of its sons and daughters. Since economic progress depends principally on this same group, with its drive for education and creative abilities, this desire can be suppressed only at the expense of development.

In the early stages of development, as for example in Guangdong, the ruling elites may be able to forge an accommodation with the middle class, particularly if local military authorities are dealt into the action. But if the Chinese accommodation survives, it will be the first one. The attempt to incorporate the six million Hong Kong Chinese, with their increasingly evident expectation of self-rule, will be particularly disruptive. The lesson of other successfully developing nations is that continued progress depends on a gradual accommodation with democracy. And history teaches another profoundly optimistic lesson: as Huntington himself has been known to observe, democracies almost never go to war with each other.

The dominant flow of historical forces in the 21st century could well be this: economic development leads to demands for democracy and individual (or familial) autonomy; instant worldwide communications reduces the power of oppressive governments; the spread of democratic states diminishes the potential for conflict. The optimists of 1910, in other words, may turn out to have been merely premature.

STAYING THE COURSE

This future is of course no sure thing. Perhaps Huntington's forces of disintegration will in the end prevail, but that is no sure thing either. The West, above all the United States, and above even that the elites who read this journal, have the capacity to influence which of these futures is more likely. If the fears prevail, it will be in no small part because they

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lacked the will and wit to bring the hopes to reality.

The American foreign policy elite is in a sense the victim of its own success. Much to its own surprise, it won the Cold War. The classic containment policy outlined in George Kennan's "X" article and Paul Nitze's NSC-68 worked precisely as advertised, albeit after 40 years rather than the 10 to 15 Kennan predicted. But after its success, this compass is no longer relevant; as we enter the 21st century, our policy debate is adrift without a vision.

Some observations above hint at one such vision: if democracies do not fight each other, their spread not only fulfills our ideals but also promotes our security interests. The era of peace before 1914 was forged by the Royal Navy, the pound sterling and free trade. The essence of the task for the new era is to strike a balance between realpolitik and moralism.

Traditional diplomacy centers on relations among sovereign nation states, the internal character of which is irrelevant. In an information age, dominated by people-to-people contacts, policy should and will edge cautiously toward the moralistic, Wilsonian pole. Cautiously because as always this carries a risk of mindlessness. We cannot ignore military power; nothing could do more to give us freedom of action in the 21st century than a ballistic missile defense, whether or not you call it Star Wars. And while we need a human rights policy, applying it merely because we have access and leverage risks undermining, say, Egypt and Turkey, the bulwarks against an Islamic fundamentalism more detrimental to freedom and less susceptible to Western influence.

It will be a difficult balance to strike The case for optimism is admittedly not easy to sustain. Plumbing the temper of our elites and the state of debate, it is easier to give credence to Huntington's fears. But then, during the Hungarian revolution or Vietnam or the Pershing missile crisis, who would have thought that the West would stay the course it set out in NSC-68? It did, and to do so again it needs only to believe in itself.

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Civilization Grafting

No Culture is an Island

Liu Binyan

The end of the Cold War has indeed brought about a new phase in world politics, yet its impact is not unidirectional. The tense confrontation between the two armed camps has disappeared and in this sense ideological conflict seems to have come to an end, for the moment. But conflicts of economic and political interests are becoming more and more common among the major nations of the world, and more and more tense. Neither civilization nor culture has become the "fundamental source of conflict in this new world."

The new world is beginning to resemble the one in which I grew up in the 1930s. Of course, tremendous changes have taken place; nonetheless there are increasing similarities. Western capitalism has changed greatly, but the current global recession is in many ways similar to the Great Depression. The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany may no longer exist, but the economic, social and political factors that led to their emergence still do—economic dislocation, xenophobia and populism.

The Cold War has ended, but hot wars rage in more than thirty countries and regions. The wave of immigrants from poor territories to rich countries and the influx of people from rural areas to cities have reached an unprecedented scale, forming what the U.N. Population Fund has called the "current crisis of mankind." We can hardly say these phenomena result from conflict between different civilizations.

CHINA'S ERRANT EXPERIMENT

For most countries the task is not to demarcate civilizations but to mix and meld them. In the former colonial countries, the problems of poverty and starvation have never been solved by their own civilizations or by the interaction of their indigenous civilization with Western civilization. But this search for a successful formula for economic well-being and political freedom continues.

Look at China. The Chinese people eagerly embraced Communism in the

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pursuit of economic development and political dignity. The bankruptcy of Maoism and socialism occurred a dozen years before the collapse of the former Soviet Union. It was not the result of the end of the Cold War, but the disaster brought about by Maoist ideology. The reason for this shift again comes from the strong desire of the people to get rid of poverty and to gain freedom. For China this is the third time people have tried to graft Western civilization onto traditional civilization—in the first half of the twentieth century and in the 1980s, with capitalism; from the late 1940s to the 1970s, with Marxism-Leninism.

Now, though Confucianism is gradually coming back to China, it cannot be compared to the increasingly forceful influence of Western culture on the Chinese people in the last twenty years. The Chinese people are a practical sort; they have always been concerned about their material well-being. In addition, the last forty years have left them wary of intangible philosophies, gods and ideals. Nowhere in China is there a group or political faction that could be likened to the extreme nationalists of Russia or Europe.

Nor can we expect any civilizational unity that will bring the Confucian world together. In the past forty years, the split of mainland China with Taiwan was of course due to political and ideological differences. After the end of the Cold War the Confucianist culture common to the Chinese from both sides of the Taiwan Strait will not overcome the differences in political systems, ideology and economic development.

Deng Xiaoping's experiment is to try to weld Western capitalism with Marxism-Leninism and even aspects of Confucianism. Thus while liberalizing the economy, the Chinese communist regime also points to the consumerism and hedonism of Western civilization in an effort to resist the influences of democracy and freedom. At the same time, it borrows from Confucianist thought—obedience to superiors, etc.—which is useful in stabilizing communist rule. It also attempts to use Chinese nationalist sentiments in place of a bankrupt ideology, seeking to postpone its inevitable collapse.

There are many historical and current examples of rulers who have a greater interest in maintaining or developing some kind of traditional order rather than in accommodating the struggles and changing interests of ordinary people. In the mid-1930s, Chang Kai-shek launched a national campaign advocating Confucianism—called "The Movement of New Life"—when China's population was victimized by famine, civil war and Japanese aggression. The movement aimed to distract people from their real interests and ended in complete failure. Since the 1980s China's new rulers began a campaign similar to the KMT's—"The Movement for Higher Spiritual Civilization"—which advocated love for the country and the party, and behaving civilly toward others. But the actual aim of the campaign was to replace the bankrupt ideology and to distract the public from its interest in democracy and freedom, and to blunt the cultural and moral impact of the West. Understandably, it failed. Even the terminology of a "spiritual civilization" became the target of

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irony and ridicule among the Chinese.

What will emerge in China is a mixture of these many forces, but it will not be the kind of mixture that this regime wants. It will not mix economic freedom with political unfreedom. Communism and capitalism are so completely different that no one will be fooled for long that they can be joined. In the end there will be a Chinese path, but it will be a different path to freedom, a different path to democracy. The Chinese people do not speak in Western phrases and political philosophies, but they know what kind of political and economic system best serves their own welfare.

TAKING THE BEST FROM EACH

It is ironic that Samuel P. Huntington sees a resurgent Confucianism at the very time when spiritual deterioration and moral degradation are eroding China's cultural foundation. Forty-seven years of communist rule have destroyed religion, education, the rule of law, and morality. Today this dehumanization caused by the despotism, absolute poverty and ascetism of the Mao era is evidenced in the rampant lust for power, money and carnal pleasures among many Chinese.

Coping with this moral and spiritual vacuum is a problem not just for China but for all civilizations. Will the 21st century be an era when, through interaction and consensus, civilizations can merge, thus helping peoples to break old cycles of dehumanization? Getting rid of poverty and slavery is the least of China's problems. The more difficult task is the process of men's self-salvation, that is, transforming underlings and cowed peoples into human beings. Enriching the human spirit is indeed the longer and harder task. It will require using the best of all civilizations, not emphasizing the differences between them.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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The Modernizing Imperative

Tradition and Change

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick and others

I approach the work of Samuel P. Huntington with keen interest and high expectations. Like most political scientists, I have learned much from his writings. Now in his article "The Clash of Civilizations?" he once again raises new questions.

In his essay, Huntington asserts that civilizations are real and important and predicts that "conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict." He further argues that institutions for cooperation will be more likely to develop within civilizations, and conflicts will most often arise between groups in different civilizations. These strike me as interesting but dubious propositions.

Huntington's classification of contemporary civilizations is questionable. He identifies "seven or eight major civilizations" in the contemporary world: Western (which includes both European and North American variants), Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American "and possibly African."

This is a strange list.

If civilization is defined by common objective elements such as language, history, religion, customs and institutions and, subjectively, by identification, and if it is the broadest collectivity with which persons intensely identify, why distinguish "Latin American" from "Western" civilization? Like North America, Latin America is a continent settled by Europeans who brought with them European languages and a European version of Judeo-Christian religion, law, literature and gender roles. The Indian component in Latin American culture is more important in some countries (Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador and Peru) than in North America. But the African influence is more important in the United States than in all but a few Latin American countries (Brazil, Belize and Cuba). Both North and South America are "Western" European with an admixture of other elements.

And what is Russia if not "Western"? The East/West designations of the Cold

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War made sense in a European context, but in a global context Slavic/Orthodox people are Europeans who share in Western culture. Orthodox theology and liturgy, Leninism and Tolstoy are expressions of Western culture.

It is also not clear that over the centuries differences between civilizations have led to the longest and most violent conflicts. At least in the twentieth century, the most violent conflicts have occurred within civilizations: Stalin's purges, Pol Pot's genocide, the Nazi holocaust and World War II. It could be argued that the war between the United States and Japan involved a clash of civilizations, but those differences had little role in that war. The Allied and Axis sides included both Asian and European members.

The liberation of Kuwait was no more a clash between civilizations than World War II or the Korean or Vietnamese wars. Like Korea and Vietnam, the Persian Gulf War pitted one non-Western Muslim government against another. Once aggression had occurred, the United States and other Western governments became involved for geopolitical reasons that transcended cultural differences. Saddam Hussein would like the world to believe otherwise.

After the United States mobilized an international coalition against Iraq, Saddam Hussein, until then the leader of a revolutionary secular regime, took to public prayers and appeals for solidarity to the Muslim world. Certain militant, anti-Western Islamic fundamentalists, Huntington reminds us, responded with assertions that it was a war of "the West against Islam." But few believed it. More governments of predominantly Muslim societies rallied to support Kuwait than to "save" Iraq.

In Bosnia, the efforts of Radovan Karadzic and other Serbian extremists to paint themselves as bulwarks against Islam are no more persuasive, although the passivity of the European Community, the United States, NATO and the United Nations in the face of Serbia's brutal aggression against Bosnia has finally stimulated some tangible Islamic solidarity. But most governments of predominantly Muslim states have been reluctant to treat the Bosnian conflict as a religious war. The Bosnian government itself has resisted any temptation to present its problem as Islam versus the Judeo-Christian world. The fact that Serbian forces began their offensive against Croatia and Slovenia should settle the question of Serbian motives and goals, which are territorial aggrandizement, not holy war.

Indubitably, important social, cultural and political differences exist between Muslim and Judeo-Christian civilizations. But the most important and explosive differences involving Muslims are found within the Muslim world—between persons, parties and governments who are reasonably moderate, nonexpansionist and nonviolent and those who are anti-modern and anti-Western, extremely intolerant, expansionist and violent. The first target of Islamic fundamentalists is not another civilization, but their own governments. "Please do not call them Muslim fundamentalists," a deeply religious Muslim friend said to me. "They do not represent a more fundamental version of the Muslim religion. They are simply Muslims who are also violent political extremists."

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Elsewhere as well, the conflict between fanaticism and constitutionalism, between totalitarian ambition and the rule of law, exists within civilizations in a clearer, purer form than between them. In Asia the most intense conflict may turn out to be between different versions of being Chinese or Indian.

Without a doubt, civilizations are important. By eroding the strength of local and national cultures and identifications, modernization enhances the importance of larger units of identification such as civilizations. Huntington is also surely right that global communication and stepped-up migration exacerbate conflict by bringing diametrically opposed values and life-styles into direct contact with one another. Immigration brings exotic practices into schools, neighborhoods and other institutions of daily life and challenges the cosmopolitanism of Western societies. Religious tolerance in the abstract is one thing; veiled girls in French schoolrooms are quite another. Such challenges are not welcome anywhere.

But Huntington, who has contributed so much to our understanding of modernization and political change, also knows the ways that modernization changes people, societies and politics. He knows the many ways that modernization equals Westernization—broadly conceived—and that it can produce backlash and bitter hostility. But he also knows how powerful is the momentum of modern, Western ways of science, technology, democracy and free markets. He knows that the great question for non-Western societies is whether they can be modern without being Western. He believes Japan has succeeded. Maybe.

He is probably right that most societies will simultaneously seek the benefits of modernization and of traditional relations. To the extent that they and we are successful in preserving our traditions while accepting the endless changes of modernization, our differences from one another will be preserved, and the need for not just a pluralistic society but a pluralistic world will grow ever more acute.

Do Civilizations Hold?

ALBERT L. WEEKS

Samuel P. Huntington has resurrected an old controversy in the study of international affairs: the relationship between "microcosmic" and "macrocosmic" processes. Partisans of the former single out the nation state as the basic unit, or determining factor, in the yin and yang of world politics. The "macros," on the other hand, view world affairs on the lofty level of the civilizations to which nation states belong and by which their behavior is allegedly largely determined.

To one degree or another, much of the latter school's thinking, although they may be loath to admit it, derives from Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee, Quincy Wright, F. N. Parkinson and others. In contrast, scholars such as Hans J. Morgenthau, John H. Herz and Raymond Aron have tended to hew to the "micro" school.

Both schools began debating the issue vigorously back in the 1950s. That Huntington is resurrecting the controversy 40 years later is symptomatic of the failure of globalism—specifically the idea of establishing a "new world order"—to take root

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and of the failure to make sense of contradictory trends and events. His aim is to find new, easily classified determinants of contemporary quasi-chaotic international behavior and thus to get a handle on the international kaleidoscope.

His methodology is not new. In arguing the macro case in the 1940s, Toynbee distinguished what he called primary, secondary and tertiary civilizations by the time of their appearance in history, contending that their attributes continued to influence contemporary events. Wright, likewise applying a historical method, classified civilizations as "bellicose" (including Syrian, Japanese and Mexican), "moderately bellicose" (Germanic, Western, Russian, Scandinavian, etc.) and "most peaceful" (such as Irish, Indian and Chinese). Like Toynbee and now Huntington, he attributed contemporary significance to these factors. Huntington's classification, while different in several respects from those of his illustrious predecessors, also identifies determinants on a grand scale by "civilizations."

His endeavor, however, has its own fault lines. The lines are the borders encompassing each distinct nation state and mercilessly chopping the alleged civilizations into pieces. With the cultural and religious glue of these "civilizations" thin and cracked, with the nation state's political regime providing the principal bonds, crisscross fracturing and cancellation of Huntington's own macro-scale, somewhat anachronistic fault lines are inevitable.

The world remains fractured along political and possibly geopolitical lines; cultural and historical determinants are a great deal less vital and virulent. Politics, regimes and ideologies are culturally, historically and "civilizationally" determined to an extent. But it is willful, day-to-day, crisis-to-crisis, war-to-war political decision-making by nation-state units that remains the single most identifiable determinant of events in the international arena. How else can we explain repeated nation-state "defections" from their collective "civilizations"? As Huntington himself points out, in the Persian Gulf War "one Arab state invaded another and then fought a coalition of Arab, Western and other states."

Raymond Aron described at length the primacy of a nation state's political integrity and independence, its inviolable territoriality and sovereign impermeability. He observed that "men have believed that the fate of cultures was at stake on the battlefields at the same time as the fate of provinces." But, he added, the fact remains that sovereign states "are engaged in a competition for power [and] conquests .... In our times the major phenomenon [on the international scene] is the heterogeneity of state units [not] supranational aggregations."

ALBERT L. WEEKS is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at New York University.

The West Is Best

GERARD PIEL

We must be in terror of the civilizations conjured by Samuel P. Huntington for the same reason that Nils Bohr admonished us to fear ghosts: We see them, and we know they are not there!

We have another reason to be in terror of them. Without boundaries, interiors or exteriors, continuity or coherent

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entity, any of the Huntington civilizations can be summoned in a moment to ratify whatever action the West and its remaining superpower deem rightful. Now they fit the Eric Ericsson definition of the pseudo-species, outside the law.

In the end, "the West and the Rest" offers a more useful analysis. We can recognize these ghostly civilizations as the developing countries and the countries in transition.

They all aspire to the Western model. They are still engaged in conquest of the material world. As they proceed with their industrialization, they progressively embrace the "Western ideas," in Huntington's litany, "of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets...."

At the primary level it is a function of lengthening life expectancy; people in those countries are beginning to live long enough to discover they have rights and to assert them. Mass education, which comes with Westernizing industrialization, makes its contribution as well. Tiananmen Square in Beijing and the massing of the people at the parliament building in Moscow stand as rites in a passage.

How long the process will take depends on how the West responds to the needs and the disorder that beset the emerging and developing nations—in fear or in rational quest of the common future. The question is: Do Western ideas have more substance than those pseudo-civilizations?

GERARD PIEL is Chairman Emeritus of Scientific American, Inc.

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





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

"NATO must go out of area or it will go out of business."

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Building a New NATO

Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee

A NEW TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN

THREE YEARS AFTER the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is headed toward crisis. Memories of democracy's triumph have faded. The immense problems facing the new democracies in the East are increasingly compounded by political gridlock, economic recession and resurgent nationalism. The revolutions of 1989 not only toppled communism; they unleashed a set of dynamics that have unraveled the peace orders of Yalta and Versailles. War in the Balkans, instability in East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, growing doubts about the European Community's future as well as the future role of the United States—all underscore the lack of any stable post-Cold War European security order.

Nationalism and ethnic conflict have already led to two world wars in Europe. Whether Europe unravels for a third time this century depends on if the West summons the political will and strategic vision to address the causes of potential instability and conflict before it is too late. A new U.S.-European strategic bargain is needed, one that extends NATO's collective defense and security arrangements to those areas where the seeds for future conflict in Europe lie: the Atlantic alliance's eastern and southern borders.

RONALD D. ASMUS, RICHARD L. KUGLER AND F. STEPHEN LARRABEE are senior analysts at RAND. The views and conclusions expressed are their own and should not be interpreted as representing the views of RAND or any other agency sponsoring its research.

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EUROPE'S CHANGED STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE

THE END OF THE Cold War has wiped away the strategic distinction between Europe's center and periphery. Whereas the potential locus of conflict in Europe during the Cold War was located along the old inner-German border, Europe's new strategic challenges exist almost exclusively along two "arcs of crisis." The first is the eastern arc: the zone of instability running between Germany and Russia from northern Europe down through Turkey, the Caucasus and middle Asia. The second is the southern arc, running through northern Africa and the Mediterranean into the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

In the eastern arc especially, the Soviet collapse has left behind significant and unbalanced military forces and weapons inventories among nations experiencing a wave of instability and conflict generated by virulent nationalism. East-Central Europe is littered with potential mini-Weimar Republics, each capable of inflicting immense violence on the others. Paradoxically, while heavily armed, these countries nonetheless lack the ability to defend themselves against major outside aggressors. This is the case despite strong residual fears about the threat of a possibly resurgent Russia—a nation that has itself demonstrated real signs of instability, the potential for a shift to the right and flirtations with imperial restoration.

These factors combine to fuel an almost desperate search for security in the region, which itself reinforces the trends toward geopolitical competition, proliferation and instability, as the expectation builds that states may soon pursue unilateral attempts to gain real or perceived security. Ideological mobilization alongside a security vacuum is once again proving to be Europe's classic recipe for instability and conflict.

While these circumstances are seemingly located safely on Europe's periphery, for a number of reasons conflicts along either arc are in fact central to European security. First, conflicts in the arcs are increasingly generated by antidemocratic and anti-Western ideologies that threaten the liberal-democratic foundations of Western Europe and the nascent democracies of the former Soviet bloc. Second, conflict and insecurity in the twin arcs are unlikely to be neatly isolated or contained. Spillover, in the form of political and economic instability and refugees, is a real danger. Third, while local conflicts

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may escalate into regional wars, instability in such geopolitically sensitive areas also threatens to draw in one or several major powers who see their own interests threatened. Finally, and perhaps most important, instability along the arcs threatens to reactivate old fault lines and dormant historical rivalries—geopolitical competition between Germany and Russia along the eastern arc, or a conflict between the West and Islam in the south.

Western policymakers have been slow to recognize these new dangers and the security needs of these states. Many still cling to Cold War distinctions between Western Europe, which is implicitly defined as a vital interest, and Eastern Europe, which is seen as a secondary or peripheral concern. The West must not delude itself that the problems of violent national conflict are exclusive to the Balkans. More than anything, events in the former Yugoslavia underscore how war is far more likely in the absence of a functioning security structure. East-Central Europe's lack of a stable security arrangement has already helped to undercut progress toward democracy and economic reform. Now, the spread of instability or violent conflict threatens to destroy even that progress achieved thus far.

Instability in the East threatens to revive old rivalries between Germany and Russia.

East-Central Europe's democrats well understand that democracy will succeed only if their states belong to a secure European and Western political, economic and military community. The West, too, previously understood this link—as demonstrated with the case of West Germany. That nation might never have become a stable Western democracy had it not been accepted into NATO's fold. Similarly, NATO membership helped stabilize democracy and stem authoritarian backsliding in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey. Those who insist that democratic credentials must be presented prior to alliance membership should remember that the need for a stable security framework is greatest when democracy is most fragile and threatened.

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A GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE WEST

THE WEST NEEDS a grand strategy to reorganize itself to deal with the issues of conflict and instability and to project collective defense, democracy and security into the twin arcs of crisis. Such a strategy must be, first and foremost, political and economic. But the West must also establish a stable security framework for these regions.

The obvious tool for this new strategy is NATO. The Persian Gulf War and the ongoing Yugoslav crisis have shown the European Community incapable of taking on such a task. Achieving consensus among the 12 EC members, especially when military action is required, is nearly impossible. Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eysken's remark during the gulf crisis—that the EC was an economic giant, political dwarf and military worm—sadly remains true.

What is true of the EC is doubly true of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The very number and diversity of its members make it impossible for this 53-nation organization spanning the globe from Vancouver to Vladivostok to speak with one voice. Only NATO—an alliance with a tested leadership structure, functioning logistics and an effective arsenal—is capable of addressing the security challenges of post-Cold War Europe.

While almost everyone from the Atlantic to the Urals shudders at the prospect of NATO crumbling and the United States withdrawing from Europe, the simple fact is that if NATO does not address the primary security challenges facing Europe today, it will become increasingly irrelevant. NATO must go out of area or it will go out of business.

The kind of NATO that could respond to Europe's new strategic challenges would bear little resemblance to the NATO of the Cold War. It would be based on a new political bargain between the United States and Europe, a different set of political and military understandings, as well as a new relationship with the East. This bargain would simultaneously expand the alliance's strategic horizon geographically and find new ways to share responsibilities and burdens. NATO's rationale and mission would be defined anew.

The act of reconfiguring NATO to handle such dangers admittedly carries both risks and costs. But NATO has already taken some steps in this direction. The London and Rome summits began redefining the

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alliance's political and military strategy. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council was created to extend cooperation to the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. But the NACC does not go far enough. It is essentially a holding operation that provides only meager psychological reassurance. The NACC's unwieldy membership, which includes all the successor states of the former U.S.S.R., including the Central Asian republics, prevents it from providing meaningful security in Europe. The only constraints on further transforming NATO are the political will and strategic vision of its members.

REORGANIZING THE WEST

POLITICALLY, SIX STEPS are necessary to forge a new transatlantic bargain. The first and in many ways most important step is to transform NATO from an alliance based on collective defense against a specific threat into an alliance committed to projecting democracy, stability and crisis management in a broader strategic sense.

A new transatlantic bargain must be based on the new political imperatives on both sides of the Atlantic. While there remains a general consensus in the United States that Washington should remain engaged in Europe, this no longer automatically translates into support for the old transatlantic bargain. Changing American priorities mean that the United States now needs to share the burdens and responsibilities with its allies. European political imperatives have also changed in ways that mirror the United States. An overwhelming desire to see the Americans remain engaged in Europe notwithstanding, Europeans want a more balanced and equal relationship with Washington.

The second step in forging a new transatlantic bargain, therefore, must be a new understanding between the United States and its European allies that harmonizes the interests of both sides. Europeanization of the alliance is as much in the interests of the United States as it is of Europeans. The United States will be less able to play the lead or major role in providing security in Europe unless it is part of a more equal partnership. While Washington recognizes its interests along both arcs and the unique role it can play, future U.S. involvement will be conditioned on Europe's willingness to bear its own share. Alter-

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nately, then, Washington must be willing to accept a stronger European identity, including in security affairs.

The inability to harmonize the transatlantic partnership with European integration has caused particular tension with France. To ease these strains, Washington must relinquish its residual ambivalence toward European integration. France will agree to participate in a new NATO only if Washington more actively supports European integration. Such a course, moreover, remains the best guarantee for securing democracy in Europe and guarding against the revival of destructive nationalism. Washington's concern that French influence in Europe will challenge American interests is both misguided and misplaced—misplaced because it is unlikely and misguided because the real danger is not that Europe will become too strong but too weak. The strategic logic of post-Cold War Europe should drive Washington and Paris closer together.

For its part, France must abandon its exaggerated fear of American hegemony. The real issue regarding the future American role in Europe is not whether Washington will be hegemonic, but whether the transatlantic relationship can be turned into the kind of partnership that fully engages the United States. Without French backing to transform NATO, the alliance will crumble. France would then find itself forced to go it alone in a Europe characterized by increasing instability along both its eastern and southern flanks, with an independent Germany and an aloof America. Paris would have helped deny itself what it is in fact most interested in obtaining: American support for a unified Europe.

Recognition of these factors has led to a shift in French thinking. In past months Paris has signaled its interest in a new transatlantic bargain. While insisting that Paris will not return to the "old" NATO, French officials recognize that NATO will have to change its mission and have announced their willingness both to define and fully participate in the process of transforming the alliance.

Franco-American rapprochement can set the stage for the third step in transforming NATO—Germany's strategic emancipation. Germany must finally resolve the confused debate over its future role in Europe and beyond. To be sure, residual fears concerning German power still exist. But only a strong Germany can facilitate European

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integration and NATO's strategic transformation.

Germany is the country most vulnerable to instability, but one whose democratic and geopolitical orientation are crucial for the continent. While Germany remains preoccupied with the staggering challenge of the political and economic reconstruction of its eastern half, the need to stabilize its eastern flank is Bonn's number one security concern. This preoccupation has little to do with some mythical *Drang nach Osten* but instead results from a *Zwang nach Osten*—the imperative to become more involved in the East in order to project Germany's own democracy and stability. It thus has been at the forefront of efforts to extend the EC eastward and, more recently, has opened the debate over a new role for NATO.

More than any other country, Germany has an interest in seeing NATO extend collective security.

Germany's constitution does not expressly forbid German troops from being deployed abroad in active combat roles. What prevents them is what former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has aptly called "state practice"—a constitutional interpretation that German politicians have chosen, often for tactical reasons. The underlying issue, then, is not constitutional but political: What must Germany do to contribute to peace and stability in a new European security order? The best solution to that dilemma is for Germany to play an active role in a revitalized Atlantic alliance.

This requires German leaders, especially among the current Social Democratic opposition, to take a responsible approach to the issue of German participation in out-of-area operations. While German politicians overwhelmingly proclaim themselves to be pro-NATO, their unwillingness to resolve this issue blocks alliance reform. Unless Germany resolves this debate, it will be all but impossible to proceed with a new transatlantic bargain. And without a strong Germany that fully participates in new security roles, including combat missions, the likelihood of an American withdrawal from Europe increases. More than any other country, Germany has an interest in seeing NATO move toward extended collective security.

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DEALING WITH THE EAST

REORGANIZING THE West will set the stage for the fourth step in this process—a coherent and coordinated Western strategy for the integration of Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and possibly Slovakia) into both the EC and NATO. Opening the EC to the East is the best guarantee against a revival of anti-Western nationalism and of stabilizing the process of political and economic reform.

EC expansion will in turn increase pressures for NATO membership. As these countries enter the EC, they will have the option of joining the Western European Union. Thus, they will acquire security guarantees from Europe's key powers and Washington's major NATO allies. A situation in which a country like Germany would extend a security commitment to Poland through the WEU, but not through NATO, could destroy the Atlantic alliance. For Washington it would create a situation like that which existed among the European powers prior to World War I—where the entangling commitments of a country enjoying an American security guarantee could draw the United States into a conflict over which it had little if any control. It is clearly better to have these security guarantees spelled out within a new NATO, where they will be credible and where the United States can influence them.

Including the Visegrad countries in NATO is also in the American interest. The political leaders of these countries are pro-American. Their views on security issues closely coincide with those of the United States and other Atlanticist members such as Britain, Portugal and the Netherlands. Their inclusion in NATO would strengthen the Atlanticist orientation of the alliance and provide greater internal support for U.S. views on key security issues.

NATO membership, like EC membership, can come in phases and should be made conditional. The criteria for membership need to be spelled out clearly in advance and should include commitment to democratic rule, civil-military reform, renunciation of all territorial claims, respect for the rights of minorities, and willingness to participate in the full range of future NATO activities from peacekeeping to collective defense. By conditioning membership on these criteria, NATO can help solidify a zone of stability in Central Europe without

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undue risk of embroiling NATO's existing members in new ethnic or intra-regional conflicts.

There is no reason why membership must be simultaneous for all these countries. Some countries, such as Poland, may be ready for NATO membership sooner than others. In the case of the EC, on the other hand, countries like the Czech Republic may be ready for accession sooner than Poland. The alliance should do what makes political and strategic sense based on its own security needs and those of the East European countries.

In the meantime, NATO should create the preconditions for the eventual integration of these countries into the alliance by expanding defense cooperation. Such cooperation would not imply a full-fledged defense commitment. Conceivably, "association agreements" could spell out the criteria for membership, but not provide explicit security guarantees. Such an arrangement would give the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the clear perspective they are looking for. At the same time, it would provide them time to adapt their military and defense establishments to meet NATO standards.

Fear of strategic entanglement, that NATO will be drawn into local conflicts in the region, has heretofore kept the alliance from embracing these countries. The alliance, however, has dealt with this issue involving other countries during different periods. The most familiar case is the Greek-Turkish conflict. It is far better to deal with such issues in the context of a collective defense framework than to run the risk that such conflicts will erupt and spill over into the alliance.

RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

THE FIFTH STEP in the new transatlantic bargain concerns Russia. If providing security is important for stabilizing East European democracy, then the same must hold true for Russia's more fragile democratic experiment. Helping to democratize Russia should be one of the West's top strategic priorities. If democratic change succeeds in Russia, then there is no legitimate reason to exclude it from the Western community. A strong security partnership with a democratic Russia would be one of the strongest guarantees of peace and stability in Europe.

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Russia nevertheless remains a special case due to its size, geostrategic position and long imperial tradition. Many Europeans believe that Russia is not a European country, is unlikely to become one and should not be allowed into core European institutions. Indeed, at the moment not a single Atlantic alliance member is in favor of allowing Russia into either the EC or NATO, although most avoid saying so openly.

The West has been reluctant to move toward the East more quickly for fear of offending Russia's strategic sensibilities. But it is hard to understand how supporting democracy and stability in Eastern Europe can undercut democracy in Russia. It is not in the interests of Russia, above all Russian democrats, to have a zone of instability, renewed nationalism and potential conflict on its western flank.

NATO needs to remain sensitive to Russia's security interests and the delicate balance of power in Moscow. As it transforms and expands relations with Central and Eastern Europe, the West should not give Russia the feeling that a new iron curtain is being erected along its western border. As NATO strengthens its links to Central and Eastern Europe, it should expand and deepen its security dialogue with Russia, above all with the Russian military, which still tends to see NATO as an anti-Russian alliance. Specifically, the West needs to lay down the basic principles around which to structure a new special relationship between NATO and the EC on the one hand, and Russia on the other. Such a charter would be designed to reassure Russia that it will be included in efforts to build a new European security order.

Extending the alliance eastward should be seen as the West taking a step toward Russia, rather than against it. As a partner of the West, Russia could play a crucial role as a pillar of security and stability in Europe and Asia. Whether NATO's eastward extension becomes a new offer for partnership or a move toward an anti-Russian alliance rests almost entirely on the outcome of Russia's own internal transformation. This process, over which the West has little control, is likely to take years. In the meantime, the West should not give Moscow a *droit de regard* over its own policies. The West must continue to define its own interests along the eastern arc of crisis and then work with Russia to implement them. To hold the future of NATO hostage to the outcome of Russian politics is a recipe for the demise of the alliance.

The sixth step in the new transatlantic bargain requires the West

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to develop a constructive Ukrainian policy. An independent Ukraine is one of the most important features of Europe's new strategic landscape; it acts as an important strategic buffer between Europe and Russia. In light of the uncertainties surrounding Russian democracy, it represents the best guarantee against Russian imperial restoration from the point of view of Eastern Europe, especially of Poland. The reincorporation of Ukraine into a Russian-led confederation would transform the geostrategic equation in Europe as a whole.

To hold NATO's future hostage to the outcome of Russian politics is a recipe for the demise of the alliance.

The West has thus far viewed Ukraine largely as a proliferation problem rather than a state with legitimate security concerns. Washington's preoccupation with the nuclear issue has been counterproductive and has obscured the larger issues at stake. Instead of making the Ukrainians more willing to give up nuclear weapons, it has strengthened pronuclear sentiment in Ukraine.

A broader policy is needed. The West should strongly resist any Russian effort to reincorporate Ukraine. If it does not, Ukraine will be driven in a more nationalist direction and toward the retention of nuclear weapons. The West should also encourage Ukraine's Europeanization, its development of closer ties to Central Europe and its integration into pan-European and regional groupings, thereby reducing prospects for the emergence of a highly nationalistic, xenophobic regime that could threaten its neighbors, especially Poland.

REORGANIZING NATO'S MILITARY

FINALLY, EXTENDED collective defense and security means that the alliance must be reorganized militarily. NATO's basic problem is the mismatch between its old mission and Europe's new strategic challenges. It is no longer possible for NATO to concentrate on the strategic luxury of territorial defense. The dividing line between "in area" and "out of area" crises, so clearly drawn during the Cold War, has become ambiguous and artificial. Redefining alliance commitments in both areas, and finding the proper balance between the two, is the fundamental issue facing the alliance. Any new balance, however, must greatly improve

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NATO's capability to conduct military operations beyond its borders, and eventually allow it to expand its full security guarantees.

The majority of future crises will likely fall into what was formerly considered "out of area." While alliance members were required to consult with each other when their security was threatened beyond NATO's boundaries, the alliance, or a group of alliance members, was not prohibited from acting together in other areas. But what was once an ad hoc and almost tangential alliance activity will now move to center stage. NATO members, therefore, must be able to assemble a coalition quickly, fashion policy and strategy, create a command staff, deploy forces and build a support infrastructure. The alliance will need to develop better institutions that will make it less dependent on improvisation in the midst of crises.

Two institutional reforms should be pursued. NATO should create a new Committee for Preventive Diplomacy and Crisis Management for developing policy concerning the twin arcs. It should also create a new Force Projection Command responsible for developing the military plans and forces needed to conduct operations beyond NATO's traditional borders. The goal of such reforms is to improve the alliance's capabilities for crisis management, whether operating under an integrated command or in less formal ways.

Above all, NATO will need to equip itself to deal with the full spectrum of possible conflicts in Europe, ranging from small to large and from peacekeeping to combat operations. Today NATO is capable of peacekeeping and modest combat operations. But it could be hard pressed to react to a major crisis, doubly so if more than one crisis were to erupt simultaneously. NATO should focus on improving forces that already exist rather than on creating new forces. NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps could be reorganized to strengthen its deployability. Further development of the Eurocorps also makes sense. These measures could triple the alliance's capacity to project power beyond its borders.

THE NEED FOR WILL AND VISION

A NEW transatlantic bargain is essential lest Europe fall back into its old rivalries and patterns of conflict. The alliance's future will be decided on Bill Clinton's watch as America's first post-Cold War

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president. During his presidential campaign, Clinton cast himself in the tradition of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman—domestic reformers and activist international leaders. They were also presidents who redefined America's relationships with Europe at crucial junctures in world history—F.D.R. by bringing the United States into World War II, and Truman by taking the lead in forging the postwar strategic bargain.

Forging a new partnership between the United States and Europe for the post-Cold War era is as important and difficult as those earlier challenges. American leadership must secure the gains of the Cold War and build a new U.S.-European partnership that can project democracy and stability. What is required is political will and strategic vision. By showing both, President Clinton can lay the foundation for a new partnership between the United States and Europe for the post-Cold War era.

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The Collapse of 'The West'

Owen Harries

OLD THINKING IN A NEW WORLD

UNDERLYING THE RECENT debates over Bosnia, the Balkans and Eastern Europe more generally, there is a much broader and unanswered question about the condition and future of the West. The proponents of intervention in the Balkans believe that, simply put, the West should go East. William Pfaff was surely speaking for many when he argued eloquently in these pages that the West should act through NATO—"the true Great Power in Europe today"—to guarantee existing frontiers in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, "so as to deprive transnational ethnic rivalry of its political and military explosiveness." The NATO guarantee to these new states should be backed up by force if necessary. Only such a policy, it is claimed, can both recover for the West the moral and political ground it has lost through its mishandling of the Yugoslav crisis and lay a base of stability for the future of Eastern Europe.

There are specific problems with such a course of action. But more important, the various policy proposals and position papers advocating such a course reflect a philosophical inertia, an inability or unwillingness to jettison old concepts and modes of thought in the face of utterly changed circumstances. In particular, such proposals for what amount to a new NATO are based on a most questionable premise: that "the West" continues to exist as a political and military entity. Over the last half century or so, most of us have come to think of "the West" as a given, a natural presence and one that is here to stay. It is a way of thinking that is not only wrong in itself, but is virtually cer-

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tain to lead to mistaken policies. The sooner we discard it the better. The political "West" is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile "East" to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the disappearance of that enemy.

SHOULD THE WEST GO EAST?

THE PROPOSALS THAT NATO move eastward, guaranteeing the borders of or offering membership to the Iron Curtain states, have support both among certain Western intellectuals and analysts and within the NATO apparatus itself. The organization's secretary general, Manfred Wörner, is an enthusiast for NATO taking on the operational responsibility for peacekeeping operations in Europe by its member states. Doing so would obviously go some way toward solving the problem of potential irrelevance that NATO faces in the absence of a Soviet threat.

A move east, however, would suffer from a variety of specific difficulties and complications, making it in all likelihood unworkable.

First, the proposal takes no account at all of Russian susceptibilities and interests and envisages no role for Russia in Eastern Europe. NATO is simply to take over responsibility for the stability of a region that has been in Russia's sphere of influence for centuries. The 45-year interlude of the Soviet bloc was merely an episode in a much larger history, and its demise should not be taken as marking the end of Moscow's involvement. Strategic interests, traditional motives of prestige, the "historic mission" of freeing the Greek Orthodox population from infidel rule, and the pan-Slavism that had a varying but real impact on policy—all these combined to make Eastern Europe, and the Balkans in particular, a matter of intense concern for Russia long before Lenin and Stalin appeared on the scene. Russian troops went to Hungary in 1848 to put down a revolution against Hapsburg rule. It was to counter Russian hegemony in the region that Britain and France fought the Crimean War in 1853–56. In the 1870s Bismarck could dismiss the revolt of the Balkan Slavs as a rising of "sheep stealers," but Russia responded by fighting a war against Turkey and creating the state of Bulgaria.

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To ignore all this history and to attempt to incorporate Eastern Europe into NATO's sphere of influence, at a time when Russia is in dangerous turmoil and when that nation's prestige and self-confidence are badly damaged, would surely be an act of outstanding folly. It could well provide a catalyst that would enable extreme chauvinistic elements in Russia to exploit frustrations, resentments and wounded national pride in ways that would have unpleasant consequences both internally and internationally.

Second, given the pathetic performance of Western countries in the Bosnian crisis, the proposal suffers from a massive credibility problem. Why should anyone in Eastern Europe take such a guarantee seriously? Why should they believe that it was any more than a bluff, something done in the hope that the commitment itself would be an effective deterrent and with no serious intention of honoring it? Besides recent evidence of division and infirmity of purpose, there are many precedents from earlier European history that would justify skepticism. In the eighteenth century, the powers agreed to honor the Pragmatic Sanction, which was supposed to guarantee Maria Theresa's succession as ruler over the Imperial possessions. But as soon as the Emperor Charles died the promise was broken. The Locarno Treaty of 1925, under the terms of which Great Britain and Italy guaranteed a pact of nonaggression between France, Germany and Belgium, is another case in point. Of it, the English historian A.J.P. Taylor laconically remarked, "The Treaty of Locarno rested on the assumption that the promises given in it would never have to be made good—otherwise the British government would not have given them."

The political 'West' is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one.

If East European memories are as long as we are told, such examples would surely be remembered. If they were not, then the more recent and even more relevant example of the French failure to honor their obligation to Czechoslovakia at Munich certainly would be. To recall such precedents is not to make mere debating points, for much of the recent behavior of West European states raises legitimate doubts about their political seriousness and willingness to bear responsibility when it comes to the test. Indeed, in all cases when the

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vital interests of states are not clearly and directly involved in an issue, the fact that they have made promises with respect to it does not ensure that they will deliver when the moment of truth arrives.

Third, if it is assumed that the NATO guarantee would be serious, intended to be honored, then, given the extent of the region's problems and its propensity for violence, it would amount to the acceptance of a potentially extensive peacekeeping and peacemaking role. As Laurence Martin has pointed out, such a commitment would likely tax the overall military capabilities of member countries to the point of distorting their force structures away from those best designed to meet their core security needs. In Martin's judgment, such a skewing of force structure has already taken place in the case of Britain—toward the army and away from the navy and air force—as a result of its involvement in Northern Ireland and elsewhere.[1] (To consider just how distorting the effect of the commitment might become, reflect that retired General William Odom—head of the National Security Agency in the 1980s and a supporter of intervention in Yugoslavia—estimates that to be effective a force of 300,000 to 400,000 would have to be committed in the Balkans, for one to two decades.)

Fourth, a policy of blanket guarantees would most likely lead to intramural disputes in NATO over the distribution of merit and blame, as well as the most appropriate action to take, in specific cases. A record of acrimony in the past when the question of out-of-area intervention has arisen suggests that this would be the case. Despite claims to the contrary, NATO does not remotely resemble a great power, with well-defined interests over a range of issues and a well-developed will of its own. Each major European power has its own interests and concerns; what Germany deems vital to its security and prosperity, England may regard as peripheral. To insist on joint intervention in such a case would only create friction where none previously existed.

At a time when the core purpose of the alliance—mutual protection against the direct military threat posed by a clearly defined adver-

[1]Laurence Martin, "Peacekeeping as a Growth Industry," *The National Interest*, Summer 1993. Since publication of Martin's article there has been additional evidence of such skewing, with the British defense secretary announcing further substantial cuts in both the navy and the air force, while the army was left essentially untouched. See "Royal Navy Goes to Sea in Fewer Ships," *Washington Post*, July 6, 1993.

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IB OHLSSON

sary—has lost much of its urgency and binding power, intervention in the complicated affairs of the Balkans and Eastern Europe, where the merits of the case are rarely obvious or entirely on one side and where many of the leading NATO states have had intense and emotion-laden involvement in the past, might prove seriously disruptive of alliance unity. Thus an effort to save NATO by finding a new role for it might end up having the effect of hastening the alliance's demise.

Fifth, such proposals take for granted the superior merits of united American-European action and never pause to consider whether in the conditions of post-communist Europe a division of labor and responsibility might be preferable. Instead of NATO being responsible

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for everything, might it not be better if the Europeans were to assume responsibility for second-order problems in Central and Eastern Europe, while the United States concentrated on wider issues, particularly those directly involving the major players, Russia and Ukraine? The notion that solidarity, unity and general participation are always preferable to a differentiated, selective, "horses for courses" approach is questionable. As long as the United States is actively involved it will always assume leadership, and as long as it does so it will be difficult for European states to reacquire the habit of being responsible for, and wielding effective authority in, their own region. And those who do not bear responsibility tend to behave irresponsibly.[2]

Finally, in any effective military intervention, there would be a high likelihood of numerous casualties—both taken and inflicted. The terrain of most of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, as well as the passionate hatred that often characterizes the region's quarrels, would not allow for military action that was both effective and cheap in terms of casualties, as the Persian Gulf War was (at least for the alliance). High casualties would quickly mean domestic division and Western opposition to involvement. That would cast doubt on the ability of Western countries to stay the course, to finish what they had begun. As far as the United States is concerned, there is a serious point to the pithy dictum coined by some military man: "We do deserts. We don't do mountains and jungles."

A CHILD OF DANGER AND FEAR

THE COUNTRIES OF the West share vast commonalities: a common history, culture and political values and institutions. It is in all this—the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome, Christianity, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the

[2]In a different context, Ortega y Gasset made the essential point over 60 years ago in his extraordinarily prescient book, *The Revolt of the Masses*: "It is only the illusion of rule, and the discipline of responsibility which it entails, that can keep Western minds in tension. Science, art, technique and all the rest live on the tonic atmosphere created by the consciousness of authority. If that is lacking, the Europeans will gradually become degraded." During the superpower dominance of the Cold War, which was also the period when several European countries lost their empires, that "consciousness of authority" diminished and a degradation took place.

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French and Industrial revolutions, representative democracy, the rule of law, the market economy—that many find the basis of Western unity. In this view, the threat from the East was just one additional factor, and by no means the most important one, in the creation of a political "West."

But those who argue thus overlook the fact that while all these common features had existed long before the Cold War, they had never created or sustained a united West before the appearance of a shared and formidable enemy. A common civilization is one thing, political unity is another, and they should not be confused. In fact, relationships among the countries of the West have been marked by division and by particularly bloody internecine conflicts throughout their history—to the point that fratricidal warfare might well be offered as one of the distinguishing characteristics of Western civilization, as opposed to civilizations that have been less marked by political fragmentation, the development of nationalism and sophisticated military technology.

Something approaching a united "West" has been spoken of only three times in modern history: in 1917–18, 1941–45 and the Cold War years. In the first two instances, the term is a complete misnomer, since the enemies—Germany and Austria-Hungary in the first case, Germany and Italy in the second—were full-fledged members of the West. The conflicts could more accurately be described (and, indeed, they sometimes have been) as Western civil wars.

But if one stretches the point and allows all three as examples, it becomes clear that the notion of a political "West" is one that has been attractive to Europeans only when some or all of their countries have been in great and imminent danger. Desperation and fear have been its parents, not natural affinities. They have been the forces that have driven Europeans to unite among themselves and to associate with the United States under the banner of "the West." Further, it is a concept that, in the European experience, is associated with the prospect of subordination and, for proud nations accustomed to being leading actors in their own right, a certain amount of humiliation. For, once in being, "the West" has always and necessarily been dominated by the United States, a country long viewed by many Europeans as unsophisticated in international affairs.

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FAIR-WEATHER FOES

In the absence of an overriding threat that one is incapable of handling on one's own—and sometimes even in the presence of such a threat—the inclination on both sides of the Atlantic has been to emphasize not unity, but the difference and incompatibility of Europe and America. Thus, even before final victory was achieved in 1945, the prevailing model of the political world had become that of the "Big Three," with Franklin Roosevelt more suspicious of Britain and its empire than of the Soviet Union; and immediately after victory, Harry Truman ruthlessly and abruptly ended Lend-Lease aid to Europe without any obvious concern for the overall well-being of "the West." Even later in the 1940s, as the clouds of the Cold War were gathering rapidly, most Europeans who thought about such things—George Orwell for one—conceived the world in terms not of two groupings but of three, with Europe and the United States constituting not one but two of them. In an article written for *Partisan Review* in 1947, Orwell saw the two as divided not only as separate power blocs but ideologically as well. Europe stood for democratic socialism, the United States, for capitalism. He longed for a self-sufficient United States of Europe, able to hold out against both America and Russia—that is, for Europe as the original "third world."

'The West' has always and necessarily been dominated by the United States.

As it was at the beginning of the Cold War, so it was at the end. Two years ago, as soon as the Soviet Union disintegrated, what we immediately started to hear propounded on both sides of the Atlantic—and what we were still hearing from President Clinton during the July Tokyo summit this year—was a tripartite or tripolar version of the world, with Europe and the United States again constituting not one but two separate sides of the triangle, and with Japan/Asia as the third. Far from stressing the continuing existence of "the West," once free of a Soviet threat many Europeans immediately began anticipating, often with ill-concealed glee, a post-Maastricht United Europe that would supplant the United States as the dominant economic—and ultimately political—force in the world. In particular, it was claimed that Europe, led by a reunited Germany,

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would take the lead in dealing with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. When fighting broke out in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1991, for example, the immediate reaction of Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, was: "We do not interfere in American affairs. We hope they will have enough respect not to interfere in ours."[3] The fact that the United States had liberated Monsieur Delors' country from occupation by one totalitarian regime during his lifetime and had subsequently protected Western Europe against the threat posed by a second such regime for four decades was neither here nor there. To say again: once deprived of a threat or some other serious trouble it cannot cope with, there is a strong tendency for Europe to treat the United States as a rival (and sometimes as a naïve, heavy-handed and incompetent rival), not as a leader or a partner.

Subsequently, of course, the momentum toward European unity has faltered and Maastricht has become a divisive rather than uniting symbol. The European economy has gone into what looks increasingly like a prolonged structural recession. Almost to a man, European political leaders have become deeply unpopular in their own countries, their authority attenuated and their ability to conduct forceful foreign policies limited. And a nasty, racist form of populism has spread through much of the continent. As all these things have happened, and as Europe has proved embarrassingly incapable of dealing with the Bosnian crisis, European confidence that it can dispense with American leadership and operate as an independent force has drained away, and we have been hearing more, again, of "the West." But if and when things improve significantly for Europe, we should anticipate another reversal.

AMERICAN ARGUMENTS

IF EUROPEAN NEEDS and insecurities constitute one condition for the continuation of "the West," there is also an obvious second condition: U.S. willingness to respond to those needs. That, too, has in the past required a deep sense of danger—danger to *American* interests—to overcome America's moralistic distaste for European power politics.

[3] *The Sunday Telegraph*, May 16, 1993.

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In 1917 it took a lot of German provocation before the New World finally did come in to redress the balance of the Old. In 1941 it took Pearl Harbor and Hitler's foolish declaration of war on the United States to produce a decisive, if involuntary, intervention. And in 1946–49 the rapid spread of Soviet power into Central Europe provided the incentive, after the United States had initially responded to the end of World War II with instant and comprehensive demobilization. Absent a sense of danger, America's aloofness has been as marked as Europe's assumption of independence and superior sophistication.

So what are the prospects of continuing close American association with Europe in the political enterprise labeled "the West"? At present the odds are somewhat against it. On one side of the scale, and it is not negligible, is the weight of habits of involvement and leadership acquired over the last half century. Americans have got used to their country being a superpower and a leader, and they like it more than they care to admit (or possibly know). There are powerful groups in the United States—in the military, most obviously, but elsewhere as well—that now have a major vested interest in "the West." And there are various arguments that they can advance in support of continued commitment to it.

One is the idealist argument that the United States has a new post-Cold War mission to promote democracy throughout the world and that this is best done in cooperation with other established democracies. Another is the realist argument that American participation is necessary in order to keep an eye on Germany and ensure that it does not go off the rails a third time before the end of the century.[4] Beyond Germany is the even greater uncertainty about the future behavior of Russia and the need some feel for an American commitment to Europe in order to forestall any major misbehavior on Moscow's part.

These are not negligible considerations and arguments, but neither are they compelling and conclusive. As for spreading democracy, a

[4]When Conor Cruise O'Brien was recently asked to consider the question of the future of the West, it was fear of Germany that he advanced as the strongest reason for believing that a close U.S.-European relationship would continue. This meant that the entity that he foresaw as continuing into the new era was the circumscribed West of 1917 and 1941—the United States, Britain, France—rather than the inclusive one of 1957 or 1977. See "The Future of the West," *The National Interest*, Winter 1992–93.

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sense of mission has never on its own been sufficient to lead the United States to commit itself to a policy of heavy involvement or close association with Europe, and this is unlikely to change. In June of this year, the House of Representatives voted to kill the National Endowment for Democracy, the agency created during the Reagan years to promote democracy abroad. Even if the Senate were to reverse this vote, it is a significant sign of the times. There is the further constraint that Europe's zeal for spreading democracy is comparatively limited, and that, at this post-imperial stage of their history, European countries lack the confidence and assertiveness necessary to sustain serious intervention in the affairs of other countries.

As for concern about the future behavior of Germany and Russia, as of now both cases lack the sense of a clear and present danger that has been necessary in the past to overcome American inhibitions and to cause the United States to commit itself to "the West"—and, for that matter, that has also been required to create a "demand" for such a commitment on the part of Europeans. In the absence of such a sense it is highly questionable whether, should a German or Russian crisis erupt quickly, the United States could mobilize the political support necessary to intervene decisively and expensively (in terms of casualties even more than of money, though the latter constitutes an increasing restraint also).

When that good Atlanticist, Jeane Kirkpatrick, wrote in 1990 that in the post-Cold War era "the United States should not try to manage the balance of power in Europe—we should neither seek to prevent nor assist Germany in reestablishing a dominant position in Europe or Central Europe. We could not control these matters if we tried and there is no reason to try," she was expressing a view that many Americans share. In the cases of both Russia and Germany, if things were to deteriorate seriously, the United States would undoubtedly use its very considerable political and economic clout in an effort to prevent trouble. But there would be legitimate doubt about Washington's willingness to commit American forces on a significant scale in either event. This would limit both the capacity and the acceptability of American leadership.

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THE 'NOGOOD BOYO' APPROACH

THE MOST POWERFUL argument for substantial American withdrawal from the kind of serious, sustained and expensive participation necessary to maintain "the West" as something more than a reassuring fiction is the urgent pull of domestic matters, long neglected or relegated to subordinate status during the Cold War. One does not have to be an isolationist or a "declinist" to believe that the time has come to alter the country's priorities in favor of domestic concerns; and it is not only Patrick Buchanan who has been saying "Come home, America." It was William Hyland, at the time sitting at the heart of the American foreign policy establishment as editor of *Foreign Affairs*, who opined that "What is definitely required is a psychological turn inwards." This view has been echoed by many others, one of the most recent being Zbigniew Brzezinski, who has called for "a period of philosophical introspection and of cultural self-critique," necessary, he believes, in order to tackle the moral, social and economic malaise that afflicts the "permissive cornucopia" that the United States has now become.

To the extent that such attitudes prevail and such advice is taken, they are inimical to a united and purposeful "West," which requires an active, outgoing and engaged America. There is good reason to believe that in the Clinton era such attitudes will prevail. President Clinton has an ambitious domestic agenda and little interest in or feel for foreign policy. He has equipped himself with a team that, to put it mildly and politely, is unlikely to press him hard to adopt ambitious, activist policies abroad, except in the area of trade. If the Bosnian crisis is any indication, one can expect that in Clinton's Washington "the West," together with the United Nations, will be used as devices not to facilitate action but to justify inaction. The United States wants to take decisive action, it will be claimed in a variety of situations, but it must be *multilateral* action and a proper international *mandate* must be given. If these conditions cannot be fulfilled, then the United States will, regrettably but justifiably, do nothing. In practice, whenever it has looked remotely as if the Europeans might agree to an American proposal regarding Bosnia, there has been a rapid backing

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off on Washington's part. After the character in Dylan Thomas's *Under Milk Wood*, this rationalization of passivity might be labeled the "Nogood Boyo" approach to foreign policy: "I want to be good, but nobody'll let me."

In fairness, it should be added that these would be difficult times for any administration as far as foreign policy is concerned, for today's conditions are novel and puzzling for Americans. Framing choices in terms of all or nothing makes little sense. Earlier experiences of confronting clearly identified enemies in extreme situations, and of leading great alliances in bipolar situations, are not very helpful and may be misleading (particularly if they lead to an incessant and indiscriminate stress on leadership). Washington will have to learn to play new and different games.

While it is doing so, the concept of "the West" is likely to revert to what it has been for most of the past: a concept of last resort, held in reserve for when things go seriously bad and individual countries or restricted alliances are unable to cope on their own. One must assume—unless one has come to accept the fatuous nonsense that war as an institution is dead—that such circumstances will again return to haunt us one day, perhaps sooner rather than later. Indeed if those who speak of "the Clash of Civilizations" (Samuel Huntington) and of "the West and the Rest" (Kishore Mahbubani) are right, the idea of a political "West" may achieve greater authenticity in the struggles of the future than it did even in the days of the Cold War. But meanwhile the notion has lost much of its definition and raison d'etre.

W. H. Auden once wrote of Brussels, the city that subsequently became the headquarters of the European Community and NATO, and thus of the West:

Its formula escapes you; it has lost
The certainty that constitutes a thing.

For the time being, at least, these words can properly be applied to the West itself.

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Japan's Non-Revolution

Karel van Wolferen

THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

THE RECENT AND ubiquitous speculation in the world's media that Japanese society has reached a watershed is based more on wishful thinking than on an understanding of the forces at work in the Japanese body politic. It is a curious phenomenon, indicative of Western apprehensions, that almost every time Japanese developments gain international attention they are accompanied by assertions that the Japanese people are making choices that will change the way they live and work. In reality, the saddest aspect of Japan is that the Japanese people are not in a position to make such choices.

It is true that Japan has entered what can properly be described as an age of uncertainty. The recent fracturing of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the parliamentary crisis are symptoms of a disorientation without precedent in postwar Japan. International reality has changed for Japan's elite administrators. Its dominant element, the relationship with the United States, has lost the underpinnings that kept it in place for over four decades. With the disappearance of Cold War certainties from American foreign policy, and Japan's emergence as a discomforting economic force, American indulgence toward Japan is shrinking to a point where the basic guarantees that Japan's political elite could count on for four decades have disappeared.

Changes in domestic reality have been less abrupt and are less easily singled out for analysis, but a pervasive sense of unease about

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Japan's economic future has left its elites disoriented. Although often deceived by their own propaganda, many of Japan's elite know that Japan's ability to export the costs of its postwar strategy of unlimited industrial expansion has been fundamental to that strategy's success. They doubt that Japan can much longer shift such costs as unemployment, environmental degradation and industrial obsolescence to other countries. During the deflation of the "bubble economy" these past three years, the Ministry of Finance has again demonstrated its genius in disproving prophets of Japanese economic doom. But the officials are now confronting forces so enormous, and international hostility to Japan's "torrential exports" has made the future effectiveness of rescue actions so unpredictable, that continued confidence in their ability to control economic outcomes can no longer be taken for granted.

Japan's age of uncertainty reached an important moment on June 18 when two prominent members of the LDP joined non-LDP politicians in a routine no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa. Four days later 44 LDP members resigned, forming two new parties. Along with the year-and-a-half-old Japan New Party, they have overturned what Japanese political commentators called "the 1955 setup." This political system, crucial to the shaping of postwar Japan, rested on two pillars: the guaranteed incumbency of the LDP, and a Socialist Party that for 38 years was mired in internal squabbles and unrealistic priorities, guaranteed to keep it out of power.

For over a quarter of a century, informed Japanese and foreigners alike have readily expressed doubts about the authenticity of Japanese democracy. A vote in the countryside could be worth up to four times as much as one in the cities. The Supreme Court, although recognizing that this system violated the constitution, has refused to endorse corrective action that might "cause confusion." By the second half of the 1960s the urban electorate had by and large stopped supporting the LDP, and in successive elections switched what were widely understood to be "protest votes" from one minor party to another. The electorate outside the cities has to a large extent been bribed or subtly coerced into keeping the LDP in power. The Diet has hardly ever been used for genuine parliamentary debates on public issues because the socialist-led opposition indulged in utterly ritualistic politics, regular boycotts of Diet proceedings being its major weapon.

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The July 18 elections to the House of Representatives have knocked over one pillar of the 1955 setup. The socialists have been punished for betraying the electorate for 38 years through the loss of half their seats. The politicians who now occupy those seats are not expected to follow the socialist example of marginalizing themselves, raising the possibility that the Diet will become less the rubber-stamp outfit than it has been. Japan's one-party system may well be dead.

POLITICIANS WITHOUT POWER

BUT THE ONE-PARTY aspect of the 1955 setup, on which doubts concerning Japanese democracy have usually centered, has obscured a more fundamental defect that is likely to remain even now that the 1955 setup is defunct. Since the early 1960s Japan's politicians have not played a significant role in determining national policy, with the sole exception, perhaps, of the brilliant and controversial Kakuei Tanaka. Despite periodic efforts by such talented politicians as Yasuhiro Nakasone, there has not been effective political oversight over bureaucratic decision-making. This bureaucratic decision-making has almost exclusively been restricted to administrative matters. A major shift in national priorities—the need for which is often conceded by independent members of the political elite—cannot come from the bureaucracy, because there is no single entity with the mandate to make decisions that are binding on the entire governing apparatus. The single most powerful entity, the Ministry of Finance, is ultimately guided by the course of action its institutional memory indicates will serve it best, which means that it continues to support the unlimited expansion of Japan's productive capacity.

It is unlikely that this arrangement could have continued for as long as it did without the strategic and diplomatic shield provided by the United States. As Japan concentrated solely on unlimited industrial expansion, there was almost no need to cope with a capricious world; no need to develop acrobatic skills in international diplomacy. These unusual conditions fulfilled the vision held by Japan's first important postwar prime minister, Shigeru Yoshida, of how the Japanese political elite could make the best of the unfortunate circumstances of the late 1940s.

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In return for American protection, the LDP accommodated the United States in what Washington cared about most until the Berlin Wall collapsed. Security arrangements, giving the Pentagon unconditional use of whatever military bases it wished to maintain in Japan, were safe as long as the conservatives kept the socialists out of power. But the LDP failed the United States in a way that no one in Washington ever anticipated. By abdicating responsibility for the national agenda to the bureaucracy, the LDP deprived the American government (and that of any other country) of an effective means to discuss any major issue requiring Japanese action. It has not been possible for an American president to discuss the future with a representative of Japan whose mandate reaches further than adjusting technicalities. As things stand, no matter how often Bill Clinton talks with the Japanese prime minister, or how cordial their relationship may be, these two cannot even begin to come to grips with what is threatening to rupture their two countries' crucial relationship.

Since the early 1960s Japan's politicians have not played a significant role in determining national policy.

For some time American trade representatives and other emissaries have been attempting to identify "the right people to talk with." And if there are not any individuals who could make a difference, so it is thought, there must be groups with access to "the right buttons." They do not exist. By leaving overall policymaking in the hands of an unelected and self-appointed group of officials, Japan's elected representatives turned over the core functions of government to men of great but limited competence. Since the 1950s, this bureaucracy has understood limitless industrial growth to be the unquestioned primary goal for Japan, a goal to which all other domestic concerns, such as education and general welfare, as well as international relations must remain subservient. Bureaucrats everywhere judge themselves by their efforts to gain prestige or power for their own institutions. Unless changes could conceivably bring further advantage to their own bureaus, bureaucrats will endeavor to work for the status quo. Japanese bureaucrats are no exception, which results in the institutional paralysis with which foreign negotiators have become familiar.

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THE PERMANENT GOVERNMENT

THE LDP'S ABDICATION of political responsibility fits in with previous forms of Japanese governance, and is connected with the major political flaw of twentieth-century Japan: the absence of a center of political accountability. This is fundamentally different from what has frequently been diagnosed as a "leadership problem," rooted in temporary weaknesses of political will on the part of Japan's highest elected officials. It must be understood that Japan's government agencies do not for practical purposes represent a real government—a core of the state entrusted with the right and duty of decision-making on behalf of the national interest, a core that Japanese citizens could get a grip on if they so desired. Japan poses major conceptual challenges to the West. Americans and Europeans, who take for granted that countries have centers of political accountability (as is clear from the frequent exhortations that "Japan should do this" or "Japan should accept that"), cannot easily understand the workings of a political system lacking a core that can explain to foreigners, to its own population and to the political elite itself what it is doing and why.

Japanese ministries come closer to being states unto themselves than any other government institutions in the industrialized world. Besides their responsibilities for administration, they also monopolize the lawmaking capacities and jurisdiction within their own bailiwicks. For all practical purposes they themselves are not subject to the rule of law. There exists no system of informal power in the world so vast as that of Japan. The system has, however, formal supports in laws that are purposely kept extremely vague to allow for the widest possible bureaucratic discretion. The only significant formal curb on the ministries would be the constitution, which is almost ignored by Japan's bureaucracy. This foreign document—bestowed upon Japan by General Douglas MacArthur—contains a number of articles designed to ward off, in one way or another, arbitrary bureaucratic rule, but these are consistently and systematically violated.

The Ministry of Finance is strongest among these semi-independent governing bodies, since the other government agencies depend on its budget bureau, which judges their annual requests. The banking law assumes that the banks will always follow the ministry's wide-

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ly varying interpretations of the law. As the 1991 financial scandals demonstrated, ministry officials are not held accountable for violating the securities laws through their informal instructions. The ministry engineered a massive transfer of wealth from the household sector to the industrial sector during the "bubble economy" years, but no one thought to protest. Effective means for holding Ministry of Finance bureaucrats accountable do not exist. Japan's main financial and economic newspaper, the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, functions as an amplifier for what ministry officials want players in the Japanese economy to think and believe, preventing it from monitoring ministerial action with critical eyes.

Cabinet ministers are generally not even considered part of the ministries they ostensibly lead. Hence the actual coordination of the Japanese bureaucracy does not take place at cabinet level, and a prime minister's leverage over the entire governing apparatus is virtually nonexistent. To ensure a measure of stability and coordination, and to minimize turf battles, ministries exchange personnel. These bureaucrats on loan double as diplomats and spies, and one of their main tasks is coordinating measures to keep at bay politicians with ambitions to make policy.

The changed circumstances that have ushered in Japan's age of uncertainty demand political adjustments from Japan that the bureaucracy cannot possibly deliver. This is understood by the main figures in the non-LDP ranks whose actions precipitated the recent political upheaval. Two of the new "reformers," now in the Japan Renaissance Party, Ichiro Ozawa and Tsutomo Hata, have for some years made clear that they are eager to apply their considerable political skills to national policymaking. They were protected by Shin Kanemaru, the single most powerful LDP boss, until an internal LDP power struggle one year ago resulted in his removal (with the help of the most recent political scandal in the press). Their loss of a solid political base inside the LDP and failure to get the LDP behind their program for electoral reform gave them an incentive to try their luck at establishing what the three had frequently mentioned as being good for Japan—a two-party system. The third major "reformer," Morihiro Osokawa, deserted the LDP the year before to form his own Japan New Party and has drawn attention with his advocacy of

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reviewing certain areas of bureaucratic power. The leader of a group of breakaway socialists, Satsuki Eda, also understands that new directions for Japan can only come from politicians.

An unknown number of senior officials in the ministries, as well as prominent retired bureaucrats, also believe in the need for political oversight. Some officials, understanding from personal experience their own ministries' limitations, privately worry that Japan will blunder into catastrophe, as it did in the 1930s, for lack of strong political guidance. But the flaw in Japan's political system is self-perpetuating. In the absence of a center of political accountability these concerned powerholders cannot take preventive action without losing their dignity and creating the impression that they are disloyal to the institutions in which they have made their careers.

A coalition government of reform-minded politicians fully intent on wresting political control from the bureaucracy would face phalanxes of the real powerholders in Japan who are highly skilled in sabotaging projects not to their liking. Drastic interference with bureaucratic personnel appointments would be required. Such steps would probably be followed by an uproar, with the activist politician pilloried among his colleagues and in the media as being un-Japanese for breaking the unwritten rules of Japanese "harmony." Ozawa, who is without a doubt the strongest of the politicians, has already gained a reputation as being too pushy for a Japanese politician. Someone of his caliber who takes a truly courageous stand in the face of bureaucratic opposition becomes very vulnerable, because it is not difficult to launch a scandal that can bring him down. As part of the new coalition parties, an ambitious group of "reformers" might actually assist officialdom in realizing bureaucratic schemes that would have been more difficult to accomplish under the old 1955 setup. It is entirely possible that the upheaval will eventually make the Japanese governmental system even less responsive to international interests and those of the Japanese citizenry. It is conceivable that future coalitions composed of the existing splitters of the LDP, new splitters, what is left of the LDP and the older, minor parties could become indistinguishable from what the LDP has been—a passive and secondary player in Japan's government.

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THE SELF-CENSORING PRESS

ADMIRATION FOR JAPAN'S undoubted economic successes and for its putative supremacy in managerial skills has blinded many Westerners to the profound failures of the Japanese political system. The general assumption, which was again very much in evidence between the lines of most press commentary, assured us that when it really became necessary this political system would respond and repair itself. This may, of course, still happen. But there are good reasons for pessimism. Major obstacles to self-repair are not fully understood in the West, because they are entirely unexpected. But they could provide clues as to what the rest of the world, especially the United States, can do to help salvage what is salvageable of Japanese democracy.

The single biggest impediment to Japanese political reform is probably the Japanese press. It is monolithic, since the five large daily newspapers speak with one voice—their commentary on the issues of the day is almost indistinguishable, and their selection of what to report and what to ignore is virtually identical. The systematic and heavy self-censorship the newspapers engage in is without parallel in the industrialized world. Hence the press directly and decisively determines what others conceive of as political reality, and as such it should be considered Japan's most powerful political—as distinct from administrative—entity.

The vast informal Japanese power structure provides ample opportunity to flay politicians with corruption scandals. Almost any politician can be implicated in such scandals at any time, because gaining political stature in Japan requires raising large sums of money. The easiest means of raising this money stems from the discretionary licensing powers of the bureaucracy. Relatively new or rapidly expanding businesses must protect themselves against arbitrary treatment. Businesses turn to politicians and offer them very lucrative roles as influence brokers. Without ever distinguishing between unethical bribery and generally accepted political funding, the newspapers consistently denigrate the motives and character of politicians, thus helping to keep alive a general sense that Japan's politicians should not be entrusted with more real power.

No newspaper doubts the need for political reform. But their stan-

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dard preachings on this subject are placed safely in the context of alleged moral deficiencies of politicians and never concern the shortcomings and abuses of unchecked bureaucratic power. Senior Japanese newspaper editors view themselves as public guardians, entrusted to help maintain a disciplined society with a maximum of order and a minimum of conflict. Since politicians cause political disturbance, and cannot hide the fact that they want power—as opposed to bureaucrats, who are thought to be selfless and dedicated servants of the people—editors protect the bureaucrats and wage regular campaigns against politicians. The newspapers are effectively allied with the police, the public prosecutor, the ministries of finance, justice, education and the *Keidanren* (the umbrella organization of the business bureaucrats, a de facto public organization).

Japanese ministries come closer to being states unto themselves than any other government institution in the industrialized world.

A very difficult aspect of Japanese political reality to fathom is the absence of public opinion. What passes for it is manufactured by the media, especially the five national dailies, and often bears little resemblance to what the Japanese people actually think. They are as capable as people anywhere of discussing a great variety of subjects with indignation and candor, but Japan lacks the institutions to turn these privately expressed opinions into a shared public opinion.

When, prompted by events, a "national debate" emerges concerning fundamental issues, it is immediately filtered by the press to conform to bureaucratic goals, in particular the overriding aim of preserving the status quo. It is therefore not surprising that the burning question in Japan's age of uncertainty, how to accomplish political direction over bureaucratic power, and the fact that this is central to the current parliamentary crisis, are not widely discussed.

Japanese civil society is extremely weak and politically ineffectual. In fact, the press can be said to have supplanted civil society. Genuine labor unions were crushed long ago and have a tradition of serving management. Japan's famous "company loyalty" precludes political activism (which would certainly destroy an employee's career in the company) and has prevented the emergence of a politically significant

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middle class. Political action and interest groups are not nationally coordinated and are invariably tied to single causes, making them unfit to serve as the foundation for sustained reasoned opposition to the status quo. The judiciary is not independent. With few exceptions, Japanese intellectuals are servants of the bureaucracy, indulging in a type of verbal political opposition that allows them to maintain an image of independence but is harmless because it remains unconnected with political reality.

Attributing Japan's parliamentary crisis to a Japanese public disgusted with political corruption, as the Western press has done, is therefore highly inaccurate. The widespread notion that the upheaval will lead to a shift from Japan's exclusive concern with producer interests to those of consumers is equally ill-conceived.

CAN JAPAN CHANGE?

JAPAN'S TRUE NATIONAL interest cannot be discussed and served unless politicians gain ascendancy. If, instead, a succession of weak coalitions leads to the further consolidation of unaccountable bureaucratic and business-bureaucratic power, this would not only be tragic for the Japanese people, but highly problematic and perhaps even dangerous for the rest of the world.

As commentators such as R. Taggart Murphy and Christopher Wood have pointed out, endless additions to productive capacity without regard to profitability could create the conditions for global depression.[1] The gradual transformation of countries belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations into "subcontracted economies" headquartered in Tokyo raises new questions about long-range Japanese security arrangements for the protection of these foreign assets.

Japan is today one of the world's most powerful political entities. Coping with it requires more than three days a year of the president's time and the attention of third- and fourth-rank American bureaucrats. Even though President Clinton has shown some understanding

[1]R. Taggart Murphy, "Power Without Purpose: The Crisis of Japan's Global Financial Dominance," *Harvard Business Review*, March/April 1989; Christopher Wood, *The Bubble Economy*, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1992.

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of the problem, there are very few people who understand how to deal with Japan effectively. They will be utterly overwhelmed with the magnitude of the task.

As experience shows, conventional diplomacy can achieve only limited goals in Japan. But the rest of the world does have levers to change Japan, while avoiding punitive sanctions. The greatest leverage comes from the desperate hankering on the part of Japan's elite administrators for acceptance of their country as a full political equal of the world's other major democratic states. The implied message from the American president and other governments should be that this is not possible unless Japan establishes a system of political accountability. An appropriate context in which to send this message is Tokyo's ardent desire to be given permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council veto power should be made conditional on Japan demonstrating a functioning civilian control mechanism over its own security apparatus. The well-known apprehensions of Korea, Russia and the Southeast Asian countries will strengthen America's case in this matter.

Such concern will actually dovetail with latent and deep-seated fears of large segments of the Japanese political elite, notably the economic ministries. They continue to treat Japan's military (by budget allocation standards the third or fourth biggest in the world) as if it hardly existed—partly because they are unsure as to where in the scheme of Japan's informal power system a fully rehabilitated army and navy would come to rest.

A convincing civilian control mechanism over the defense bureaucracy would foster the development of control mechanisms over other powerful entities, particularly the Ministry of Finance and the business-bureaucratic establishment. Large Japanese companies are—in their behavior and incentive structure—effectively bureaucratic entities, not ultimately driven by considerations of profit making.

A well-informed, imaginative approach ready to engage in unconventional "diplomacy" can achieve much vis-à-vis Japan. Washington could start by urging the Japanese people to write their own constitution. The political/intellectual turbulence this would engender in Japan could only have a salutary effect on the growth of Japan's civil society. It would also end any lingering impression of the United

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States as postwar parole officer—a role Washington no longer cares to play or understands how to play in any case. Some of the "reformist" politicians, notably Ozawa, need no convincing that Japan needs a constitution giving it unambiguous sovereignty and legitimizing its armed forces.

Contrary to fashionable opinion, the way in which the Japanese have organized their sociopolitical system is very much the business of foreigners. Japanese journalists, many of them moved by feelings of guilt about their systematic self-censorship, frequently solicit and print opinions of foreigners on subjects they dare not touch themselves. Newspapers will prominently feature well-known Americans who direct themselves to the Japanese public with sympathy and genuine understanding. Constant reminders that the people of a great nation must wield power through their politicians and cannot leave fundamental questions of their lives undiscussed would have a far greater positive impact than Westerners now imagine.

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Can NAFTA Change Mexico?

Jorge G. Castañeda

THE RISKS OF FREE TRADE

MANY MEXICANS HAVE welcomed NAFTA as an undisguised blessing, whatever its effects on the United States. In the government and among the general population the agreement is seen as a ready course to modernization. President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's policies have consciously supported this impression. His administration has determinedly pursued NAFTA as part of a dual strategy. Economically, the trade agreement was to provide Mexico's ailing economy with the foreign capital injections it has long required for sustainable growth. Politically, an expanding Mexican economy—one linked to the United States—would help lay the foundations for an eventual and controlled democratic transition.

Overlooked, however, has been the fact that NAFTA itself entails great risks. No country has ever attempted to develop an export manufacturing base by opening its borders so quickly and indiscriminately to more efficient and lower-cost producers. No nation today, not even the United States, has so willingly sacrificed an industrial policy or an equivalent form of managed trade. By unilaterally renouncing these advantages, Mexico will lose far more jobs in the next few years than it will create. Old industries and agricultural producers will die, be swallowed up or join with foreign ventures, long before the new jobs arrive.

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DANNEMILLER/SABA

McDonald's, Mexico City 1992

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Mexico is not a modern country. True, over the past half-century it has witnessed dramatic change. An inward-looking, illiterate and agrarian land has become an urban, partly industrialized nation with a growing middle class and a nascent civil society. But Mexico's underlying problems persist. It retains a largely corrupt and unchallenged state that possesses only the merest trappings of the rule of law. The enduring obstacles to Mexico's modernization—its repeated failure to transfer power democratically or to remedy the ancestral injustice of its society—remain and will require Mexico to continue to change itself, with or without a trade accord.

Any Mexican government's performance, as well as the virtues of a new relationship with the United States, must be measured against this background. Under certain conditions, NAFTA provides an opportunity to build a more prosperous, democratic and equitable nation. But NAFTA alone will not modernize Mexico. In the short term especially, the accord as it stands may only exacerbate the country's already stark disparities and dislocations. Rather than speeding and facilitating Mexico's long-awaited and much-hoped-for democratic transition, the near-term effect may be to slow the momentum for political reform. This must not happen.

WAITING FOR DEMOCRACY

WHATEVER POLITICAL ADVANCES may have occurred under President Salinas, Mexico has yet to devise a system to transfer power democratically. The 1994 presidential succession promises to be as traditional a ritual as ever. The outgoing president will choose his successor, and then do everything necessary at the polls to secure his election. This system worked adequately for more than a half-century. But it dealt only with half the problem of modern government—order—leaving the other half—democratic representation—unresolved.

This quasi-magical procedure functioned properly only so long as everyone accepted its rules. But by the mid-1980s parts of the political establishment began to wonder whether they might not do better outside the system. In the 1988 election former Governor Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of Mexico's most revered president this century, and former Institutional Revolutionary Party Chairman Porfiro

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Muñoz Ledo broke with the PRI and ran for office on their own, faring much better than they would have otherwise. Muñoz Ledo was elected senator for Mexico City, and Cárdenas, in the opinion of many Mexicans, won the presidency.

Since then, despite two electoral reform laws under Salinas, Mexico's democratic transition has not come to pass. The opposition and Mexicans generally, according to polls, believe that the 1994 elections will again be a sham. The umbilical cord between party and government has not been severed. This was demonstrated by the "shakedown dinner" at which the PRI, in the presence of President Salinas, attempted to extract campaign contributions of $25 million each from 30 of Mexico's richest business leaders. But this time, the PRI's central problem of appointing a candidate and securing the election and accession of a new president will be further aggravated by Mexico's economic doldrums and social deterioration. Salinas seems unable to satisfy either of the two desires of his middle class constituency: a democratic and orderly transfer of power and a growing economy with low inflation and a stable exchange rate. The only solution, as Carlos Ramírez, the most widely read columnist in Mexico, has put it, lies in the de facto exclusion of the presidency from the electoral arena, ensuring that, come what may, the next president will be the PRI candidate.

The opposition and Mexicans generally believe that the 1994 elections will again be a sham.

Part of the problem is that Mexico's opposition has yet to become a viable alternative to the status quo. The National Action Party (PAN) lacks strong national leadership and a nationwide presence; Cárdenas and his Party of the Democratic Revolution are still perceived as too radical, divided and inexperienced to take office. Yet both probably maintain sufficient strength to prevent the PRI from tampering with next year's election without incurring exorbitant costs. Thus, in addition to winning the election more or less cleanly, the PRI candidate will also have to convince his rivals of their defeat and his victory. Mexican politicians and pundits across the spectrum believe that the 1988 crisis must not be repeated. It would be terribly costly to carry into office another PRI candidate whose victory at the polls was disputed by adversaries representing half the electorate.

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The need to manage a difficult succession makes a political solution more likely. Instead of emphasizing continuity in economic policy, Salinas will more likely choose a successor who can both win and persuade the opposition he won. Manuel Camacho, the mayor of Mexico City, and Luis Donaldo Colosio, the Minister of Social Development, look best placed to accomplish this task, although Finance Minister Pedro Aspe and Education Minister Ernesto Zedillo cannot be overlooked. The appointment of either Camacho or Colosio would enhance the possibility of what many are calling for privately: a pact among the PRI, PAN and Cárdenas to set ground rules for the campaign, the election itself and some sort of post-election national reconciliation. Camacho best understands the need for such an arrangement, but has aroused suspicions among the business community that he is a closet populist who places negotiation above a firm hand. Colosio, meanwhile, is experiencing difficulties in gaining national support.

While the PAN seems to pose no serious challenge in the presidential race, Cárdenas' situation is more complex. Conventional wisdom holds that he has squandered the popular support garnered in 1988 but that he will still fare better than the nine percent his party obtained in the 1991 midterm elections. Polls give him strong recognition ratings—over 60 percent—higher than any other contender. But he also has high negatives. A poll for the daily *Excelsior* showed 35 percent of those questioned felt Cárdenas should run again, while 44 percent said he should not.

Cárdenas' fate will ultimately be determined by the state of the economy, the extent of social inequities and the eventual divisions within the PRI. Also critical will be his ability to focus the campaign on his strong suits—democratization, social justice and the fight against corruption—and at least to neutralize his weaknesses—the lack of a detailed economic alternative and the fear that he represents instability.

MEXICO'S FLAGGING ECONOMY

MEXICO'S LACERATING social and economic inequality stems partly from the antidemocratic nature of its politics. High levels of postwar economic growth, progress in education and health, and the

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emergence of a significant middle class have not remedied Mexico's atrociously lopsided income distribution. If 40 years of growth did not help, then a decade of economic stagnation in the 1980s only made matters worse. A recently published survey found that the richest ten percent of Mexicans, those who earned 32.8 percent of national income in 1984, saw their share jump to 37.9 percent by 1989. Conversely, the share of the poorest 40 percent shrank from 14.3 percent to 12.9 percent. The 1990 census, moreover, revealed that 63.2 percent of the nation's inhabitants made no more than twice the minimum wage—$200 per month—while price levels approached those in the United States. The long absence of free elections, of an emancipated labor movement and of the rule of law has helped keep the fruits of any economic expansion in the hands of a minority.

Much of the problem has been Mexico's inability to hurdle an apparently immovable obstacle to its economic growth: the need for substantial foreign capital injections. Since 1972 Mexico has been unable to overcome this external constraint on growth, except during the ephemeral convergence of exceptional circumstances—high oil prices, cheap and abundant lending, wholesale privatization or high yields in the stock market. The costs of attracting foreign capital—higher interest rates and reduced domestic spending—have become a severe burden and have engendered boom-bust cycles in the economy. Either the economy does not grow or, if it does, immense current account deficits spring up, requiring equivalent magnitudes of capital to finance them. The outcome of each cycle has been a currency devaluation, like those in 1976, 1982 and 1987, or an economic downturn with equally devastating consequences.

The Salinas administration sought to break these frustrating cycles and to achieve high growth—five to six percent a year—with a moderate external imbalance. Trade liberalization, privatizations and reduced restrictions on foreign investment were means to this end. After an initial, prudent economic expansion, however, the trade balance began to deteriorate drastically, rising from $4.3 billion in 1990 to more than $20 billion in 1992. Imports have risen by approximately 25 percent annually since 1988. At the same time, exports have stagnated, growing less than one percent in 1991 and 1.5 percent in 1992. This imbalance was made largely inevitable by the rapid opening to foreign

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trade, an appreciating real exchange rate and the remarkable propensity of the Mexican middle class to consume imported goods. By 1992 the overall current account deficit had reached $23 billion, or seven percent of GDP—Mexico's highest level ever.

Consequently, the Salinas administration was forced to throw the economy into a virtual recession, as the foreign capital imbalance prevented faster growth. After expanding in 1990 at 4.5 percent, economic growth slowed to 3.5 percent in 1991 and 2.6 percent in 1992. Government figures forecast slightly lower levels for both 1993 and 1994. Mexico's per-capita growth has thus once again fallen dangerously close to zero.

Moreover, Salinas was forced to make a series of bold moves to attract enough foreign capital to finance even these reduced and more realistic growth rates. He thus pursued a free trade agreement with the United States, the privatization of the Mexican banking system and a policy of encouraging powerful local investors to transform the Mexico City stock exchange, or Bolsa, into a magnet for money from abroad. These steps paid off. There has not been, and probably will not be, a major devaluation of the currency, and Mexico has built up an unprecedented $20 billion of reserves.

But there were costs. Yields on the Bolsa had to stay astronomically high (over 60 percent in dollars in 1991), and when they declined or stagnated, as they have since mid-1992, interest rate differentials between the United States and Mexico had to rise to stabilize portfolio or speculative investment (estimated at approximately 70 percent of the total). Direct foreign investment remains dismally low, as in the 1980s, ranging from 1.5 percent to 1.8 percent of GDP. And overall investment, despite the unprecedented inflow of funds, has not budged, remaining at a disappointing 19 percent of GDP. The dire need for foreign capital drove domestic real interest rates to nearly 15 percent in dollars by mid-1993; lending rates reached 30 percent. Besides, the capital these moves attracted was not ideal. Two-thirds was speculative, and the rest was concentrated not in the creation of new wealth but in services, largely tourism, and in foreign purchases of existing Mexican assets.

In the end, the course Salinas set is more responsible than that of his predecessors, but it still has not achieved the long-sought goal of

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high growth combined with manageable external accounts. The economic downturn, together with the effects of the previous decade of stagnation, has contributed to rising unemployment and social decay. Manufacturing employment, flat even while the economy was growing, has now fallen: in an index in which the year 1980 equaled 100, it never rose above 87 under Salinas, and by early 1993 it was down to nearly 80. By 1993 tens of thousands of factory workers, bank employees and retail store clerks had lost their jobs. Although a number of new jobs have been created, many more have been lost as a result of the economic downturn and the growing, and so far irresistible, competition from abroad.

Salinas' strategy in the face of myriad economic and political difficulties was simple: free trade with the United States.

Many in the United States nonetheless believe that economic integration and NAFTA have moved jobs on a "fast track" to a modernizing Mexico. In fact, the country's disparities are deepening. Ever more dispossessed accompany the growing number of Mexican "yuppies." The loud "sucking noise" of American jobs going south that U.S. presidential candidate Ross Perot ominously announced last fall is, from the Mexican side of the border, singularly difficult to hear.

IS NAFTA THE ANSWER?

THE SALINAS REGIME'S strategy in the face of these myriad economic and political difficulties was simple and singleminded: free trade with the United States. To hold a clean election and at the same time to secure the victory of Salinas' hand-picked candidate, the economy had to deliver high growth and create near the million jobs per year necessary to absorb population increases and facilitate social spending.

The only way to attract the foreign capital necessary to stabilize the exchange rate and to fund the ensuing current account deficit was to provide hesitant potential investors with guarantees of continuity of economic policy and access to the U.S. market through an ironclad agreement with Washington. NAFTA, it was hoped, would satisfy both requirements. The sustained economic growth generated by NAFTA would narrow income differentials by creating jobs. President Salinas'

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antipoverty program, known as Solidaridad, would ease the transition from past stagnation to NAFTA-fueled high growth. As the fruits of growth trickled down and discontent no longer threatened economic policy, Mexico would gradually evolve into a democracy.

More than a complement to the modernization policies embarked upon since 1985, NAFTA was seen as a silver bullet to neutralize the obstacles those policies engendered. When more capital than expected was needed and greater reluctance to invest was encountered, NAFTA would make up the difference. It would also relieve pressure from abroad to accelerate political reform, as U.S. supporters of NAFTA toned down their criticisms of human rights violations and electoral fraud in Mexico to avoid imperiling free trade. Investment from abroad would enable the economy to grow while introducing new technology and greater efficiency and modernizing Mexican society. Most Mexicans' traditional identification of modernity with the United States would be reinforced; their traditional resentment of the United States over past injuries and present asymmetries would be softened.

While it was hoped that NAFTA would address many of these problems, it has not defused the end-of-term crisis that Mexico's succession process has traditionally generated. Granted, the government's expectations, however inaccurate or overblown, touched a receptive chord among large sectors of the population. Polls repeatedly indicate strong support for NAFTA, as well as unfounded reasons for it: a recent survey found that 45.8 percent of those interviewed believed NAFTA would make it easier for Mexicans to get jobs in the United States. Similarly, it has created illusions in the United States that it would help stem Mexican immigration. Most immigration scholars in both countries expect NAFTA and the economic policies it will encourage in Mexico to stimulate migratory flows in the short run, as displaced peasants and laid-off employees take advantage of large wage differentials and head north.

But the dichotomy between the short and long term runs through the debate on NAFTA's advantages and drawbacks. Economic integration between the United States and Mexico, already under way for years, is surely better served by a legal framework to rationalize and administer it. And Mexican economic development and living standards—if not national autonomy or cultural identity—will benefit in

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the long run from more investment and trade with the United States. The problem lies in the interim: How will the adjustment costs of NAFTA be distributed among the three partners and among different regions and sectors of the population within each country? How should the agreement address these questions?

NAFTA either ignores these problems or leaves their solution to the market. The trade pact presupposes that the amount of money needed to bring together economies and societies as distinct as Mexico, the United States and Canada is not overwhelming and that market forces alone will provide it. In fact the United States will have to retrain tens of thousands of workers and cushion the shock to innumerable communities and factories. Canada is already losing jobs and markets, while Mexico confronts its balance-of-payments difficulties. The three countries will also have to tackle environmental problems and infrastructure deficiencies, along the border and inside Mexico, together with major regional disruptions and a costly process of harmonization.

NAFTA'S HIDDEN COSTS

AS THE EUROPEANS have learned, bringing together advanced and backward economies is an expensive proposition. Since the disparities between Mexico and its neighbors are greater than any comparable differences in Western Europe, odds are that the North American experience will be more costly. The three governments hope whatever must be done will be accomplished by private investment: low wages and solid business opportunities will attract private capital to Mexico, paying for infrastructure, environmental cleanup, the trade gap and debt service. But private money is unlikely to prove sufficient; nor will it flow to Mexico as freely as expected. For now NAFTA incorporates no contingency provision—no special funds and no special taxes.

Moreover, Mexico's regulatory situation was largely excluded from NAFTA, with the exception of those areas where strong American interests are involved: foreign investment, intellectual property and the textile industry. But if Mexico profoundly differs from its neighbors in any way besides overall wealth, it is in the absence of the rule of law and the regulatory framework that characterize developed market economies. The Mexican judicial branch is totally subservient to

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the executive; regulatory agencies have no independence whatsoever; corruption is egregious. By omitting both supranational mechanisms for enforcement of norms and rights—on the environment, labor, consumer protection, due process—and any demand for the overhaul of Mexico's political and legal system, NAFTA's signatories ignored a fundamental facet of the Mexican reality.

Finally, NAFTA does not address the issue of whether Mexico has—or should have—the same type of market economy as that espoused by United States. Is Mexico more like the United States, where nearly everything is left to the private sector and the relatively free workings of the market? Or are Mexican traditions closer to those of the European social market economy model, with greater emphasis on state involvement and more stringent regulations and constraints on the market? Will NAFTA be an association of like-minded partners, like Europe before Britain joined, or will Mexico always play the role of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, defending seemingly eccentric customs and preferences? In the initial euphoria of negotiations, these matters were all shunted aside, dismissed as irrelevant or to be taken up at a later time. That time may have suddenly arrived.

NAFTA NEEDS REFORM

IN THE SAME WAY that the Clinton administration decided that a series of so-called supplemental agreements would serve U.S. interests, a number of changes would render NAFTA far more beneficial to Mexico as well. Various proposals have been placed on the table to transfer resources from NAFTA-winners to NAFTA-losers: border transaction taxes, a windfall profit tax, a North American development bank, a European-style regional fund scheme and a deeper reduction in Mexico's debt, among others.

These proposals are viable because their proponents come from the two wealthier nations, who would have to foot most of the bill. Moving forward with NAFTA without provisions along these lines would mean missing an excellent opportunity to attack the key obstacle to Mexico's development. A long-term program, including social conditionality and accountability—whereby local authorities and non-

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

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governmental organizations receive and supervise part of the funding—would work wonders for Mexico's balance of payments, the reconstruction of infrastructure and the redistribution of resources.

NAFTA should also be designed to contribute to political change in Mexico. It should only go into effect with a preamble like that issued in 1978 by the European Community at the start of negotiations to include Spain, Portugal and Greece: "The heads of state and government solemnly declare that respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and human rights in each member state are essential elements of the European communities." The application of the European precedent would entail a crucial test: submitting Mexico's August 1994 presidential elections to international monitoring by the United Nations and the Organization of American States. U.S. or Canadian congressional certification of the elections should be explicitly excluded; the multilateral nature of the exercise should be firmly proclaimed.

Support exists in Mexico for the idea. PAN has often called for international observers, and grass-roots groups have invited contingents from abroad. Cárdenas met with former President Jimmy Carter in May to explore the possibility of Carter's participation in Mexican election monitoring. Ratification of NAFTA and its entry into law could be postponed until the elections, as may occur anyway. Or NAFTA could be ratified, but its entry into law conditioned on free, fair and internationally monitored elections in 1994.

Finally, there is a necessary social facet to the new U.S.-Mexican relationship. Money of the right sort will not flow to Mexico in adequate volumes, nor can it be put to good use, unless a series of deep changes are carried out in social policy and structure. These policy changes must extend to unions and the environment and include efforts to reduce income disparities through tax reform and higher social spending, as well as measures to strengthen civil society. These are the famously debated labor and environmental chapters of NAFTA—side agreements with teeth, that is, commissions independent from the three governments with the resources and power to impose sanctions.

Beyond the side agreements, though, the bilateral relationship must empower Mexican society to achieve its own aims and fight its

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own battles. Mexico's social inequities can only be redressed through major efforts in education, health, housing and combating poverty. This enterprise, in turn, can only be achieved through significant tax reform. Other than improvements in collection, little has been achieved on this score; the adjustment in Mexican public finances over the past decade occurred entirely on the spending side. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, total tax revenues over GDP stagnated from 1980 (17 percent) through 1991 (16.8 percent), remaining at a level well below not only that of Europe and the United States but also that of most successful developing nations.

There are, of course, other additions to the trade pact that would be beneficial to Mexico, such as beginning immigration negotiations on temporary domestic service workers. And there are issues of concern to the United States—and to many Mexicans—that can be partially approached through democratization: the authentic establishment of the rule of law, improved drug enforcement and an end to corruption.

CHANGE WITH OR WITHOUT NAFTA

THE QUESTION IN THE final analysis is whether a free trade agreement without these improvements is still in both countries' interests and, conversely, what consequences NAFTA's rejection or postponement would have for Mexico. As with the rest of the NAFTA debate, hyperbole has contaminated the discussion of what these options would imply: a collapse of the Mexican economy, a reversal of the structural reforms, a run on the currency, a dramatic drying up of investment, a deep-rooted nationalist backlash.

Except for short-term pressure on the peso—manageable in many ways, including the Federal Reserve's intervention in exchange markets—should the agreement not be approved by the U.S. Congress by January 1, 1994, these catastrophic scenarios are unlikely. They are mainly a scare tactic to expedite passage. The Mexican economy is already in recession. Adopting nafta on time might set off a rush of short-term financing, but raising the long-term volume of direct foreign investment is an arduous task, especially given the global economic slowdown. The economic reforms undertaken in Mexico over

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the past few years were largely inevitable; with logical, and necessary, rectifications and adjustments, they are here to stay.

NAFTA's rejection would lead to a nationalist backlash only if the Mexican people felt strongly enough about it. But while polls show they support NAFTA, Mexicans are increasingly skeptical and vastly uninformed about the accord. Undoubtedly, some would engage in "gringo-bashing," but outside the immediate circle surrounding Salinas and the largest Mexican conglomerates, NAFTA's postponement may be either regretted or hailed but would not mean the end of the world.

Indeed, the most severe consequences of postponement may well be political. President Salinas bet the store on NAFTA, and if passage is his triumph, rejection or delay is his defeat. There was no need to frame the issue in those terms, but now that Salinas has, damage to his prestige and power may be unavoidable. That this complicates the succession is beyond dispute, although it is already clear that Salinas will have to choose the PRI candidate without knowing the outcome of the NAFTA debate. It is equally evident that quick approval of NAFTA would strengthen Salinas' hand in the succession; its postponement or rejection would weaken him. But whether it would weaken Mexico is highly dubious.

The broader issue is which process for transferring power will help to address Mexico's deep-rooted dilemmas. The case has been made that the most desirable outcome can, under present conditions, only be secured through the traditional authoritarian process; a NAFTA-induced crisis would favor supposed "nationalist-populist" options, either within the PRI itself or in the Cárdenas camp. But others argue, more persuasively, that if postponement of NAFTA forced an opening of the political system and a clean election in 1994, the process itself would guarantee the outcome: whoever was elected—even a closet populist from the PRI, Cárdenas or an inexperienced PAN candidate—would have to govern in the center, because that is where the votes are. Instead of the perfect outcome resulting from an increasingly unstable process, a reformed democratic process would ensure an acceptable outcome for everyone.

In the end, this is the central issue Mexicans and their neighbors to the north must face. The country has enjoyed unparalleled stabil-

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ity for more than seventy years, but the levers and gears that maintained it are worn out. There are two risks to choose from: sticking with the old system until it breaks down, seriously and irreparably; or taking the leap into a new system, knowing full well that both the transition period and the new order itself will not be free of dangers. Had everything neatly fallen into place—the economy buzzing along at six percent, jobs and social spending up, corruption and drugs under control, NAFTA approved on time and with minimal damage—a painless and risk-free, gradual and perfectly managed transition might have been feasible. But in the real world, everything does not always break the right way; many of the things that could have gone wrong did. In view of the options, the best choice for Mexico is evident: change at last. It is not without perils, but it offers the chance of finally making Mexico the country its people have always deserved, and never possessed.

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Oil: Reopening the Door

Joseph Stanislaw and Daniel Yergin

GLOBAL AGAIN

TWENTY YEARS AFTER it burst into international politics with the 1973 crisis, oil remains a strategic commodity critical in the global balance of power. But, looking toward the 21st century, the perspective has changed radically since those days when it seemed that oil power would engulf world politics.

Today, economics is taking precedence over politics. Many exporting countries court the international oil companies that they once shunned. The door that was slammed shut in the 1970s is being reopened. In fact, with the prospect of the opening of the petroleum reserves in Russia and many other countries that up to now have been politically inaccessible oil is truly a global business for the first time since the barricades went up with the Bolshevik Revolution.

In retrospect, the shocks of the 1970s can be seen as the high point of oil nationalism. It was the era when the world economy hung on the comments of oil ministers in the hallways of OPEC meetings and when the wrongs of colonialism were to be set right. It was to be the beginning of the "new international order," a zero-sum game that would see a wholesale redistribution of wealth from the North to the South and a diminution of the international stature of the United States and the other major industrial powers.

Much of that is now history. The oil exporters learned that they

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needed the importers as much as the importers needed them. The producers may have had oil to sell, but the consumers provided the markets. They could also provide, when needed, security. These developments lead to new questions about the very meaning of security, and what durable relationships are now possible between consumers and producers that will serve the longer-term interests of both. The Persian Gulf War of illustrates both the critical position of oil in the global balance of power and the importance of interdependence between producers and industrial consumers. There is also the increasingly important question of how to reconcile energy use and environmental imperatives.

With the collapse of communism, the global security issues that were uppermost have receded. Regional security issues, however, remain. The world is now shifting back to oil dependence on the Middle East, where modernization and Islamic revivalism are in conflict. Moreover, oil's traditional relationship to other global issues continues. It is intertwined with Russia's transition to free markets and Asia's economic growth. The United States is back on the track of higher oil imports, which means that its foreign policy will remain acutely sensitive to developments in oil-exporting countries.

In the years ahead, the global oil industry will require much higher levels of investment than in the recent past to meet both energy needs and environmental requirements. Politics, which in the 1970s sundered economic links between producers and consumers, is now permitting the reconnection of those links, though on a different basis. Thus, a new dimension of security between exporting nations and oil companies will come from the interweaving of investment, trade and finance. This reconstruction will mobilize the investment necessary to develop supplies for the next century. As a result, producers will be able to tap into the capital, technology and skills of consuming countries while supplying their markets.

LESSONS OF THE OIL CRISES

In September 1973, Japan's prime minister went so far as to predict that an oil crisis would come within ten years. It came in more like ten days, with the surprise attack that launched the 1973 Yom Kippur

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War, quickly followed by the oil embargo. In fact, the crisis had been building over the previous three years as the world market tightened and oil exporters began pushing up prices and asserting control over the oil resources within their borders. The resulting oil crunch took on the political cast of a battle between South and North.

The 1973 crisis drove prices from $2.50 to $10 a barrel and sent the global economy into a downturn. Then, at the end of the 1970s, revolution disrupted supplies from Iran, creating a panic that drove prices from $13 to $33 a barrel, seeming to foretell a permanent shortage and continuing turmoil.

Within a few years, however, it became evident that the price increases and the specter of shortages were creating powerful counter reactions. Non-OPEC oil development proceeded at a rapid pace. Conservation proved far more powerful than generally expected. All over the world utilities switched from oil to other fuels. Confronted with such developments, the exporters found that they could maintain high prices only through laboriously negotiated production quotas.

OPEC was soon faced with declining oil demand and diminishing market shares. Its share of the world oil market (excluding the former Soviet Union) fell from 63 percent in 1972 to 38 percent by the end of 1985. In one memorable quarter, Saudi Arabia's oil production had slumped to less than that of the British sector of the North Sea. In 1986, in the exporters' quest to regain market share, oil prices collapsed, falling to $10 before recovering to about $18 a barrel.

In the meantime, the consuming countries established security measures that would help moderate future crises. These included the International Energy Agency, an international emergency sharing system, increased communications, and prepositioned stocks such as the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve.

In the same years, the oil market became more flexible and transparent, with the development of trading ("oil as just another commodity") and the rise of futures markets. Oil is now carried around the world not only in behemoth supertankers but also in a sea of electronic information that instantaneously sweeps through trading rooms on every continent. While it can take a decade or more to develop a major new oil field, today's markets can swiftly adjust to changes in current supply and demand. For example, oil prices rose

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dramatically at the beginning of the gulf crisis but began declining in response to adjustments after only two months, as other producers hastened to bring unused capacity back into production. By the eve of Desert Storm, oil prices were actually lower than they had been a half-year earlier, in the weeks before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

WELCOMING BACK OLD ENEMIES

THESE CHANGES HAVE brought a dramatic shift in the perspectives of oil exporting countries. They are redefining their relationship with the market and with the international oil industry. For the exporting nations, the essential issue of sovereignty has been answered. They own their resources and determine what happens to them. That was their essential victory in the 1970s. Now undisputed, this fundamental political recognition provides the exporting countries with the flexibility to focus on their longer-term economic interests.

Part of this reflects a shift in the broad intellectual currents in the global economy. In the 1970s the trend was toward increased state control—whether nationalization in developing countries or price controls in the United States. Today, the trend is quite the opposite—toward privatization, deregulation and commercialization. "The God that Failed" is not only the intellectual's adherence to Marxism but the very socialist model embraced as the path to development throughout much of the Third World.

Many of these developing countries are also in an economic bind. Populations are growing rapidly. When combined with flat oil prices, that means declining real per capita income. The OPEC surpluses, which so worried central bankers in the 1970s, have long since disappeared. What is less recognized is the debt burden and the budget and balance-of-payments pressures many of these countries are under. Like many other governments around the world, they need to reduce government spending and deficits. Yet they face political difficulties in making such adjustments. In a world in which oil prices are not even keeping pace with inflation, oil earnings can be increased only through greater productivity and increased output. But that takes significant investment—money that many exporters do not have.

Thus economic imperatives and changing ideologies are moving

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current and would-be exporting countries to seek the international oil industry's capital, technology and management skills. These countries are showing a new willingness to transfer the risk of exploration and the investment requirements to an international oil industry that is organized to carry such risks and that has the capital—thus preserving limited state funds for investment in infrastructure and societal needs.

Around the world, doors are being reopened. Venezuela, which nationalized foreign companies in 1976, is cautiously inviting them back to develop marginal fields. Argentina, which established the first state oil company in 1922, is now privatizing it, and at the same time is encouraging foreign companies to explore and produce within its borders. Algeria is actively inviting in companies to stem the threatened decline in its oil production and to bolster natural gas output. And Vietnam, no longer on a Soviet dole, has offered some of the most attractive terms to entice companies to explore there. It is already the site of a mini-oil boom and will become the site of a bigger boom once U.S. restrictions on American companies are lifted. China, worried about the adequacy of energy to sustain its economic growth, is opening new areas to Western companies as well.

RUSSIA'S NEW REVOLUTION

BUT OF ALL THE DOORS, the biggest and most uncertain opens into the former Soviet Union, where the successor states, particularly Russia, are engaged in what may be described as the most extreme privatization in the world—the privatization of the revolution.

Behind this transformation lies the failure of state enterprise, which is central to the overall collapse of the Soviet economy. Just five years ago, the Soviet Union was the world's largest oil producer, having pushed its production to 12.5 million barrels per day. As an oil exporter the Soviets had been among the biggest beneficiaries of the price increases of the 1970s. The huge windfall in foreign earnings enabled the Soviet Union to postpone economic reform. ("We will never make that mistake again," Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said recently.) After the 1986 oil price collapse, the Soviet system paid a terminally heavy price for its failure to grapple with reform earlier.

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In addition, its stellar production numbers obscured the grave weaknesses—overinvestment in terms of return, poor oil field practices and outdated technology. Most of the Soviet oil production was concentrated in Russia—11.5 million out of 12.5 million barrels per day in 1988. In the five years since 1988, however, production in Russia has collapsed to 7 million barrels per day. The astonishing drop is equal to 60 percent of total U.S. oil production and is greater than the output of any OPEC nation except Saudi Arabia.

The impact of this decline on the world market has been cushioned by the precipitous drop in Russia's economy, which has drastically reduced its domestic oil demand, and by the reduction in non-hard currency exports from Russia to the other former Soviet republics. Hard currency exports of oil and gas are essential to Russia's economic recovery, as they currently represent half of total hard currency earnings. At current hyperinflation exchange rates, oil and gas earnings are twice Moscow's entire budget deficit.[1]

Until the late 1980s, the Soviet oil industry was closed to the outside world. Even statistics on the size of reserves were a state secret. While its personnel had high-level skills, they worked with technology 30 or 40 years behind that of the West. Since the late 1980s, Western oil companies have been able to carry out geological research with advanced technologies. As a result, while output continues collapsing, the estimates of the potential have been growing. Reserves, now thought to be three or four times the unofficial number of the 1980s, are in the class of the big Middle East producers. They will, however, be more expensive and less convenient to find and produce than those in the Middle East. Foreign companies are anxious to participate, viewing the geological opportunities to be among the best available in the years ahead. They recognize the many risks and obstacles, and discover more along the way, but they have concluded that the biggest risk would be in not participating.

Foreign investment could make a major difference. It is estimated that investment on the order of $50 billion between now and the year 2000 will be needed to stabilize Russian oil production at its current

[1]Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson, *Russia 2010—And What It Means for the World*, New York: Random House, 1993.

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levels. Otherwise output could fall to as low as 4 million barrels a day, which could be disastrous for Russia. To return to the output levels of the 1980s could require another $50 to $70 billion of investment. Russia does not have resources available anywhere near that size. Clearly foreign investment will have to provide a substantial part. Foreign investment, by bringing in Western technologies, will also substantially improve environmental performance. The end of communism has revealed a devastating and deadly pattern of environmental abuse. No exception is the oil industry, which is estimated to leak annually the equivalent of 400 supertanker cargoes from pipelines into the soil.

It is hard to see how the Russian oil industry can be turned around without Western participation.

But significant foreign investment will not occur until the legal, fiscal, financial and institutional foundations are in place, at least to some degree. In turn, that depends on the overall evolution of the Russian political system. The current situation is too volatile and unpredictable for international oil companies to make large commitments.

Another hindrance is the opposition of some Russians to foreign participation. They argue that they do not want to be "colonized" and that the Russian industry can modernize itself and generate its own surplus for investment. If there is Western participation, they say, it should be on Russian terms and Russian terms alone. Missing, however, is an awareness of the international competition for oil investments. Companies can choose between Russia, Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia—as well as the highly promising oil and gas reserves of the newly independent states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

That investment flows are available is illustrated by the shift of capital out of the United States. In the last five years, oil companies have dramatically realigned their spending away from America to the rest of the world. Driving the shift is the quest for better opportunities, reinforced by increasing operating constraints and environmental barriers to exploration and production in the United States. The shift also means that the contraction continues in the domestic U.S. oil industry.

It is hard to see how the Russian oil industry can be turned around

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without Western participation. Some progress, in fact, is already being recorded. Recently a Russian official reviewing one American-Russian proposal concluded, "This project will bring us $40 billion in foreign earnings over the life of the project that we otherwise would not have. How can we not go ahead?" Facilitating the involvement of Western companies in Russian oil development in ways that Russians themselves will regard as beneficial and fair is a matter of the highest priority. Such cooperation will not only help support the overall stability of the world oil market. It is also of critical importance to Russia's ability to make the transition to democracy and free markets, which in turn will be one of the key factors in global security.

But the risks also have to be reasonable for the Western investors. That means creating a framework that will give investors confidence over the longer term. Some steps have been taken, such as the developing European Energy Charter, to which, despite its name, the United States is a party. But a good deal more will have to be done.

THE CHALLENGE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM

THE OPENING OF DOORS around the globe points to a competition between countries for investment and a surge in activity by private companies. Yet producers and consumers face a new potential for divisiveness—over environmental policies. In the 1970s the dominant fear was of running out of oil. In the 20 years since, proven world oil reserves have doubled to over one trillion barrels. Today the policies of industrial countries increasingly focus on the environmental effects of energy use, particularly of oil.

A host of industrial world policies has singled out oil as the product whose use is to be discouraged. To the exporting countries, these policies disadvantage the product central to their national incomes. "Petrophobia" is the label given to this trend by Saudi Arabian Petroleum Minister Hisham Nazer. "Oil," he has said, " has been made the culprit."[2]

The conflicting interests are embodied in the controversy over broad-based energy taxes, such as the come-and-gone BTU tax in the

[2]Hisham Nazer, "The Development of the Environment and the Environment for Development," speech, Houston, TX, February 1993.

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United States and the European Community's would-be carbon tax. For the industrial countries, such taxes raise revenues that contribute to closing yawning budget deficits and meeting environmental goals. To the exporters, however, such taxes mean a reallocation of revenues, or economic "rent," between producers and consumers, thus damaging the exporting countries' main source of national income.

Last year, EC countries earned about $200 billion in taxes on the 11.8 million barrels per day of oil products they consumed. This is nearly three times the $74 billion that the oil exporters earned selling a similar amount. The Italian treasury alone earns as much in its tax take on 2 million barrels a day of consumption as Saudi Arabia earns in producing more than four times as much oil.[3]

The drive for increased energy taxes has two effects on oil exporters. First, it makes them question their pricing strategies. Second, and of longer-term significance, it makes exporters question the value of investing in capacity necessary to support a growing oil demand that the industrial countries are trying to discourage.

Yet vigorous environmentalism is a reality that all participants in the international petroleum industry must recognize. Oil has been a business of technological change since the first well was drilled in Pennsylvania in 1859. Increasingly, the technological effort will be applied to meet the environmental agenda. The investment and technology that will be required—whether in production or in refining cleaner products—provide a new dimension in which the interests of producers and consumers will coincide and cooperation will be essential.

THE NEW PRIZE

OIL DEMAND, left stagnant or declining by the 1970s' oil crises, only began to grow again after the 1986 price collapse. By 1989, world consumption finally regained the previous record level of 1979, and is continuing to grow. Indeed, if Russia is excepted, world oil demand is currently increasing at 1.8 percent per year, even in the midst of a weak global economy.

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[3]Joseph Stanislaw, "Ecotaxes and Oil Prices: A New Battle?" Cambridge Energy Research Associates, Cambridge, MA, 1993.

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But the pattern of growth has changed. Demand is rather flat in North America and Western Europe, reflecting, among other things, the growing use of more efficient automobiles. In these nations the oil industry is preoccupied with the costs of staying in business. The U.S. oil industry is estimated to be facing $152 billion in costs and investment over the next 20 years to meet environmental standards.[4]

Demand growth is elsewhere—reflecting economic advancement in the developing world. The new prize is Asia. Economic "miracles," sustained growth, and rising incomes require energy. Many of these countries are swiftly applying higher environmental standards. But they do not want to be impeded from striving for higher living standards. Over a decade, Asia will require in excess of a trillion dollars of energy investment to support economic growth.[5] Oil demand will increase by five million barrels or more. By early in the next decade, Asia will be consuming more oil than North America. This means a shift in the oil market's center of gravity and that the Asian countries will come to play a bigger role in investment and oil trade, commensurate with their stakes.

Despite continued conservation, global oil demand could be 15 to 20 percent higher a decade from now. The trend could, of course, be changed by the considerable research and development efforts to find alternatives to oil, particularly in transportation. Yet, as things are today, oil is more than economically competitive—something that would have seemed unlikely in the era of the oil crises.

The years ahead will see an economic and environmental competition among energy sources, a technological horse race in which tens of billions of dollars will be wagered. To date, oil is proving to be environmentally competitive, keeping up with or even running ahead of new standards, albeit with considerable investment.

Natural gas, once the unwanted by-product of oil production, is now oil's biggest competitor and becoming the premium fuel around the

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[4]National Petroleum Council, *U.S. Petroleum Refining: A Report to the U.S. Secretary of Energy*, Washington, 1993. Forty-six billion dollars is estimated to be spent on existing facilities to meet existing requirements; $106 billion is for costs and investments either for new facilities or to meet anticipated requirements.

[5]Cambridge Energy Research Associates, "Energy Investment to Meet Asia's Economic Growth," Cambridge, MA, 1993.

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world. A great deal of the financial resources of the "oil and gas industry" will actually be going into natural gas. It is an environmentally attractive fuel; some even call it the "politically correct" energy source. A decade from now there is likely to be a vigorous and diversified international trade in natural gas. Natural gas is not a significant competitor in transportation, where oil reigns supreme. Rather, the battle for markets will be played out around the world in electric generation, where the emphasis will very much be on environmental attributes.

But there is a question mark over oil supplies. A U.N. embargo has excluded Iraq from the world market since it invaded Kuwait. As a result Iraq has forgone more than $40 billion of oil earnings since August 1990. At some point, however, Iraq will meet U.N. requirements and will reenter the world market with substantial exports. And when it does, prices could well sag for a time.

As it is, OPEC countries continue to argue over quotas. Still, the market balance is very different from the conditions of a decade ago. Even factoring in Iraq, the world oil market is operating at about 92 percent of production capacity, quite different from the 1980s, when it was down to 80 percent. Today's market is reminiscent of the balance in the 1970s on the eve of the first oil shock.

Although political considerations and producer-consumer relations are very different from the 1970s, a tight oil market is vulnerable to shocks in a way that an oversupplied market is not. Projecting into the next century, one sees no shortage of potential crises that could affect world oil supplies, with dangerous consequences. Future crises could arise from the Middle East, as in the past. Since the fall of the shah in 1979, Iran's population has grown from 39 million people to more than 60 million. Its policies in the future are uncertain, torn as they will be between Islamic militancy, both at home and abroad, and economic self-interest. A number of other countries are feeling the pressure of political Islam and social turbulence. But future crises could also arise from events in other parts of the world, such as some kind of disruption in the former Soviet Union.

If a disruption occurred in a tight market a few years from now, perhaps at a time of economic growth around the world, the effects could be quite sharp, both as measured in inflation and recession and in terms of raising international tensions.

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Such risks underline the continuing need to assure an adequate "security margin" that can absorb such shocks. Moreover, considerable new production capacity will have to be added to support a growing world economy, but the timing of those additions is uncertain. What happens to oil prices, with all that they signify for the world economy, depends very much on the relative timing of demand growth and investment in new production capacity.

Where will the additional supplies come from? Not from the United States, where oil production has fallen by a dramatic 25 percent since 1986 and is continuing to decline. The domestic U.S. oil production industry is deeply depressed, and the U.S. oil services industry, which is the global leader, is also under heavy economic pressure. U.S. oil imports are likely to continue rising in the years ahead. Some of it will come from oil development that is being encouraged by more open investment policies around the world. As Russia struggles to stem its economic decline, at least two of the newly independent republics, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, will become important players in the world oil market.

Projecting into the next century, one sees no shortage of potential crises that could affect world oil supplies.

Much of the new supplies will come from the Middle East, in particular from Saudi Arabia. In 1972 the Middle East provided 42 percent of world oil (excluding the Soviet Union); by 1983 it had declined to 27 percent; today it is 32 percent, and will probably rise to 45 percent by 2003. This means that production capacity in the Middle East will rise from 18.3 million barrels a day to 28 million barrels a day. In light of the political and social forces in the region, and the potential for yet another surprise or two in the decade ahead, security of supply will be a continuing concern for importing countries, even as the exporters continue to worry about "security of demand."

There is no single answer to these two security questions. Rather, the best bet for stability in a changing world arises from a global pattern of investment and trade in which security is enhanced by the diversity and density of economic and political links and by the commonality of interests in an environmental age.

In the years ahead, relations between producers and consumers

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could become strained again if, for instance, economic and demographic pressures mount in the exporting countries, or if political instability becomes pervasive, or if ideology again shifts, or if changes take place in the balance of power of the kind for which Saddam Hussein bid. Or, for instance, if the exporting countries come to see the implementation of the environmental agenda in developed countries as an assault on their main source of national income.

Yet even as the Cold War division between East and West has lost its significance, so economic progress is also erasing the division between North and South that was once so intense. Today, producers and consumers have a common interest in the technological advances needed to keep oil environmentally as well as economically competitive. The global energy supply system itself has become much more flexible. Over the last two decades, both producers and consumers have learned powerful lessons that reinforce their mutuality of interests and recognition of interdependence. Those lessons in themselves are a form of security. They constitute a major element in a framework that can help buffer whatever surprises may lie ahead.

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The Battle for Egypt

Stanley Reed

CAN MUBARAK SURVIVE?

EGYPT'S USUAL CALM has been shattered. Nearly every day new incidents occur in the deadly struggle between the government of President Hosni Mubarak and Islamic militants known as the Gamaa al-Islamiya, or Islamic Group. The militants gun down policemen, ambush officials and hostile intellectuals, and terrorize tourists with bombs near the pyramids or the Karnak Temple. The government hits back with equal ferocity. Suspected extremists are rounded up by the score in bloody sweeps that have left many bystanders dead or wounded. This summer Mubarak began sending his antagonists to the gallows. Groups of six and seven men were hanged on single mornings. Such mass executions are rare and shocking in Egypt.

Mubarak is facing the most serious challenge since he took over the government following the assassination of Anwar Sadat in October 1981. The danger is not so much that the Gamaa will seize power. They lack the popular appeal and the talent to take over any time soon. But they could cripple Mubarak's ability to deal with economic and political challenges that are daunting enough without the added complication of an armed insurrection. The rebellion also leaves Mubarak vulnerable to criticism that he is partly to blame for the emergence of the militant Islamic groups. His critics take him to task for failing to promote sound economic growth; for tolerating corruption and growing social injustice; and for putting off political liberalization, thus giving frustrated youths nowhere to turn to except militant Islam.

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In the coming months Mubarak's confrontation with the militants will strain the special relationship that has developed between the United States and Egypt since the Camp David process began in the mid-1970s. Indeed, there is already tension between the Egyptian government and its powerful benefactor. For the United States it is impossible not to compare the current situation in Egypt with the one that led to the disastrous fall of the shah of Iran in 1979. Once again a Middle Eastern country central to America is menaced by Islamic activists. Once again American policymakers ask whether the enormous political and economic capital that they have invested in Egypt, including $35 billion in aid since 1975, is in danger of being swept away. They also question whether Mubarak's leadership adds to the risk of failure.

AN ECONOMIST'S NIGHTMARE

MUBARAK REALIZES THAT to snap Egypt out of its present malaise and decrease the appeal of Islamic fundamentalists, he must improve the economy's performance. He has taken the first step of committing himself to an ambitious restructuring of the economy, but he faces a herculean task. Years of avoiding the sort of structural reforms so many other countries have adopted have weakened the Egyptian economy. The economy stagnated during the 1980s, while external debt rose by nearly 150 percent, from $21 billion to $50 billion. In 1991, with arrears to foreign creditors mounting, Egypt was forced to agree to a reform program monitored by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In deference to the role it played in the Persian Gulf War, Cairo received extremely generous compensation—$7 billion in military debt write-offs from the United States and another $10 billion from other bilateral creditors, conditioned on Egypt's staying in the good graces of the international lending agencies.

So far the reform effort has progressed more smoothly than anyone expected. Floating the Egyptian pound and initiating treasury bill auctions brought some $14 billion in reserves into the central bank coffers. But the hard part is still to come. The international agencies are pushing Egypt to begin privatizing chunks of the public sector, which still accounts for nearly 70 percent of industrial production, and to drop the current high tariff barriers. But with the possibility of fur-

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ther social unrest doubtless in mind, Mubarak is balking at policies that could raise unemployment, already unacceptably high at 15 percent. Mubarak is also running into resistance from the notorious public sector bureaucracy, which does not want to see its power base turned over to private businessmen. Even private businessmen are far from unrestrained admirers of reform. They have spent large sums to obtain permission to operate in Egypt. Protection often makes their plants highly profitable. The last thing they want is relaxed rules that allow competitors entry into their markets.

The goal of the reform program is to create quality export-oriented manufacturing jobs. That is fine in theory, but Egypt will likely have to endure a lot more economic hardship before it becomes reality. Government officials confess that it is not yet clear which Egyptian industries will be internationally competitive or what markets they will serve. In addition, the militants' attacks on tourists have blighted the prospects of a $2 billion to $4 billion a year industry once considered a sure growth area. They have also warned off foreign investors, whose funds are badly needed.

The most likely scenario is that Mubarak will have a tough time preserving existing Egyptian living standards. While a combination of government efforts and other factors has brought population growth down to 2.4 percent, given Egypt's estimated population of 57 million that still means more than a million new mouths to feed each year. The current zero to one percent economic growth rate is nowhere near enough to keep the already dismal $700 annual per capita income from sinking further. In addition, the legacy of the mini-baby boom after the October 1973 war means that Egypt will have to create 4.5 million jobs in the 1990s just to keep up with additions to the labor force. That is a frightening number, considering that the total labor force is only 15 million and that only 2.2 million domestic jobs were created between 1976 and 1986. In addition, the 2.3 million Egyptians working in Saudia Arabia, Libya and other Arab states are vulnerable to political and economic instability.

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A BREEDING GROUND FOR FUNDAMENTALISTS

THE SUCCESS OF Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt has been due in part to their ability to channel public discontent with the economy into support for an Islamic regime. The Gamaa al-Islamiya, which is leading the challenge to Mubarak, evolved in the 1980s from several Egyptian militant groups. The most prominent of these was al-Jihad, an arm of which was responsible for President Sadat's assassination in October 1981. Al-Jihad was established in 1980 by a Cairo electrician named Abdel Salam Farag. Farag was an Islamic activist thinker in the tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood, the seminal Islamic revolutionary organization founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in 1928. In particular, Farag built upon the work of the Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb, who was one of several brothers hanged under the Nasser regime. The Brotherhood campaigned mostly for purging the Arab world of Western influence and fighting the Zionists in Palestine. Qutb, who was tortured in prison, drew Nasser's ire by arguing that the Egyptian military regime's secularist outlook and its brutal persecution of Islamic activists proved that it was non-Islamic, or pagan. Islam had to be propagated as it was among pagans—by force. Farag went one step further, saying that the state's determination to crush Islamic activism made all courses of action futile with the exception of violent attempts to overthrow the rulers.[1]

Lacking religious credentials, Farag brought in Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, a graduate of al-Azhar, Cairo's leading Islamic university, to bless al-Jihad's military operations. The sheikh was either too peripheral or too clever to be convicted of involvement in Sadat's assassination, but he seems to have been instrumental in picking up the pieces of the movement after Farag and four others were hanged in 1982. Abdel Rahman is now the spiritual guide of the Gamaa and the inspiration behind the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and a number of other terrorist plots.

The Gamaa is organized in cells, making it very hard to monitor and suppress. It also has separate military and *da'wa*, or "call," wings.

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[1]See Gilles Kepel, *The Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, London: Al Saqi Books, 1985.

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The *da'wa* preachers are charismatic local sheikhs who avoid involvement in violent operations. The military wing seems to have been strengthened by the return of Egyptian volunteers from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Known as "the Afghanis," these militants are said to be the Gamaa's toughest and most effective fighters. The Afghan connection raises Egyptian suspicions of CIA involvement. In the late 1980s Abdel Rahman was a visitor to Peshawar, Pakistan, the staging area for the CIA-supported effort to defeat the Soviets. Many Egyptians believe Abdel Rahman was a CIA recruiter and that the agency is protecting him. Reports that a CIA official signed his U.S. visa approval in Khartoum strengthen such suspicions. The Egyptian Islamic groups have maintained offices and training centers in Peshawar, and some of their leaders, including Mohammed Shawki Islambouli, the brother of Khaled Islambouli who led the squad that killed Sadat, were based there. Recently the Egyptians persuaded the Pakistanis to close many of these offices.

Egypt's Islamic movement is a homegrown phenomenon that arises from the particular circumstances in Egypt.

Islamic militants gained their first foothold by taking over Egyptian student politics in the 1970s. They won adherents by providing relief from the squalid conditions in Egypt's underfinanced but open-to-all universities. They offered female students protection from sexual harassment by providing them with private transportation and campaigning for sexual segregation in the packed classrooms. They helped students save money by producing cheap copies of textbooks and organizing private tutorials to compete with the expensive ones offered by professors. It is worth noting that Sadat encouraged the Islamic movement until he realized his mistake in the late 1970s. Sadat viewed the Islamists as a useful counterweight to the left. He also thought making a show of his own personal piety would raise his stature. Saudi Arabia, whose policies toward Islamic radicals have also been incredibly shortsighted, contributed government and private funding for Islamic causes.

The Islamic activists' horizons broadened in the 1980s. While still retaining control of the campuses, they moved out into slum neigh-

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borhoods such as Cairo's Imbaba and the rural backwaters of upper Egypt. Through a network of thousands of "unofficial" mosques as well as through cassettes and pamphlets they spread the message that Mubarak's government was tyrannous, corrupt and un-Islamic. The solutions they propose are not very profound. Egypt should have Islamic law, or *sharia,* rather than the French-based system that now prevails in most courts. They claim that under an Islamic system Egyptians would not have to bribe their children's teachers or swelter in wretched apartment blocks while Cairo's elites cavort in five-star hotels and nightclubs.

Both domestic and international circumstances enhance the appeal of their message. The Islamic preachers constantly stress that Egypt's patron, the United States, is bombing such Muslim countries as Iraq and Somalia while doing nothing to aid the Muslims being slaughtered in Bosnia. At home the Egyptian government, under pressure from Western creditors, has been dismantling the ramshackle welfare state built by Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s. Food, fuel, clothing and electricity all used to be available for a small fraction of world prices in Egypt, but their prices have risen substantially in the last two years with the slashing of subsidies and lifting of controls. The poor, of course, suffer most from higher prices, and their neighborhoods tend to receive low priority when it comes to establishing schools and health clinics. The Islamic activists have been able to ease some of the burden with health clinics, Koranic schools and even loans.

Published lists of those accused of terrorism show that the Gamaa appeals to young disadvantaged men—tradesmen, food vendors, schoolteachers, students, the unemployed. Such men find themselves in a terrible position in today's Egypt. They are unlikely to find decent jobs unless they go to Saudi Arabia or other wealthy Arab states. Without good jobs they will not be able to afford the stiff prices for apartments, a requirement for marriage.

While estimates of the Gamaa's strength are sketchy, its militants may number around 10,000, with hard-core support several times that. A high percentage of both the Gamaa rank and file and its leaders come from such upper Egyptian cities as Asyut, Sohag and Beni Suef. The people in these regions tend to be poorer and more alienated from Cairo than those in the north. They are also more prone to

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blood feuds and other violence. Finally, the large numbers of Christians in these regions exacerbates Muslim extremist sentiments. The Gamaa's ugliest trait is its harassment and persecution of Christians. Some local Gamaa leaders have been ruling areas of upper Egypt as virtual fiefdoms, forcing the Christians to pay taxes and robbing them to finance Gamaa activities. In the last two years there have been numerous killings of Christians in upper Egypt, including the massacre of 12 people in an upper Egyptian village in 1992.

Such violent acts are a two-edged sword for the militants. While taking on the government has gained the Gamaa notoriety, the mayhem alienates most Egyptians. In particular, a recent series of nail-packed bombs that killed children and other ordinary Egyptians has hurt the Gamaa's cause, although the group denies responsibility for these attacks. In addition, many Egyptians are discovering that the Gamaa's attacks on tourism have severely cut into their livelihoods.

Mubarak has accused Iran and Sudan of being deeply involved in the wave of terrorism in Egypt. In March, he threatened military strikes if Sudan allowed Iranian warships to use Port Sudan. The Iranians undoubtedly have some contact with Egyptian militants. They do what they can to encourage Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East—although with only minor success so far. As for Sudan, the regime of Lieutenant General Omar al-Bashir probably is giving refuge to Egyptian militants, as it does to other Arab extremists. They may well be infiltrating across the wastelands between the two countries. On the other hand, neither foreign regime's role seems crucial to the Egyptian movement. It is essentially a homegrown phenomenon that arises from the particular circumstances in Egypt. There will always be a gulf between Egyptian and Iranian militants, because the former are Sunni Muslims and the latter Shiite.

Mubarak may have ulterior motives for his bellicose rhetoric toward Iran. Egypt may be trying to stay in tune with the Clinton administration, which has expressed concerns about Iranian arms purchases and intentions. It also may be trying to persuade the gulf Arabs to make use of Egyptian troops. The Egyptian regime is disappointed that Saudi Arabia and the other gulf Arabs have shown no interest in having Egyptian troops stationed in their region, preferring to rely on American forces for defense.

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CAN THE FUNDAMENTALISTS TAKE OVER?

AT PRESENT IT is difficult to conceive of the Gamaa taking power in Egypt. The movement lacks a leader with the charisma of an Ayatollah Khomeini or the ability of Sudan's Hassan al-Turabi. This shortcoming, moreover, applies to the whole Egyptian Islamic movement, not just the Gamaa. Until recently Abdel Rahman was not well known in Egypt and not taken very seriously. But he has shown considerable dexterity in manipulating his dealings with U.S. and Egyptian authorities to gain publicity. The militants also suffer from organizational problems. Their loose, decentralized structure helps in recruiting and in creating new leaders, but it also encourages strong personalities to form their own groups. Egyptian press reporting on the movement is full of tales of ideological and personality conflicts. There still seems to be a conflict between expatriate remnants of al-Jihad, who want to concentrate on assassinating key regime figures, and activists inside Egypt, who might be amenable to an accommodation with the authorities that would ease the burden of repression. The nail bombs may have been intended to sabotage any deal with the government. Tensions have on occasion led to deadly shootouts among the groups.

On the other hand, the Islamic tide is still rising in Egypt. Cairo's atmosphere has changed over the past 15 years. Today one frequently encounters women in full Islamic regalia, including heavy veils, and a majority of women cover their hair in public. The bounds of what is permissible in literature and scholarship are narrowing. A professor was denied tenure this year at Cairo University because Islamic authorities said his work smacked of atheism. Books by Farag Foda, a writer assassinated by the Gamaa in 1992, and other works deemed offensive to Islamic mores were barred from display at this year's Cairo book fair.

Many intellectuals deplore the Islamic trend because it threatens to curtail their freedom and does not seem to offer useful answers to Egypt's problems. But they are now asking whether it will dominate Egyptian politics as Arab nationalism did in the 1950s and 1960s. While they find Mubarak uninspiring, they nevertheless side with him against the militants as the lesser of two evils. Others, seeing opportu-

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nities, have shifted from being Marxist writers to Islamic ones.

The Muslim Brotherhood, whose appeal is broader than that of the Gamaa, could wind up being the beneficiary of this cultural shift. Still officially banned, the Brotherhood has been tolerated by the government since the 1970s as a moderate alternative to groups like the Gamaa. It has formed an alliance with the Socialist Labor Party, which allows it to use the party newspaper *al-Shaab* as a forum for its views. In the last seriously contested parliamentary elections in 1987 this grouping easily outdistanced other opposition parties, winning 17 percent of the vote. But the Brotherhood has been concentrating its efforts on taking control of the influential professional associations, whose elections are much more democratic than votes for the legislature. It now has control of the doctors', pharmacists' and engineers' unions and about half the seats on the governing council of the Egyptian Bar Association.

Although it dabbled in terrorism in the past, the Brotherhood claims to have learned a bitter lesson from the brutal repression it suffered under Nasser and to be interested only in peaceful evolution toward an Islamic society. While there are undoubtedly contacts between the Brotherhood and the Gamaa, there is also tension. Brotherhood spokesmen have openly criticized Abdel Rahman's calls for violence, saying that the Gamaa's tactics could provoke a wave of retribution that would set the Islamic movement back for decades. The Brotherhood has a very different face from the Gamaa. It is rooted in the traditional establishment of professionals and businessmen. The Brotherhood's appeal, however, suffers somewhat from its image as an exclusive, bourgeois secret society. It has elaborate initiation procedures, and many of its leaders are men well past their prime. Also, many Egyptians have lost money in Islamic banking schemes—some of which were associated with the Brotherhood.

MUBARAK'S RESPONSE: ALL STICK, NO CARROT

ALTHOUGH ISLAMIC revolutionaries have been a problem for Mubarak throughout his term, the Egyptian president has yet to come up with a coherent strategy for dealing with them. He is relying mainly on crude repression. The 14 men executed in June and July

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were tried in military courts known for not respecting due process. Moreover, many Egyptians believe that Mubarak has given the police so much license that they are out of control. On March 10, for instance, police are said to have lobbed tear gas grenades into a mosque in Aswan and then killed seven people and wounded 15 others as they tried to escape the fumes. Human rights groups such as Middle East Watch and the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights report that torture and detention without charge are common practices. Such tactics may backfire because they radicalize prisoners and their families. Mubarak's tough approach could also lead him into conflict with the United States. He has been warned that human rights violations could jeopardize the $2.15 billion the United States gives Egypt each year but, publicly, he is shrugging off the warnings. "I refuse to allow human rights to become a slogan to protect terrorists," he said in July.

At the moment Mubarak's approach seems to be all stick and no carrot. He risks making the same mistake as the Algerian regime—repressing the Islamic movement relentlessly without providing any outlet for peaceful religious activism. He recently ousted Interior Minister Abdel Haleem Moussa in part because the minister favored a dialogue with the militants. He is also backing the Muslim Brotherhood into a corner by changing the election rules for professional associations so as to break its grip on them.

While his aides talk of the need for a multidimensional approach, Mubarak seems to be more or less standing pat. His prime minister, Atef Sidqi, appointed in 1986, is one of the longest-serving heads of government in modern Egyptian history. Several members of Mubarak's cabinet have served even longer. He has not responded to months of pleading by intellectuals and liberal politicians that he counter the fundamentalists by broadening political participation. He has done nothing to bring corruption under control, even though it has become a major political issue, affecting the society from top to bottom. In the early part of his term Mubarak was considered an honest—if plodding—manager, but one now hears frequent rumors of corruption in his cabinet and in his entourage. Some American companies will not even bid on Egyptian government contracts because they think the process is rigged. Before

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making changes in the oil industry in 1991, Mubarak allowed years of mismanagement to drive out foreign companies and hurt the prospects of a major foreign exchange earner. Egyptians complain Mubarak spends even more lavishly on vacation homes and other perquisites for himself than did Sadat. Some Egyptians think that it is unethical for Mubarak's son, who works for Bank of America in London, to be arranging lucrative Egyptian debt-equity swap deals worth about $200 million.

Some American companies will not even bid on Egyptian government contracts because they think the process is rigged.

Mubarak risks being increasingly seen in Egypt, as well as the United States, as part of the problem. He has not made use of the system of limited democracy that Sadat introduced to keep his opponents occupied. While the opposition press is quite open and free, the party system has become almost moribund. Most of the opposition parties boycotted the last parliamentary elections in 1990 because they considered the election rules so biased in favor of Mubarak's National Democratic Party that it was not worth participating. Because the parliament nominates the president, its compromised legitimacy will detract from his mandate if, as expected, he runs for a third six-year term in October. Mubarak will probably face embarrassing challenges to the legality of the election laws.

Criticism of Mubarak comes not only from the opposition but also from the heart of the establishment. Last fall, Tahseen Bashir, a senior retired diplomat and former spokesman for Sadat, published an open letter to Mubarak detailing shortcomings that hobbled Egypt's political and economic development. "There is a general perception among all classes of people that corruption is spreading in a shocking way and that it is having a negative effect on all economic production and the capacity to grow and compete," Bashir wrote.

As long as Mubarak retains the confidence of the military, he will be reasonably secure. Under Egypt's three military leaders, the officer corps have become almost a separate caste, living in their own enclosed world of subsidized housing, education and recreational facilities. In Cairo today one picks up only hints of military discon-

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tent. Senior officers are said to be unhappy that their living standards no longer compare with those of wealthy businessmen. There are also reports of senior officers extracting financial tribute from underlings. Junior officers are said to be unhappy with their seniors' monopoly on perquisites such as subsidized apartments, which they rent out for extra income.

Such grumbling is certainly not sufficient cause for risking intervention. It is also unlikely that the officer corps have been extensively penetrated by Islamic extremists, although Islambouli and another key al-Jihad figure, Abboud Zommour, a jailed rival to Abdel Rahman, were officers. But if the mobs take to the streets, as they did in 1977 and 1986, Mubarak will likely have to call on the army to restore order. One wonders whether in the present circumstances the general staff would be tempted to demand political adjustments.

To keep the military on his side, Mubarak will have to preserve access to modern weapons, training and other benefits that come mainly from the United States. If the military thinks he is jeopardizing this relationship, Mubarak will be in trouble. It is a good bet that some of the savvier officers are already skeptical about how Mubarak will fare with the Clinton administration. They doubt that he appreciates the changes in Washington, and suspect that he does not understand that the new administration will likely place more emphasis than its predecessor on democracy, human rights and political reform. In the event of trouble, the pro-American but controversial former Defense Minister Abdel Haleem Abu Ghazala could serve as a rallying point. Abu Ghazala was damaged by involvement in a recent scandal but still has admirers in the military.

FORCING MUBARAK TO CHANGE

THE TROUBLES in Egypt create an acute dilemma for the United States. Despite debilitating economic problems, Egypt is the closest thing the Arab world has to a leader. As such it is probably a more useful ally than Iran ever could have been. Egypt was instrumental in assembling the Arab coalition against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War, and Mubarak has persistently pushed the Palestinians and Syrians to make good faith efforts in the U.S.-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace

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process. Egypt in the hands of an aggressive, Islamic regime—still a remote possibility—could prove far more destabilizing for the Middle East than Iran. Such a regime would almost certainly threaten the peace with Israel. And it would likely have much more influence in the Arab countries than the Iranians, who are partially isolated from their Arab neighbors by language and cultural barriers.

But these concerns and Mubarak's value as an ally should not stop the United States from taking stock of its relationship with Egypt. Of course aid has been generally a good deal for the United States in that it has helped keep the peace with Israel. But in the long run Egypt and, indeed, Israel are not so important to the United States that they should receive half of U.S. foreign aid. Moreover, it is disturbing that after an enormous, nearly 20-year American effort so little about the Egyptian economy and political system has changed. There seems to have been too much funding and not enough tough questioning. Because the United States has consistently gone along with Egyptian officials' arguments that reform would be too risky, it bears some responsibility for Egypt's economic problems.

In an interview, Osama al-Baz, Mubarak's able political counselor, acknowledged that American aid cannot continue forever at current levels and indeed should not. But he warned that five to seven more years were needed "to cushion the impact of reform," or it might be aborted. It is hard to deny the general thrust of this argument, but the United States should nonetheless demand economic reform.

It would also seem fair to ask Mubarak to take some important steps to address U.S. concerns about Egypt's political stability. Although the Egyptian political parties have severe flaws, holding more open elections, as King Hussein has done in Jordan, might well improve Mubarak's position. The U.S. Agency for International Development is putting together a project to increase the clout of the Majlis al-Shaab, Egypt's parliament, but such a program will not be terribly effective if the organization is a sham. Mubarak has also put off grooming a successor for far too long. Though there are rumors that Mubarak will soon appoint one or more vice presidents, including someone from outside the military, he has long resisted such a step, apparently for fear of creating a rival. But a dangerous situation could arise if something should happen to Mubarak. There is no clear

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choice among the current defense minister, Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, and other top officers. Some analysts fear a factional struggle could ensue if Mubarak suddenly departed the scene.

Egyptians may bridle at American interference, but the United States has little choice but to push harder—albeit diplomatically—for reform. Mubarak and Egypt probably have time to make adjustments, but the recent troubles show that they cannot afford to muddle along forever.

While supporting Mubarak, the United States should avoid adopting a broadly hostile stance toward Islam. The troubles in Egypt may signal that a period of change is coming to the Middle East, which has so far avoided the upheavals that have swept the communist world. The Arab nationalist military regimes that have dominated the Middle Eastern stage for four decades appear to have worn out their welcome. While the Gamaa and other Islamic revolutionaries do not seem to be the Arab world's Václav Havels or Lech Waleşas, American policymakers should keep open minds about Arab leaders with strong Islamic credentials—and indeed about other emerging agents of change. A more traditional, Islamic Arab world does not have to be a more anti-American one, unless the United States helps make that happen.

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Freedom and Its Discontents

Fritz Stern

THE TRAVAILS OF THE NEW GERMANY

IN 1983 THE PRESIDENT of the Federal Republic, Richard von Weizsäcker, published a collection of essays under the title *German History Has Not Stopped.* Even he could not have predicted the pace of progress since then. And as the process of unification has unfolded, one can see the drama of German history continue as well. The economic consequences of unity are becoming apparent; the moral and psychological consequences are harder to grasp and may prove longer lasting. It is these that this article addresses.

While the two states of postwar Germany existed, Germans could believe in the unity of their nation, of a people with a common language, a common past, even a common fate. Now unified within one state, the deep divisions among Germans are more visible. No doubt there is truth in Freud's words about "the narcissism of small differences" that divides neighborhoods and family members, and yet in 1989 there was an expectation that Germans would understand Germans. In the first flush of enthusiasm, people forgot the estrangements that had grown so strong over 40 years, as West Germans came to regard the French or the Tuscans or the Dutch as closer, and perhaps more attractive, to them than the East Germans. For their part, East Germans lived with a prescribed if gradually attenuated hostility to the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.), and with a nonprescribed envy and resentment of its freedom and prosperity, witnessed

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FRITZ STERN is a University Professor at Columbia University. His article is an abridged and revised version of the second of two Tanner Lectures that he gave at Yale in April 1993.

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

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

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

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AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

The fall of the Berlin Wall, 1989

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nightly on their television screens.

Visitors to East Germany, including this author, sensed the estrangement. And in the Federal Republic, for all the ritualistic invocations of German solidarity, for all the many individuals who did genuinely care about their fellow Germans in the East, one sensed an enormous, unacknowledged indifference to them. Sudden commonality, sudden huge demands, did not instantly transform indifference to openhearted solicitude.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF FREEDOM

BOTH GERMANIES GAINED greater, if sharply different, kinds of freedom after unification—and with that freedom came new uncertainties and discontents. In the East it was the freedom from the knock at the door, freedom to travel, release from a regimented, intimidating, false existence, freedom to examine one's life. But almost immediately 17 million East Germans discovered that freedom also meant freedom to face an uncertain future, freedom to lose a job, to lose support nets, however inadequate they may have been.

For 40 years, most East Germans had accommodated to life in a world of public lies and private doubts. Totalitarian regimes mobilize people into passive participation in politics. After 12 years of Nazi rule and 40 years of communist rule in the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), they may have survived psychologically by practicing denial, by wishing not to see.

After 1989 avoiding reality became impossible, given the economic dislocations of transforming a dysfunctional, decaying command economy into a market economy—as if there was but one type of market economy. The closing of state-run enterprises led to mounting unemployment. Moreover, economic affairs were only part of what had been prescribed under the old command economy. So much of life had been lived in the public realm. So much of it had been ordered from above or came by inherited routine. Suddenly the East Germans, released from public control, had to learn to make their own choices, think their own thoughts, find their own truths. They were indeed privatized at a time when the associational life of a civil society was being but slowly introduced.

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Market economies presuppose legal structures, a system of private and public law—a legal code that has to be taught, learned and gradually assimilated. But the art of evasion also flourishes in market economies—as the 1980s so vividly illustrate. Western enthusiasts for the free market in the former G.D.R. often ignored the social costs of the transformation. Worse, the abrupt introduction of new forms of economic life also created what sociologists and Marxists have long identified with modern capitalism: alienation, anomie, insecurity. For the East Germans, the move from the rigid world of communist rule to the demands of a mobile society was hard. The very notion of planning for a market economy had an ironic ring to it. A new dependency developed. Much of life in the new eastern *Länder* of the united Germany came to be organized by Westerners who were practiced in taking decisions, in making things work and assessing the risks of the market, and who had the skills and the funds to take charge. East Germans had been taught to live and work by plans that bore little relation to reality; they had learned to suffer and endure but not to take responsibility or to live by trial and error.

East Germans hoped that the end of communism would bring instant rehabilitation as well as instant improvement in their living standard. But soon they began to think they were being "colonized"—a word commonly used that was infuriating to Western ears. Defeated, humiliated, more object than subject, many East Germans expressed their disappointment in terms of self-pity and resentment. Was there no end to their being victimized? In the early years of occupation, the Russians had dismantled and taken what was left of German industrial plants in their zone. A current estimate is that the Russians extracted some 54 billion Deutsche marks in reparations—all this while the Western zones and later the Federal Republic received Marshall Plan aid. Of course the balance sheet is far more complicated: West Germany also benefited from the huge influx of refugees from the Soviet zone and of Germans expelled by Poles and Czechs, and on the other hand, Bonn did make restitution payments to Israel and gradually gave support to the G.D.R. But East Germans believed, with some justification, that they had paid disproportionately for Hitler's war.

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SEPARATE AND JOINT PASTS

AFTER 1990 BOTH East and West Germans had to consider their separate and joint pasts. Former G.D.R. citizens had to address questions that have beset other countries at other times in the twentieth century: questions of collaboration and collusion, of culpability and trustworthiness. Which of them were so compromised that they could no longer be teachers or judges, civil servants or plant managers, professors or members of renowned academies? Who was to make these judgments, and on what basis?

West Germans, hardly at peace with their own past, seemed ready to make their judgments about Easterners. From the moment of unification I was concerned that the West Germans would be far more cheerfully, self-righteously assiduous in punishing suspected collaborators with the communist regime than their forbears had been in dealing with the servants of the Nazi regime. The very popularity of that regime had made de-Nazification difficult. Even now, West Germans with an undetected compromised past continue to flourish. Earlier this year a prominent West German physician was forced to resign from a major post in an international organization because it was revealed that he had participated in the Nazis' euthanasia program.

The Nazi past divides West Germans still, as shown by the controversy surrounding President Reagan's visit to Bitburg in 1985, by the so-called historians' debate, and by the decades it has taken to document the complicity of the German army in the atrocities on the Eastern front. To this day many Germans, in and out of uniform, choose to believe in the *Wehrmacht's* innocence. National Socialism never needed a wall; there was never a threat of a mass exodus. By comparison, millions of East Germans voted with their feet. Under the Nazis an indeterminate number of Germans had gone into "inner emigration," tried to remain insulated, to purchase peace at the price of silence. West Germans who were confounded by this past—and divided among themselves about it—were now called upon to judge fellow Germans who had lived for a further 40 years under a totalitarian regime initially held in place by foreign bayonets.

Most East Germans knew that their leaders, piously mouthing slogans of peace, had believed in violence and had no mercy. What they

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could not have known, because the tape was released only last February, was that in 1982 Erich Mielke, head of the Stasi, the state security police, had told his closest colleagues that to save the lives of millions one might have to kill a bandit: "All this drivel about not executing and no death sentences, all crap, comrades."

The tone does remind one of Nazi evil. In the post-Stalinist era East German leaders, like leaders throughout the Soviet bloc, sought to replace torture with other kinds of intimidation, including the abomination of psychiatric wards. Party leaders ordered alleged enemies of the regime to be tortured, incarcerated or shot; they organized espionage and initiated or facilitated international terrorism. But these same leaders after 1970, and especially in the 1980s, garnered official recognition by other states. Chancellor Helmut Kohl received them in Bonn; Franz Joseph Strauss visited them and arranged for the G.D.R. to receive a one billion Deutsche mark credit. West German Social Democrats collaborated with functionaries of the East German Communist Party to hammer out a joint paper defining areas of agreement and disagreement. Today the former East German leader, Erich Honecker, is free in Chile, and only a few frontier guards are in prison, while tens of thousands of teachers and other East German civil servants have been suspended or dismissed.

Questions of collaboration and collusion beset East and West Germans alike.

As the communist regime crumbled, East Germans, left in their crowded, drab, decaying dwellings, saw pictures of how the *nomenklatura* had lived in insulated comfort and read about the perquisites that ranged from special medical care to Swiss bank accounts. Had they really not noticed that the much-touted egalitarianism of the first German socialist state had been traduced daily, visibly and invisibly? The apparatchiks had their own Volvos, their children had privileged access to education, and all of them could shop in the Intershops, where Western goods could be bought for Western currency. The revelations of the extent of these special benefits—petty by Western standards—enraged many East Germans. They felt betrayed. They remembered the leaders' endless invocations that, unlike the rapacious capitalist West, the G.D.R. was an egalitarian society where austerity

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and sacrifice provided a psychological guarantee of a better future. But they must have had at least an inkling that their leaders had not practiced the virtues of delayed gratification that they preached.

The resultant outburst sprang from what I think was an ambivalence about deprivation. They minded it, of course, but they may have felt that austerity was virtuous—in old Germanic terms, ennobling. To have stark proof that their leaders had mocked this notion was offensive. In this largely Lutheran country, was this a distant echo of Martin Luther's attacks on a Roman hierarchy that preached poverty but lived in corrupt luxury?

THE STASI LEGACY

THE EAST GERMANS were made to realize something far worse. Their insidious, malevolent regime had managed to entrap vast numbers of them in collusion and corruption. The state security police had organized an unprecedented web of surveillance. In its final days, the Stasi consisted of 97,000 full-time employees—with perhaps as many as 140,000 unofficial collaborators, most of whom had acknowledged their commitment in writing. Only the higher ranks of society, such as professors or members of elite academies, were allowed to register their agreement orally. In addition, membership in the Communist Party rose to two million people, who were particularly vulnerable to Stasi demands. All this machinery for 17 million Germans—while the Gestapo, helped by countless voluntary informers, at the end of the Nazi regime had only 32,000 members for 80 million Germans. The Stasi files—nearly 100 miles of them—offered poisonous proof of a poisoned society.

The Stasi were the eyes and ears of a regime deeply distrustful of its own people. Born of distrust, the Stasi became an agent of distrust. In a world without laws or enforceable rights, a person searches for the like-minded, for another person to talk to, if need be in some outside place where surveillance is more difficult. West German observers thought that East Germans had managed to have closer, more trusting relationships. Some East Germans probably did have a particular affinity for trust and friendship. They invested in them as rare human goods at a time of moral scarcity. Imagine then the shock,

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the retroactive dissolution of trust, when one discovered one's friend had been an informer; husbands had informed on their wives, wives on husbands, parents on children, friends on friends. Even now, as more information is divulged, the web of suspicion spreads ever wider.

During the 1970s, when the East German regime gradually replaced physical terror with calculated intimidation, the Stasi, like other secret police, learned to play with fiendish aptitude on people's vulnerabilities, operating an ever more elaborate system of carrots and sticks. The rewards for being an unofficial collaborator varied—advancement in a career, travel to the West; the sticks were more formidable, often involving the punishment of children for the alleged sins of their parents. The Stasi also resorted to more lethal methods, such as efforts to bring about "personal destabilization," including undermining marriages—a whole array of Iago-like villainies aimed at destroying trust among friends and potential critics.

Stasi revelations have threatened some of the most promising political careers in the new *Länder* of the united Germany. Two examples may suffice: Lothar de Mazière, the first vice chancellor of the unified Germany, resigned when it was said that he had had Stasi contacts; and insinuations continue to be made against the only socialist minister president in the new *Länder*, Manfred Stolpe of Brandenburg. Stolpe had worked in and with the Protestant churches and had helped them to help victims of the regime. He had regular contacts with the Stasi—how else to aid people entrapped by them? Knowledgeable defenders of Stolpe and others similarly accused insist that any responsible person who tried to help people who had fallen afoul of the regime had to deal with the Stasi. But critics claim that even talking to Stasi officials was to take the first steps on a slippery slope. Others, myself included, might argue that in a tyrannical system only absolute immobility can protect one from the dangers of that slope. Once upon a time the Stasi oppressed a people. Its legacy has been to demoralize them and perhaps to deprive them of the few good political leaders they might have had.

Opposition to the G.D.R. regime was feeble compared to that elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. After the one great outburst of June 17, 1953, when East German workers took to the streets to defy their ever more demanding and repressive regime and were crushed by Soviet tanks,

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there was apparent conformity. Not in East Germany the repeated uprisings or the great alliance of workers and intellectuals as in Poland's Solidarity Party, or in the Hungarian rebellion of 1956, or in the Czechoslovak Spring of 1968. It has often been said that Germans are somewhat untutored in civic courage. They have the word but not the all-essential practice. Albert Hirschman once wrote of moral resources, including civic spirit and trust: "These are resources whose supply may well increase rather than decrease through use . . . like the ability to speak a foreign language or to play the piano, these moral resources are likely to become depleted and to atrophy if not used."

The Ulbricht-Honecker regime, mixing German traditions with Soviet models, had time to promote a separate cultural life in the G.D.R. They wanted to create athletes of the spirit, writers and artists who could dazzle the outside world and satisfy at least some aspirations of their own people. As the East German molecular biologist and admirable citizen-thinker Jens Reich makes clear in a new book, the regime sought to implicate the entire intelligentsia—technicians as well as poets—and to a devastating degree it was successful. For many reasons the samizdat literature that flourished in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Russia did not exist in the G.D.R. In the early years of the regime, writers like Robert Havemann were imprisoned and gifted irritants like Wolf Biermann were expelled. This last decision prompted East German writers to protest for the first time. But by and large the limits of state tolerance for dissent were rarely, if ever, tested.

The Stasi files—nearly 100 miles of them—offered poisonous proof of a poisoned society.

Gradually the demands for socialist realism were relaxed. Other kinds of art were allowed. The novelist Christa Wolf was able to depict life in the G.D.R. with some degree of candor. Writers jousted with censors, and parodists ventured the occasional mischief, as when the writer Heiner Müller said, "We are the most progressive state ever: 95 percent of the people are against it, such a thing has never happened before," or when he sang, "The Stasi is my Eckermann." Now come the revelations that these writers, too, were once part of the Stasi net. In the late 1950s and early 1960s Christa Wolf was an unofficial informant, unbeknownst even to her husband. Decades lat-

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er she described at length how she too came under Stasi surveillance. As the most prominent of East German writers, she has been denounced and defended. She illustrates how easy it was under that regime to move from being accomplice and perpetrator to victim, and how difficult it is to judge the conduct of people enmeshed in a system with so many visible and invisible tentacles.

There is at present a great controversy about the conduct of East German authors and the intelligentsia. Some West German critics express outrage, and there is a danger that in time the work of these writers might be altogether forgotten. This would be a distortion and a loss. Some of them were guarded witnesses to life under dreadful conditions. Now, in the unified Germany, West Germans who were spared anything like these terrors have assumed a leading role in decision-making, in dismissals and recruitments throughout the eastern *Länder*. Their work is officially subsumed under the term *Abwicklung*. This sanitized bureaucratic term, once used by the Nazis, suggests legal procedures or business liquidations. It bespeaks distance and condescension; it is unattuned to tact or compassion.

The question of judgment is inherently difficult. In the case of many of the accusations against former East German citizens, one must ask: How reliable are the Stasi files, and how often were they slanted by inferiors trying to curry favor with their superiors? Finally, as Jens Reich has implicitly warned, the Stasi could easily become a scapegoat for the G.D.R. regime. The greater villains were the party and state functionaries; the Stasi were not autonomous villains, and some of their collaborators may have had mixed or honorable motives. Only the clearest picture of life in the G.D.R. can help to render humane judgments. There may be good reason to sympathize with those West Germans of an impeccable past who say of all these leaks and revelations: "Enough"—an "enough" that has been much heard in the countries of Eastern Europe.

LIVING WITH HISTORY

IN THE YEARS to come Germans of both East and West will continue to find it difficult to deal with the history of the 40 years of the G.D.R. and F.R.G., two entities that lasted almost as long as the Bis-

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marckian Reich. Polemical, divisive arguments have already begun about who supported whom and when, who promoted unification and who opposed it. Right-wing Germans or newborn nationalists are already accusing the old Federal Republic's left of national neglect, of having slighted the goal of national unity, of having collaborated with the Communist Party or of having been "soft" on East German criminals or collaborators. In time, after the calumnies and the memories are extinguished or transformed, later generations may "bracket out" the G.D.R.'s history—as Germans call such a deletion—while finding that it remains hard to expunge the Nazi past. As President Weizsäcker has said, the G.D.R. neither started a war nor committed genocide. It may gradually fade from historical consciousness, be dismissed as a Soviet satellite, an alien excrescence of something called the Cold War. West Germans' earlier indifference to the G.D.R. will facilitate so convenient a lapse of memory. But the G.D.R. in all its ambiguity needs to be remembered and in some way integrated into the history of Germany and Europe in our century.

The beginnings of the G.D.R. are most likely to be forgotten, the time immediately after the war when in the Soviet zone of occupation a so-called socialist state was gradually established, expropriating the large estate owners and nationalizing what was left of German industry. In the baggage train of the conquering Red Army arrived Moscow-trained German communists—many of whom had been tortured in Nazi camps—determined to forge a union between socialists and communists and create what they called a great antifascist bloc, a bulwark against a revived German fascist-type nationalism. True socialists, remembering how at the end of the Weimar Republic communists had in fact aided the rise of Nazism, defied communist pleas and demands; men like Gustav Dahrendorf and Kurt Schumacher never had any doubts about the true nature of communism. A few socialists in the Soviet zone believed that the Communist Party was genuinely antifascist, that it would radically purge all former Nazis and would recruit its own cadre, mostly of young, untrained people from the unpropertied classes. The claim that the German Democratic Republic, formally established in 1949, would become the first socialist state in German history, that by its extrusion of Nazis and dismantling of capitalism it was cleansing German soil of Nazi

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poison, that out of devastation it was building up an egalitarian society—all had a certain appeal, particularly for writers and intellectuals. Bertolt Brecht, long the lyricist of a proletarian culture, happily left his American exile, with its capitalist culture and McCarthyite hysteria, to win honors and his own theater in East Berlin. Lesser writers followed. Thomas Mann accepted an honor from the new state—though he decided to settle in Switzerland, spiritually equidistant from both Germanies. In the G.D.R., as elsewhere at the time, communists had the inestimable advantage of claiming to be the vanguard of a new culture; judge us by some distant future, they said, not by the bleak present. Intellectuals, once committed to the faith, found it hard to break with it, to confess to themselves their error.

In the last few months an old German word has reappeared over and over again in books and articles. Although there is no English or French analogue, *Lebenslüge* roughly means the lie that is life-giving, the lie that is essential to a particular life, the lie that a person or a people may know to be false but without which a person or state would perish. The G.D.R. was saddled with one *Lebenslüge* from the start: the fundamental insistence that the Soviet Union was at once liberator and fraternal master and model. The East Germans sensed the travesty of truth. They knew that the Red Army had raped and looted. They knew that the Soviets had despoiled their country, and they sensed as well that their rulers, at least in the beginning, were servile instruments of Soviet masters. One of the many East German witticisms—the one commodity in which they outperformed the West Germans—insisted that the Russians were indeed brothers with whom one had indissoluble fraternal bonds: friends one chooses, brothers are unalterably inflicted. Gradually the antifascist principle, the G.D.R.'s sole threadbare claim to legitimacy, lost its credibility as well: to call the Berlin Wall the great antifascist wall was too grim an absurdity.

The Soviets and the G.D.R.'s rulers needed each other. For the former, East Germany was the frontier state, the most important defense post with the greatest arsenal of weapons. For the rulers of the G.D.R., the Soviet presence constituted the ultimate reserve army against their own people. The Federal Republic, its own legitimacy accepted by its people, had tied itself to the West, but these attach-

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ments enhanced security and prosperity and corresponded to the wishes of most of its people. In the 1980s the East German regime, encouraged by the Federal Republic's ever more enterprising Ostpolitik, sought to gain some greater room for maneuver, some independence from Moscow. Characteristically, Honecker's greatest moment of independence came at the end, when he banned Soviet publications carrying Gorbachev's liberalizing message. To the end, Honecker remained a German Leninist—German because there was a tinge of sentimentality to his inhumanity. He and his closest advisers, most of them ardent believers in the powers of repression, ignored younger members of the *nomenklatura* who understood the need for reform in East Germany. Their day came too late. The G.D.R. was founded on deception, on various *Lebenslügen*, and its end was hastened by the self-deception of its aged leaders.

The G.D.R. leaves an ambiguous legacy, as does the Federal Republic; the difference is that the institutions of the old F.R.G. have not ended but are in the process of having to adopt to different conditions. The old political culture of the Federal Republic is being tested and, in part, measured by Eastern ideals. In the historic rivalry between communism and social democracy, the former by its very collapse has scored a major triumph. Many people, especially on the political right, rejoice in confounding communism and socialism, interpreting the dismal failure of the one as irredeemably discrediting the other as well. The historic task of democratic socialism has been to correct the most grievous, ruthless qualities of what Jacques Delors once called "*capitalisme sauvage*." It is doubtful that this task will ever be totally completed.

The G.D.R. is dead, and some East Germans already have their nostalgic moments. Disappointed in the present, prompted by a selective memory, they ask: "Was everything wrong in the last 40 years?" And they tend to erase from memory the hopelessness of the old regime and remember that at some level of subsistence, however drab and uniform, even ordinary citizens could count on the essentials of life: housing, however wretched, food, however meager, medical care, however inferior and indifferent. They remember that in the old G.D.R. there was no crime, no drugs, no pornography. The communist rulers of the G.D.R. could have echoed President Nixon's

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boast: "We have taken crime off the streets." The government had assumed a monopoly on crime.

Citizens remember the much vaunted *Kinderkrippen*, a grandiose term for child-care centers to which working parents could send their children. The memory of the *Kinderkrippen* evokes the G.D.R.'s traditional concern for family life, for women's rights, including the nontraditional right of abortion, for social welfare—all this in contrast to the cold life in unified Germany, where the cash nexus rules all. These *Kinderkrippen* have become a kind of symbol for the better side of G.D.R. life. People forget that these benefits were palliatives for deeper pain. The *Kinderkrippen* were the decorous part of a controlled society that violated the home it pretended to protect.

MORE DIVIDED THAN BEFORE

On some deep psychological level the unified Germany is more divided than before; the physical wall has been internalized. Where once had been the untroubled hope that at some future date the division of the country, unnaturally maintained, would be healed, there are now painful inequalities of power, wealth, experience and assertiveness. The living standard of East Germans is still much lower than that of West Germans; wages are lower and unemployment is at least three times higher. Economic inequalities heighten psychic discontent: East Germans are given to self-pity, West Germans to arrogance and exasperation. Some West Germans themselves complain of Western self-righteousness. Both sides deserve understanding. There are many Germans who demand solidarity not in words but in deeds, but their pleas are lost on pusillanimous politicians who, in confusion, think mostly of the next election.

In March 1993 the Bonn parliament finally approved a solidarity pact that has brought some predictability into the economic picture. It provides for new taxes to fund specified payments to the new *Länder*. Approximately seven percent of GNP will be transferred to the East over the next decade—roughly one trillion Deutsche marks. In July even the European Community agreed, reluctantly, to provide 27.5 billion Deutsche marks over the next six years to the new *Länder* out of its regional assistance funds. The strains are clear: Germany as a whole

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is in a deep recession, with continued negative growth; according to many observers, it is the most serious recession since the founding of the Federal Republic. Hence the great unease pervading both parts of Germany. Still, the solidarity pact affords real chances for the new *Länder*, as Kurt Biedenkopf, minister president of Saxony, made clear in a speech to the Saxon parliament in mid-March—a candid speech that exemplified the possibilities of democratic leadership.

The old Federal Republic has also gained greater freedom in 1989, but a very different kind of freedom from the East Germans'. Unification has fulfilled the old national dream and attenuated—even on some level removed—Germany's dependency on its Western allies. From the beginning of the Federal Republic, it needed Allied protection, most clearly in the ever vulnerable city of Berlin. For 40 years this dependency dictated the parameters of choice. Now questions about German national interest and purpose reemerge in full force. In the ongoing debate there are some who demand greater German assertiveness, who have grown tired of being held hostage to the memory of the Nazi past. That sentiment is so strong that Jürgen Habermas has warned against yet another *Lebenslüge* for Germany, the *Lebenslüge*, as he puts it, "of us being a normal nation." How understandable the wish of so many Germans to be liberated of the burden of the past, to "relativize" Nazi crimes, to seek a retrospective moral equality. How understandable, and probably how unattainable.

It is one of the tragic ironies of the 1989 revolutions that they coincided with deepening crises in the West. The newly liberated countries reached out for a market economy at a time of worldwide recession. They sought to embrace democracy when the democratic countries had plunged into scandals of corruption and a general paralysis of leadership. They looked to Europe just as the hopes of Europe 1992 faded in the post-Maastricht malaise and when the term "democratic deficit" seemed to have resonance beyond the internal arrangements of the European Community.

Germany's unanticipated unification, with its staggering demands, came at a time when the old Federal Republic was already experiencing mutually reinforcing pressures. The West German economy—in the past the guarantor of West German democracy—was slowing down. The capitalist world was not at its most dynamic, or at what

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Joseph Schumpeter defined at its most destructively creative, when East Germans clamored for a free market and the many gurus of the market economy urged instant transformation. West Germans, including leading politicians, were not immune to the greed and corruption of the Reaganite 1980s. Faith in the political system was shaken. Put differently, the twin miracles of Bonn's beginnings, the economic miracle and the political miracle—that is, the emergence after the devastation of the Nazi years of unprecedented political leadership—had come to an end. Germany faces its gravest crisis since the end of World War II.

A new and ultra-right-wing party, the Republicans, has scored impressive victories. It is doubtful that the massive increase in asylum seekers between 1987 and 1992—an increase of some 800 percent—is solely or even primarily responsible for the dissatisfaction that this party exploits. People in all parts of Germany feel an imbalance between the economic and moral requirements of the newly unified state and their political response. There has hardly been a time in which the political classes were held in such low esteem—as is true in the rest of Europe. The present uncertainties prompted Marion Countess Dönhoff, Helmut Schmidt and a few like-minded citizens to issue a manifesto in November 1992 under the title "Because The Country Must Change." Or consider Jens Reich's fears of future unrest "when I observe our dance around the golden calf, called property, prosperity, consumerism . . . which we hold sacrosanct. Even now I see the coming disgust and the helpless failure of the putative victors. Late socialism clung to the illusion of eternal growth and progress. We should not succumb to it under a different guise."

On some deep psychological level the unified Germany is more divided than before.

The eruption of xenophobic violence, the killing of Turkish women and children, has horrified the world. Hundreds of skinheads are supported by thousands of nationalist, perhaps even neo-Nazi, sympathizers, while millions of Germans organize silent marches to protest this ugliness, a demonstrative solidarity never before seen in Germany. To some, the very silence of these marches, however impressive in themselves, is disturbing. Germans need speech, thought and moral authority, charged questions about asylum seekers

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and fiscal measures that would grapple with the needed transfer payments to the east. All these need public argument. Over and over again in the last few months Chancellor Kohl has been admonished to "tell the truth."

In all parts of Germany there is a palpable deficit of trust—trust in leaders, trust in almost all aspects of life. The English philosopher John Dunn has spoken of trust as the core element of democracy. And while trust is in short supply in all countries, its steady decline in Germany is alarming. Degrees of trust cannot be quantified, unlike the interest rates of the Bundesbank—yet the two are linked. The Deutsche mark remains the symbol and instrument of Germany's economic stability, and the unarticulated incantation could be "In the Deutsche mark we trust." In a decade or so that same Deutsche mark will—by the painful transfer of some thousand billion Deutsche marks—transform the new *Länder*, especially Saxony, into the most modern region of Europe; the moral-psychological recovery and unity will take much longer.

I say this with a certain sadness, sadness that the promise of 1989, or what I thought of as Germany's second chance in this century, has been trapped in pain and disappointment. Once again Germany's history did not have to be like this; there was nothing inevitable about it. More truth, better leadership and greater tolerance would have made a difference. Even now the pessimists see a political system without leadership—and see a repeat of Weimar. The optimists see the possibility of rejuvenation and reciprocal learning, of which there has been too little.

To seek freedom in defiance of the state is not part of the German political tradition, as it is of the English, Dutch, French and American traditions. And yet twice in the last half century Germans defied a tyrannical state: on July 20, 1944, a few Germans tried to overthrow Hitler—they failed, and the two Germanies have had a difficult time assimilating or celebrating their memory; and in the fall of 1989, hundreds of thousands of East Germans successfully defied their regime, admittedly at a time when neighboring countries had already thrown off the communist yoke; it was nonetheless a momentous achievement in German history. Their leaders have already sunk into oblivion, and the memory of those great days has faded. People refer to

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these events as *die Wende*, the turn, thus transforming what had been dramatic and heroic into something prosaic and bureaucratic. For all the disappointments that have followed, we should celebrate not merely the collapse of the Berlin Wall, but the men and women who by their demand for a better and freer life made that collapse one of the great moments in their history and ours.

The revolutions of 1989—however darkened in the meantime by the return of barbarism in many parts of the world—have given us an opportunity to live in trust and truth, to validate the hopes of Václav Havel.

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Holding Together South Africa

J. Daniel O'Flaherty

THE THREAT OF POLARIZATION

OBSERVERS OF SOUTH AFRICAN apartheid have long predicted that the imposed system of racial separation could only come to a cataclysmic end. The violent aftermath of the April 12 assassination of the popular black leader, Chris Hani, as well as the dramatic assault by right-wing Afrikaners on the site of constitutional negotiations in June, offered a glimpse of that convulsive future. But alarming as these events were, their real significance lies in the fact that neither was able to derail progress toward eventual black participation in government.

In July, South Africa's traditionally bitter enemies agreed to hold the country's first multiracial election next April 27. That vote will be the first step in implementing an unprecedented five-year power-sharing arrangement. Despite persistent problems, South Africa retains significant potential for reconciliation. The imperatives that sparked multiparty negotiations since 1992 have only grown more compelling. A worsening economy continues to drive the desire for accord. All major parties, moreover, including the African National Congress, have accepted that none is strong enough to govern successfully alone. Despite the impression lent by ANC President Nelson Mandela's decision to delay calling for an end to economic sanctions, South Africa's post-apartheid transition remains on course.

The language of democracy is being spoken in South Africa by politicians who are simultaneously striving to create a new order and

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prevail within it. The deals still required for a lasting accord run the risk of decoupling leaders from their followings. Each major party will have to convince wary constituencies of the benefits of compromise and that their interests are not being sold out. ANC leaders, having already abandoned armed struggle, must now explain that sanctions should be lifted and power shared while many of the outward manifestations of apartheid remain. The governing National Party (NP) must still reassure its increasingly nervous white constituency of its future after one-person one-vote elections without the safeguard of a white veto. And Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) has already had to agree to an elected constituent assembly, and therefore a leading national role for its bitter rival, the ANC, before securing the degree of regional autonomy it had wanted.

The danger of polarization is real. South Africa's ongoing negotiations are about far more than constitutional mechanics. They represent an effort to construct a political center that will hold together. But selecting an election date before fully establishing the rules of the game decisively transforms South Africa's constitutional negotiations into a power struggle among these contending parties. This struggle is certain to have a number of unsettling consequences that will provide the first major test of South Africa's transition. Further negotiations will only become more politicized and potentially polarized, making compromise harder to achieve.

THE ANC'S NEW PRAGMATISM

FOR THE PAST two years the ANC has engaged in intensive talks on a range of policy issues with the government and other important institutions, such as business, labor and church groups. In the process it has jettisoned the political baggage of a socialist past—most important, its support for nationalizing private companies. The ANC leadership is now focusing on finding ways to generate new wealth to meet the pent-up demands of its mass base. Consequently, it has accepted power-sharing and a more market-oriented approach to the economy. The ANC will likely cohere on political and constitutional issues. But when it comes to the degree of state intervention in the economy and the redistribution of wealth, significant internal disagreements persist.

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The most serious potential fissure is between the ANC's negotiators, who accept the interim power-sharing formula and a major role for free markets, and its more militant wing, which favors mass action and greater government economic intervention. Hani, though often in the latter group, could have served as a bridge. His assassination complicates the task of the moderate ANC leadership surrounding Mandela, which is operating on the premise that, at least initially, the ANC will need the cooperation of the white establishment in order to run the country.

The negotiating parties have tried to counteract the powerful trends pulling apart South African society.

Since 1992 the negotiating parties have tried to act as a countervailing force to the powerful trends pulling apart South African society. This pragmatism stems in part from the ANC's realization that it lacks the broad support for a mass uprising. Evidence of this fact was demonstrated in September 1992 when, after the ANC had pulled out of negotiations, its more militant wing led a "mass action" on Bisho, the capital of the "independent" Ciskei homeland. Instead of being welcomed by a sympathetic population, 28 ANC demonstrators were killed when Ciskei soldiers opened fire. The ANC realized then that there would be no South African "Leipzig," the site where hundreds of thousands of East Germans had thronged into the streets in evidence of that regime's terminal illness. Indeed, aware of the destructive potential of violent demonstrations, ANC leaders actively intervened following the Hani assassination to keep mass protests under control.

This pattern of restraint will now be put to the severe test of a ten-month election campaign. Political violence, on the wane during the first half of 1993, is now rising in the townships, where rival political organizations greeted the announcement of the election date by killing more than 160 people in ten days. Criminal violence has also reached alarming proportions. The murder rate has doubled in the past four years and now stands at more than ten times that of the United States. In 1990-91 blacks were the victims of 96 percent of the average 49 murders committed daily in South Africa. Many of these deaths were due to the low-grade civil conflict between the ANC and IFP, exacerbated by the prolonged recession and the absence of a

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legitimate police authority in the townships and squatter camps. Both the transitional executive that will oversee the election and the ensuing government of national unity are widely expected to conduct some sort of crackdown to restore order. Meanwhile, many fear that political violence could undermine the legitimacy of the election results.

These conditions have combined to convince Mandela and ANC economists of the need to revive South Africa's economy by regaining access to international capital. Consequently, the ANC abandoned its insistence that full majority rule be a precondition for the removal of international economic sanctions and made a tactical retreat in favor of a power-sharing agreement. While power-sharing will allocate some unspecified ministerial portfolios to minority parties, it will also undoubtedly reflect what now appears to be a decisive ANC electoral advantage. But the ANC's growing confidence about its electoral prospects has yet to overcome its lingering insecurities about the final stages of negotiations.

INKATHA'S INSECURITIES

THE PARTICIPATION of Buthelezi and the IFP is the sine qua non of any successful political agreement. Despite the apparent willingness of the ANC and government to continue negotiations in the IFP's absence, both understand that the country cannot be governed in the teeth of IFP opposition. At each decisive juncture, the IFP has demurred, delayed and finally come around after extracting concessions.

Although the IFP attempts to be a national political movement, its strategy is ultimately designed to shore up its base in Natal province and eventually to use that support, in a federal system, as a kind of parliamentary make-weight holding the balance of power. As chief minister of the KwaZulu homeland, Buthelezi wanted the IFP to "entrench devolved power now, before a new constitution is drawn up." He advocates a weak central government and, on that point, the white government agrees, as both fear ANC domination under strict majority rule. Buthelezi is now clearly accepting less entrenched devolved power than he would like.

Two sources drive Buthelezi's hostility toward majoritarianism. First, almost half the population in Natal and his KwaZulu homeland

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seems to support the ANC. Second, Buthelezi fears that resources might subsequently be allocated to ANC-dominated areas such as Soweto and Johannesburg rather than to the KwaZulu/Natal region, which has a lower per capita income and provides Buthelezi's main base of support.

The conflict between the ANC and IFP has much to do with deep-seated fears at the grass-roots level about political gang warfare based on historical allegiances. Such anxieties have led to concern that the low-intensity conflict currently simmering in KwaZulu/Natal and elsewhere could boil over. What makes the possibility of escalation especially dangerous is Buthelezi's real and potential white allies on the extreme right.

Conjuring up nightmare scenarios for the nation's future is a cottage industry in South Africa. In the most extreme, Buthelezi plays a role similar to that of Jonas Savimbi in neighboring Angola, where the rebel leader resumed fighting after losing an election. Buthelezi could thus unite with rogue elements of the security forces, disgruntled homeland leaders, extremist Afrikaner groups and the Conservative Party—currently the official parliamentary opposition, some of whose leaders are charged in the Hani assassination. This unseemly alliance, the conjecture goes, would oppose an ANC-dominated central government, by force if necessary. In fact, the nucleus of such an alliance already exists in Buthelezi's "Concerned South Africans Group," which links the Conservative Party and several anti-ANC homeland leaders.

Buthelezi has been variously perceived in the United States as an ally of the South African government, an advocate of free enterprise, a source of political violence or a friend of business interests. He is also thought to have strong links to conservative groups in the United States that may advise him to be overly confrontational. At the moment, however, Buthelezi is best understood as a regional leader, uncertain of his political footing and fearful of having been outmaneuvered by both the government and the ANC.

DE KLERK'S GAMBLE FOR THE NP

BY THE END OF THE 1980s the governing National Party had concluded that persisting in apartheid would impoverish the country and

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render it ungovernable. The NP thus began pursuing accommodation with the ANC, gambling that it could find enough common ground with its leadership to drive a negotiating process. The NP bet that it could keep Buthelezi on board, or at bay, long enough to create a survivable political center and a structure that offered real guarantees to white South Africans, if not a white veto over government policies.

The deal that has emerged includes a package of simultaneous measures: a transitional constitution, assurances of objective media and a fair electoral process, a transitional executive council and the agreement on the April 27 election of an assembly that would create a "government of national unity" composed of all parties receiving at least five percent of the vote. The government of national unity will run the country for up to five years while the assembly produces a final constitution.

The NP made it clear when it won its negotiating mandate in the March 1992 referendum that there would be no more all-white elections. At that time, the NP fantasized briefly that it could win enough black and mixed-race votes to govern, either alone or in coalition with the IFP. The party opened its membership to blacks and has courted mixed-race and Asian voters with little success so far. In fact, it has been more concerned with preventing its own right wing from defecting. It seems unlikely that President F. W. de Klerk would win an all-white election today, as the near-term costs of the transition become more evident and the long-term benefits appear more elusive.

The erosion of de Klerk's traditional base of support among conservative whites raises the possibility of a challenge to his dominant position in white politics and increases the opportunity for vigilante elements to assert a claim to defend white South Africa. No political figure, however, has yet emerged to pose a credible challenge.

BUILDING A POLITICAL CENTER

POLARIZATION IS THE MOST serious threat to South Africa's transition. The success of the transition depends on the persistence of a political center that can resist powerful centrifugal forces and prevent the initiative from passing to violent elements on both the left and the right.

To date this center has consisted chiefly of those around de Klerk

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and Mandela. It is currently fraying, however, and will doubtless be subjected to great strains as the election approaches. A perverse and potentially explosive interplay, for instance, has developed between the radical wing of the ANC and white nationalist farmers who have coalesced with a group of retired top commanders of the security forces. In the weeks following the Hani assassination the ANC Youth League took up the chant, "Kill the farmer; kill the Boer," leading to the Afrikaner retort, "I'm a farmer and a Boer; come and try me."

While their sentiments may resonate with a substantial portion of the old National Party constituency, the white nationalists are seriously limited by the absence of an achievable objective. In the short run they would like to see negotiations slow down while law and order are restored. Although many aspire to a white homeland, there is little consensus on its boundaries, much less on how to achieve its racial homogeneity. In the end, the right wing may have a greater store of grievances than troops among largely suburbanized Afrikaner households.

The emergence of former general Constand Viljoen as the leader of a "committee of generals" may provide the government with a focal point for dealing with a highly fragmented collection of right-wing groups. Viljoen himself disavows any interest in paramilitary operations and has pledged loyalty to the civilian political leaders of South Africa. At a minimum, however, the emergence of the generals' committee and their following of disaffected white farmers and Afrikaners gives public expression to the erosion of de Klerk's support on the right and further diminishes the luster of his victory in the March 1992 white referendum on negotiations.

There is a final serious constraint on the threat that the right wing poses to the transition: the more overtly racist white nationalists become, the more difficult it is for Buthelezi to make common cause with them. On important issues such as the degree of federalism to be embodied in the new constitution, an alliance of white conservatives and the IFP may be able to block proposals they dislike, but they are unlikely to agree on a positive program.

Fissures on the left of the ANC may also cause disruption. The Pan-Africanist Congress, with its infamous slogan "one settler, one bullet," (borrowed from the liberation struggle in Rhodesia) will clearly

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pick up some of Hani's support among the more radicalized populations in the townships and squatter camps. Within the ANC signs of competition to succeed Mandela have surfaced, with the more radical ANC Youth League playing a significant role. It seems unlikely that the current moderate ANC leadership will lose control to a more radical faction in the foreseeable future, although it is certain that its policies will be driven by the need to expand and consolidate a base of enduring support.

The success of the transition depends on a political center that can resist violent elements on both the left and the right.

The election polls—highly tentative measures of a volatile situation—show a slight drift to the extremes, but still reflect a solid ANC/NP political center. A nationwide survey of the entire electorate released this spring by the Human Sciences Research Council shows the ANC alliance possessed 47-54 percent of popular support (up slightly from the fall), the NP 21-26 percent (down slightly), the IFP 8-11 percent (also down), the radical Pan-Africanist Congress 3-10 percent (up), the centrist Democratic Party 3-6 percent and the combined right-wing parties 5-6 percent. The five-percent threshold for participation in the government of national unity could result in the exclusion of both the left-wing Pan-Africanist Congress and the right-wing parties, further inclining them to extra-parliamentary action. It could also have the effect of excluding the Democratic Party, home of such stalwart opponents of apartheid as former parliamentarians Helen Suzman, Harry Schwarz and Frederik van Zyl Slabbert.

The real challenge confronting the ANC is the ultimate governability of a country in which rapidly improving the economic well-being of the majority population is highly unlikely. The ANC-dominated government following the April 27 election will face essentially the same choice as the current NP government: some combination of economic revival and authoritarian crackdown on violence. The latter will almost certainly bring the ANC into conflict with the IFP. But because tribal rivalries have been muted by several decades of urbanization, a real economic revival would do much to undergird peace and civil order, providing an opportunity for democratic institutions to take root.

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THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC REVIVAL

THE OVERRIDING IMPERATIVE for South Africa's new government will be to lift the economic growth rate as far as possible above the population growth rate without falling victim to hyperinflation. Given the limited amount of investment capital available within South Africa—and the very real limits on South Africa's ability to reduce the size of its public sector—foreign investment is imperative. But even foreign capital is no panacea, because of the lag between private investment decisions and the creation of new jobs. South Africa will clearly also need significant foreign assistance, from both bilateral and multilateral donors.

To a great extent political agreements are being made in the hope that foreign investors will return—hence the ANC's agonizing about whether to call for the lifting of sanctions. In fact, foreign capital inflows have dropped steadily since 1985, along with gross domestic fixed investment, which has fallen to 15 percent of GDP from 30 percent in 1977. There is little evidence so far that foreign investors are poised to come into South Africa on a grand scale. U.S. direct investment in South Africa has fallen dramatically from its 1981 peak of $2.6 billion to about $820 million today. From 1984 to 1992, 218 U.S. companies withdrew from South Africa, leaving only about 120 U.S. subsidiaries in the country, many of them very modest in size.

Large and growing black unemployment is also a cause for concern. Unemployment and underemployment among blacks is currently running at a staggering 45-50 percent. The economy is producing no net jobs, and employment is likely to remain scarce among black youths, whose education and training have been severely neglected. South African economists estimate that even with six percent annual growth in GDP, seven million South Africans will remain unemployed by the year 2000. Unfortunately, the sectors that show the most promise for labor-intensive growth—chemicals, textiles, automotive assembly and electronics—also face intensely competitive world markets. The new South African government will have to walk a fine line between economic liberalization—throwing off 45 years of policies that promoted bloated bureaucracies and import-substitution protectionism—and the need to increase black employment.

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The ANC leadership recognizes that South Africa's present economic position is untenable. It also acknowledges that foreign investment is the key to recovery. Although Mandela stated publicly that the principal aim of his July visit to the United States was to encourage American investment, for now the ANC has apparently decided to place the tactics of the negotiations above its longer-term interest in economic revival. By delaying a call to end sanctions the ANC hoped to gain some last-minute leverage. That leverage, however, is surely a wasting asset as the ANC comes closer to becoming a part of the government and having to deal with the consequences of sanctions.

UPDATING U.S. POLICY

IF THE UNITED STATES wishes to foster democracy and free markets in Africa, it should quickly dismantle remaining sanctions against South Africa and provide incentives for U.S. private-sector trade and investment.

This may not happen as quickly and efficiently as the ANC will eventually desire. The remaining U.S. sanctions—more than 160—are state and municipal measures. Local governments are likely to dawdle in the absence of constituent pressures from grass-roots organizations that may be slow to change their position on sanctions repeal.

Another obstacle may be the imperfections that are almost certain to abound in South African democracy. If the new government does not attempt to redistribute wealth radically, as it appears it will not, many will argue that apartheid remains. If the government displays an authoritarian strain—and all indications are that it may—some will question whether freedom has in fact arrived. The long investment of activism by the U.S. anti-apartheid movement should now be joined with the interest of the business community in encouraging private investment in South Africa.

Additional U.S. investment in South Africa will clearly take place, especially in the computer industry, telecommunications, consumer products and automotive assembly. The Clinton administration will, however, need to encourage the creation of a hospitable investment climate in South Africa, given a world where competition among

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developing countries for investors is intense. American investors will obviously be aware of the need to make a contribution to social development. South Africa for its part will need to avoid making demands that discourage investors. This will require effective, ongoing communication among the private sector, Washington and Pretoria.

The ANC hopes that the anti-apartheid movement represents the nucleus of a support group for assistance. It has close and long-standing ties to the Congressional Black Caucus and to civil rights and church organizations in the United States. For many members of this formidable coalition, South Africa has become a domestic civil rights issue and a vehicle for expressing broad mistrust of the motives of multinational corporations overseas. The ANC may need to devote considerable effort to transform this constituency into enthusiastic supporters of a U.S. assistance effort led by private enterprise.

In the end, U.S. policy toward the South African transition will depend largely on Nelson Mandela. The Clinton administration will move when Mandela gives the word. The state and local governments may move then as well. And surely, U.S. companies will consider major investments only after Mandela has successfully campaigned for removal of the obstacles remaining from the sanctions era.

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Reviews

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Reagan and Shultz at Camp David in 1982, at the start of Shultz's tenure in the State Department

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Review Essay

Playing a Good Hand

The Secrets of Shultz's Success

Robert W. Tucker

Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State. BY GEORGE SHULTZ. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993, 1,184 pp. $30.00.

George Shultz was the nation's last Cold War secretary of state. When he came to office in the summer of 1982, the conflict with the Soviet Union appeared to have entered a phase more intense and threatening than it had been in a generation. Fears of a nuclear war were widespread. When he left office six and a half years later, Soviet-American relations were better than they had been since the years immediately following World War II. By the close of 1988 the stage was set for the end of the great rivalry that had dominated world politics and American foreign policy for more than four decades.

It is only reasonable to assume that the official who presided over so vast a change in American foreign policy would have a compelling story to relate. The history Shultz has written of his years in office is indeed almost consistently interesting and instructive. *Turmoil and Triumph* tells more about the foreign policy of the Reagan administration than any other published memoir of the period has done or, for that matter, is likely to do. Until historians have had the opportunity to examine the documentary record of those years, his book may be expected to remain the most informative source available for the diplomacy that marked the last years of the Cold War.

The memoirs, nevertheless, do not appear to have evoked the interest that might have been expected. His book is very long, but so were the more successful memoirs of some of Shultz's prede-

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cessors. Shultz, however, has neither the literary gifts of a Dean Acheson nor the power to delineate character of a Henry Kissinger. Both Acheson and Kissinger are masters of the ironic; Mr. Shultz clearly is not. His writing is always direct and one-dimensional; it is intended neither to amuse nor to outrage the reader. Although he pulls few punches in relating the behavior of leading figures in the Reagan administration (he seems less than candid only in discussing his superior in the White House), Mr. Shultz is no gossip. His character judgments of those with whom he had disagreements, often bitter ones, and who sought to frustrate his policies appear generous almost to a fault.

Shultz is also unwilling to probe much beneath the surface of issues when doing so raises questions he does not wish to ask. His treatment of the Iran-contra affair is ultimately unsatisfactory, not because Shultz is hiding something of his own role but because of his refusal to ask about the deeper reasons for the affair.

It is, I think, largely for these reasons that Shultz does not make the best copy. There is a further reason. The memoirs of earlier secretaries of state dealt with problems that promised to be, and were, the problems of their successors as well. Shultz, by contrast, has had the bad luck to be telling a story that ends at the threshold of one of the great transformations of modern history. In consequence, he has written of events that, while they occurred only yesterday, appear to many as ancient history, and no longer hold most of us in thrall.

Arms control, to which many of the book's pages are devoted, is the most obvious example of this. A sharp discontinuity is currently seen to separate the years of the Cold War from the period that has followed. Perhaps if Shultz had published his memoirs much later, they would have seemed much fresher.

THE SECRETS OF SUCCESS

Memoirs record successes. They do not dwell on failures. Certainly Shultz has recorded his successes as secretary of state. The memoirs deal with all of the major problems the American government confronted during Shultz's years as secretary of state, though the coverage does not always seem proportionate to an issue's significance. Too much attention is given to the account of Shultz's abortive efforts to achieve that most elusive of American diplomatic objectives, a Middle East peace. On the other hand, allied relations receive very little space despite the fact that the marked improvement in those relations in the 1980s was one of Shultz's chief accomplishments.

In reading the Shultz memoirs it is necessary to keep in mind that the period the memoirs cover is one of growing Soviet weakness and vulnerability. This simple though crucial fact largely accounts for a diplomatic record increasingly marked by Soviet concessions and retreats. It is to Shultz's credit that he perceived early on the favorable change occurring in the balance of power. Persuaded that the Soviet empire was steadily weakening under the strains of its own internal problems and external entanglements, he pursued a diplomacy toward Moscow that took such advantage as prudence permitted. He did so, moreover, with considerable success.

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Dealt a good hand, he played it well.

While Shultz acknowledges having been favored by circumstances, he is also intent on attributing his successes to a diplomatic design that departed from that of his predecessors. He singles out the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy. "I put aside the Nixon-era concepts 'linkage' and 'détente,' " he writes of a 1984 speech that developed his own conceptual framework for managing U.S.-Soviet relations, "and set out a new approach that I hoped would prove more effective and that reflected the reality of what we were in fact doing." Emphasized on several occasions in the memoirs, Shultz's concern to distinguish his diplomacy from the architects of the earlier "new structure of peace" is rather mystifying. Only the blind in these matters would confuse the two, and while there were the diplomatically sightless in the high reaches of the Reagan administration, as Shultz constantly reminds the reader, there is no apparent need today for the former secretary to make allowance for them.

It may be that Shultz was at the time persuaded, and remains persuaded, that his views of détente and linkage broke new ground. But his critique of détente a la 1972 had long formed the stock in trade of Kissinger's critics; Kissinger himself had for all intents and purposes accepted the criticism. The same was true of linkage, the principal corollary of détente. By the 1980s few believed that linkage had the almost magical powers Nixon administration policymakers had once attributed to it. In attacking the diplomatic construction of the early 1970s, Shultz was assaulting an edifice that had already fallen.

His memoirs, moreover, neither recognize the circumstances that prompted the earlier diplomatic design nor persuade us that he put forth a grand design of his own. When Shultz informs the reader that he rejected Kissinger's "delicate web of interdependence" in dealing with Moscow and insisted on "fighting out each issue on its own," he does not add that in contrast to his predecessors he enjoyed the advantage of dealing with the adversary from a growing position of strength. Détente and linkage were the U.S. responses to a lost war and to a conviction that the growth of Soviet military power, together with a deepening reluctance at home to support a policy of global engagement, required that American interests be preserved through other and easier means than those employed prior to Vietnam. Furthermore, although never very promising, the Nixon-Kissinger détente might still have enjoyed a measure of success had Watergate not intervened. With Watergate, however, the institution that had forged America's global position—the presidency—lost its dominance over foreign policy, to regain it partially only in the 1980s. In this turn of affairs, George Shultz was a beneficiary.

Ronald Reagan's victory was the indispensable condition for the successful diplomacy Shultz subsequently pursued. Not only did Reagan partially restore presidential power over foreign policy, he articulated what was to become the principal thrust of U.S. policy in the 1980s. To stop and even reverse the decline in America's global role, restore the nation's reputation for power and its use, end the steady expansion of Soviet influence that

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had occurred in the 1970s, and in time even put Moscow on the defensive—these were the foreign policy ends to which President Reagan dedicated his administration. They are the same policy objectives Shultz articulated as secretary of state, with one exception—human rights. In promising to move beyond past strategies of containment and détente, in undertaking to counter Soviet challenges wherever they occurred, Shultz faithfully followed the path already marked out by Reagan.

These background considerations notwithstanding, Shultz did make a significant contribution to the Reagan foreign policy, one without which that policy might well have foundered. Reagan's initial foreign policy alarmed not only Moscow but much of the American public as well as a number of the nation's principal allies. It did so by virtue of its apparently casual attitude toward nuclear weapons, its indisposition to enter into arms control agreements with Moscow and, more generally, its seeming rejection of the traditions of postwar internationalism subscribed to by preceding Democratic and Republican administrations alike. The Reagan administration gave little indication that it shared the commitment to multilateralism of its predecessors. American allies sorely tested the administration's patience by their perceived unwillingness to bear their share of the common defense and by their susceptibility to the threats and promises of the adversary. Talk of abandoning the Western alliance in favor of a policy of global unilateralism became increasingly common.

REAGAN VS. REAGANISM

It was in these circumstances that George Shultz became the nation's secretary of state. Persuaded that the great historic tides were running in America's favor, he also believed that the United States was not playing its hand well and that the president was surrounded by advisers who were not serving him effectively. The new secretary set about altering the early face of Reagan foreign policy. In the critical area of arms control, he insisted on abandoning a posture of shunning arms control negotiations with the Soviets. The deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe against strong Soviet opposition, Shultz insisted, must be accompanied by a serious arms control negotiating position. Neither the American public nor the nation's allies would long support a policy of indefinite confrontation with Moscow. If the Soviets were to be opposed over missiles in Europe, if they were to be countered in some regional conflicts, and if they were to be pushed to live up to the 1975 Helsinki accords on human rights, Washington had to show its willingness to negotiate with Moscow. The Reagan administration's initial outlook, that the Soviets must first make major changes and only then could negotiations be seriously considered, would have to be abandoned. From the outset, Shultz sought to persuade an initially reluctant president that in taking the path of negotiation America had nothing to lose, so long as it was careful to structure the bargaining environment to its advantage. An ever more favorable balance of power, he argued, held out the promise that negotiations, if patiently pursued, would result

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in Soviet concessions and in an improved relationship as well. The memoirs trace how the Shultz view came to prevail over the opposition of almost the whole national security establishment outside the State Department.

Shultz's great achievement as secretary of state was that he developed and refined, and thereby insured the success of, Ronald Reagan's basic foreign policy. While preserving the essential Reagan, he discarded Reaganism. Shultz had the wit to see from the start that Reaganism—an outlook and style that embodied the traits of historical isolationism and obsessive anticommunism—was in conflict with the essential Reagan, a man who combined idealism with common sense. The realization of the essential Reagan required that both the American public and allies be confident and supportive. Reaganism jeopardized both. The essential Reagan required a policy of strength, consistency and patience in its pursuit of improved relations with Moscow. Reaganism held out little prospect that a policy driven by the crusaders' fervor and prone to unilateralism in action could stay this course.

It is in this light that the Shultz diplomatic record is best understood. In insisting on a two-track course toward Moscow, repairing allied relations, and reaffirming the essentials of postwar internationalism, Shultz made the Reagan foreign policy not only acceptable at home and abroad but also far more effective than it otherwise would have been. More than this, he added his own contribution to the fundamentals of that policy, if only in giving an emphasis to human rights that was absent before he became secretary of state. Reagan had come to office contemptuous of the Carter administration's human rights policy. He left office a self-proclaimed convert to the cause. The change was in no small measure the work of his secretary of state. The record may not quite bear out Shultz's claim to evenhandedness in the pursuit of human rights—certainly, evenhandedness was scarcely a part of Reagan's outlook. Despite some lapses, Shultz's commitment to human rights was nevertheless very real and is apparent in the pages of the memoirs.

In giving the Reagan foreign policy a different and more attractive look than it had initially possessed, Shultz was occasionally accused by more hawkish figures in the administration of being too soft on Moscow. The charge was ironic since Shultz consciously attempted to move away from an earlier period of the Cold War and a predecessor who was also accused by the right of being soft on Moscow. Shultz's policy of negotiation with the adversary bore a strong resemblance to Dean Acheson's concept of negotiation from strength. In both, negotiations were to be pursued in the expectation that they would have, in Shultz's words, "the right outcome," that is, one that reflected a favorable power position. But whereas Acheson was never able to negotiate from such a position, Shultz did, and with "the right outcome."

THE ODD COUPLE

The memoirs of a secretary of state are read for the light they throw on the relationship between a president and his chief cabinet officer. In this respect, however, memoirs usually prove disappoint-

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ing. Secretaries of state are not given to speaking candidly of the presidents they served. Candor runs the risk of appearing disrespectful, not only toward the temporary holder of the office but toward the office itself. At the close of his book, Shultz devotes several pages to what he titles "Understanding Ronald Reagan." What must impress the reader is how unrevealing these pages are.

Taken as a whole, what the memoirs do show is a secretary of state who thought he seldom got the presidential support to which he felt entitled against bureaucratic aggressors in the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council. Perhaps the most serious of Shultz's complaints against his superior, it is voiced time and again. Although Shultz sees Reagan as a man of vision and sound instincts, he also sees him as a lazy man prone to rely excessively and uncritically on staff and friends who often gave him bad advice. Thus Reagan's visions were ever in danger of perversion. Shultz cites the Strategic Defense Initiative as an example of a great vision that came close to being fatally damaged by the bizarre way in which it was initially presented.

In Shultz's account, Reagan was the prisoner in foreign policy of the ideologues and hawks in his administration until Shultz became secretary of state and began to liberate him. The process of liberation, however, was never entirely successful; a continuing effort was required to keep the president from again becoming the captive of those bent on confrontation with adversary and ally alike. Shultz's account of his relationship with the president and his efforts on the president's behalf is yet another variation, this time by a political moderate, on the familiar theme: "Let Reagan be Reagan."

The question Shultz's portrait raises, assuming that it is largely accurate, is Reagan's own role as the president. Was the nation's 40th president the master of his domain or, when left to his own devices, the hapless victim of those who happened at the time to have his ear? Shultz clearly inclines toward the latter view, although not consistently and unambiguously. Thus, in his account of the Iran-contra affair, the reader is left uncertain over the role Shultz thinks the president played. If at one point in the story Reagan is presented as the initiator of the arms-for-hostages scheme, at another he is seen as the dupe of the National Security Council staff.

In the end Shultz sees his former boss as far more the dupe than the initiator in the Iran-contra affair. Perhaps that is the principal reason why Shultz did not resign over the affair, despite his strong opposition to it. He had offered his resignation before on occasions of far less gravity. In this case he did not do so because, in his words, "In order to get the ongoing arms-for-hostages efforts shut down for good, it had been essential for me to stay in there and slug it out." Had he left, Shultz appears to be saying, Ronald Reagan might well have remained the victim of those who had already used him so badly. It is a startling judgment of the nation's most popular president in the past quarter century.

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Review Essay

The End of Churchillmania?

Reappraising the Legend

Michael Howard

Churchill: A Major New Assessment of His Life in Peace and War. EDITED BY ROBERT BLAKE AND WM. ROGER LOUIS. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1993, $29.95.

Churchill, The End of Glory: A Political Biography. BY JOHN CHARMLEY. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993, 752 pp. $32.95.

Winston Churchill is probably more revered today in the United States than he is in Britain. For the British he is a great statesman, certainly, and one to whom we owe it that 1940 was our finest hour rather than a year of humiliation and disaster. But he stands in a line of other great statesmen—the two William Pitts, the Duke of Wellington, perhaps David Lloyd George—who brought us through comparable trials.

In the United States, however, Churchill is seen as a *chevalier sans peur et sans reproche,* surpassing any comparable American figure—with the possible exception of Abraham Lincoln—in his goodness and greatness. Shrines to his memory proliferate across the United States. American presidents from Kennedy to Bush, perhaps unable to find appropriate figures among their own predecessors, have taken him implicitly or explicitly as a role model, focusing on his supposed shrewdness of judgment in peacetime and his undoubted qualities of leadership in time of war. The well-founded suspicions felt for him by his American contemporaries, that he was primarily concerned with harnessing American power to the service of British interests, have largely melted away. Churchill is now seen as the last great

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leader of the West, one whose like we shall not see again.

This is understandable enough. In spite of his indomitable John Bullishness, Churchill took far after his American ancestors far more than his English ones, something for which anyone who reads, in the Blake-Louis volume reviewed here, David Cannadine's hilarious account of the drunken, degenerate, spendthrift family from which he sprang has cause to be grateful. His arrogance, his egocentricity, his flamboyance, his emotionalism, his unpredictability, his remorseless energy, not least his eccentric taste in friends and generous indulgence in drink made him an outsider to the British "establishment" from the moment he entered politics at the beginning of the century until the day in May 1940 when they turned to him in despair because there was no one else to whom they could turn.

More importantly, Churchill is remembered in Britain for a political career that was checkered, to use no stronger a term. He switched parties with a nonchalance that few found endearing, and was given office, as often as not, because he was more of a nuisance outside the government than inside it. His judgment on major issues was frequently terrible. Even his credibility about the danger posed by Hitler's Germany was eroded, for his contemporaries, by his stubborn resistance to the granting of self-government to India and by his lone stand in defense of King Edward VIII. By the 1930s the fact that Winston was on one side of an argument was seen by most sensible people as a good reason for being on the other. One of his most perceptive biographers, Robert Rhodes-James, wrote a study of Churchill's career up to 1939 and entitled it quite legitimately *Churchill: A Study in Failure*. The problem for the historian is not, as so many Americans believe, why Churchill's advice was ignored for so long, but how it was that a man with so unpromising a background and so disastrous a track record could emerge in 1940 as the savior of his country.

CHURCHILL DISSECTED

Of the two volumes under review here, the first is by a group of established, if not "establishment," historians containing few surprises, and the second by a scholar of a younger generation who tries to pack as many controversial judgments into his 650 pages of text as the volume can hold.[1] The American contributors to the edited volume include Gordon Craig writing on Churchill and Germany; Warren Kimball on Churchill and Roosevelt; Stephen Ambrose on Churchill and Eisenhower; and Roger Louis, one of the editors, on Churchill and Egypt after 1945. The British contributors are too numerous to mention here individually, but they—sorry, we—are all immensely eminent, and there is one Indian scholar, Sarvepalli Gopal, who writes about Churchill's disastrous record with respect to his own country more in

[1] In this first I must declare an interest, since of the 29 contributions by divers hands, one is by me—on Churchill in the First World War; but there are few specialists in the period, whether American or British, who were not invited to contribute.

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sorrow than in anger.

Although there are few surprises, there are a number of points that may come fresh. One, made by no less an authority than Ronald Hyam, is how little real interest Churchill took in the British Empire by which he set so much store. Such knowledge of it as he possessed had been gained during his brief tours of duty at the Colonial Office in 1905–1908, when he had to deal mainly with South Africa, and in 1921–1922, when he focused on the settlement in the Middle East. He never visited India after he left it as a cavalry subaltern in 1897, taking with him a collection of prejudices that he was never to change, and he never penetrated farther east at all. Robert O'Neill confirms in his essay that the Pacific region was a faraway country of which Churchill knew nothing, and points out the calamitous results that his neglect of British defenses, naval and military, in Southeast Asia was to have for British strategy—and Commonwealth relations—in the Second World War.

THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE

The brash young Churchill, 1900.

It may, however, come as a surprise for those who think of Churchill primarily as a great war leader to find how much interest he took in domestic affairs, and, as Paul Addison shows in his contribution, the leading part he played in social reform; both under Asquith between 1908 and 1912, when the foundations were being laid of "the welfare state," and under Baldwin between 1924 and 1929, when as Chancellor of the Exchequer he collaborated closely with Neville Chamberlain at the Ministry of Health to extend a scheme of comprehensive social insurance. Almost the only American president who has not yet cited Churchill as a role model is President Clinton. He is better entitled to do so than some of his predecessors.

But there are two outstanding contributions that should be read by all uncritical admirers of Churchill: Richard Ollard's "Churchill and the Navy" and Donald Cameron Watt's "Churchill and Appeasement." In a beautifully balanced piece, Ollard shows how Churchill, by his long-overdue reforms at the Admiralty before 1914, made the Royal Navy ready for war, but also, by his detailed

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meddling with every aspect of its activities and harassing of its officers, very nearly wrecked it. His bullying of his wretched subordinates to make them endorse his project for forcing the Dardanelles, a major enterprise undertaken with minimal examination of the operational problems involved, was all too typical of his conduct of affairs. It was to be repeated in the disastrous Norwegian fiasco of 1940; and any admiral tough enough to stand up to him won his undying enmity. He preferred somnolent yes-men like Dudley Pound, who played Keitel to Churchill's Hitler, or flamboyant heroes like Roger Keyes, who shared his own cavalry-subaltern approach to naval strategy. Here Ollard's profound knowledge of British naval history provides valuable illumination:

> Cunningham continued to be amazed at how little this great war minister of unrivaled experience understood the nature or application of sea power. Churchill remained, as he had been in his youth, a cavalry officer, looking on naval men, however eminent, as narrow-minded experts, unfit to have a say in the larger use of their unsurpassed professional skill. Essentially it was the view of the pre-Pepys navy when officers were generally classed as Gentlemen, whose function it was to lead men and fleets into battle, and Tarpaulins, who supplied the expert knowledge necessary to work the ships and fire the guns. In the twentieth century ministers such as himself and Lloyd George were the Gentlemen, the admirals the Tarpaulins.

RETHINKING APPEASEMENT

As for "appeasement," Professor Cameron Watt firmly sets the record straight. "The Churchill critique [of Neville Chamberlain's policy]," he writes, "can be reduced to three propositions: that a greater rate of British rearmament would have deterred Hitler; that a more aggressive style would have deterred him at critical moments in his advance; and that a grand coalition would have deterred him or led to his overthrow." As to the first, we now know that from 1935 onward the British government was pushing rearmament as fast as economic constraints would permit, and the only aspect of it that Churchill wished to see speeded up was in the air. In fact, Hitler never showed the slightest signs of being impressed by the growth of British air power, and Churchill never showed the slightest interest in pressing for the only kind of rearmament that might have impressed him, the building up of a large continental-style army that would have reassured the French and presented the Germans with a real deterrent to initiating a war on either their eastern or western fronts. Nor did Churchill show any interest in building up the navy, to whose obsolescence his own policy, when Chancellor of the Exchequer, had made so major a contribution. Even in the air, Churchill showed no interest in the development of the defensive fighters that were to save England during the Battle of Britain, while his confidant Professor Lindemann initially did his best to delay the development of radar that was to make that victory possible.

As for a more aggressive policy, the evidence shows that when Britain did stand up to Hitler the result was not to deter him but to make him speed up his timetable of conquest. Revelation of the

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extent of British rearmament in 1937 made him lay out his accelerated program of aggrandizement to the east as reported by the Hossbach Memorandum, while the British guarantee to Poland of March 1939 provoked him into, rather than deterring him from, attacking that country. As to whether a more stalwart attitude would have provoked a general's putsch in Germany, or whether such a putsch would have been any more successful than that of Herr Kapp in 1919, we enter the realm of wishful thinking. For most historians of Nazi Germany, such a belief betrays a complete incomprehension of the strength of the totalitarian regime that the Nazis had established since 1933.

In light of what we now know of Hitler's intentions, it can thus hardly be argued that Churchill's policy would have prevented the war; nor can it be said that the kind of rearmament he was advocating—a massive increase in bomber strength of a kind already obsolete by 1939—would have put Britain in a better position to fight it. This does not mean that the policy of appeasement pursued by Chamberlain was necessarily right: insofar as it was animated by a desire to avoid war at all costs it was certainly wrong. But insofar as it was an attempt to gain time, to test Hitler's intentions and to build up British military strength to the point where war might be threatened as a serious option and conducted with the support of a virtually unanimous public opinion, there was a lot to be said for it. And there was even more to be said for it when we consider the economic predicament in which Britain found herself in the 1930s—a predicament not eased by the total disinterest displayed by an American government long on expressions of moralistic opinion but short on any intention to risk a single dollar or a single American life in backing up its declaratory policy. Churchill was able to act as he did in 1940 because he was prepared to take the huge gamble that the United States, in spite of all its professions of disinterest, would be prepared to come to the aid of Britain now that the worst had come to the worst. There was nothing whatever to suggest that this was the case either in 1938 or 1939.

THE CHARMLEY CRITIQUE

That brings us to John Charmley's book, an account of Churchill's career down to "the end of glory" in 1945. It is based on a commendably thorough trawl through the archives, although to find within the first few pages a reference to John Duke of Marlborough as "the greatest soldier of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries" and a quotation from Tennyson to the effect that nature was "careless of the individual, so careful of the type" indicates a cavalier disdain for accuracy of detail. Although Charmley is an avowedly "revisionist" historian and determined never to give Churchill the benefit of the doubt, much of his book is no more controversial than the revisionist views expressed by the contributors to the Blake-Louis volume. Further, such controversy as the book did arouse on publication was largely the consequence of a review by Alan Clark, a wealthy right-wing maverick and former junior minister, who expressed his own view that Churchill made a great mistake in rejecting Hitler's peace terms in 1940, since

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they would have preserved Britain's status as a world power far more effectively than did his policy of selling out to the Americans. Charmley does not exactly say this, though he comes very near it.

Charmley's thesis is, basically, that Churchill was a romantic and his opponents were realists; to adapt the deathless description of Cavaliers and Roundheads in *1066 And All That,* he was Wrong but Wromantic, while they were Right though Repulsive. But Churchill's romanticism, Charmley maintains, was to destroy the independence of Britain and the power of the British Empire far more surely than did the caution of his adversaries. He draws a very interesting comparison between the controversy over India that divided Churchill from his colleagues in the Conservative Party and that over the appeasement of Germany a few years later. In both cases his opponents were conscious of the limitations of British power—limitations imposed partly by the weakness of the British economy and partly by their appreciation of what the British electorate (which since 1927 comprised every adult man and woman in the United Kingdom) was likely to stand. These limitations made it impossible to hold down India by force, and so Indian nationalism had to be "appeased," that is, Gandhi had to be treated as a serious interlocutor, with whom some compromise had to be reached. This Churchill denied: the prestige of the Empire made compromise impossible, its power made it unnecessary. So it was, in their eyes, with that other troublemaker, Hitler. Like Gandhi, Hitler had a certain amount of right on his side; like Gandhi he was making unacceptable demands that might be scaled down by negotiation; but neither the state of the British economy nor that of public opinion in the 1930s made possible the kind of uncompromising stand advocated by Churchill. It was not as clear to contemporaries as it may seem to us with the benefit of hindsight that Churchill was wrong on the first issue but right on the second.

WRONG BUT ROMANTIC?

In what he has to say about appeasement Charmley is thus no more controversial than Professor Cameron Watt. It is when we get on the issues of 1940 that his views become more interesting. With the defeat of France, he maintains, the sensible, farsighted conservatives, led by Chamberlain and Halifax, were in favor of cutting their losses and making as good a peace with Hitler as they could get, and a bewildered British public would probably have followed them, as they had followed them over appeasement. It was only Churchill, by his success in hypnotizing the British people into sharing his own romantic vision of their country as a great, unconquerable nation, who prevented this from happening and persuaded them to follow him in the enormous gamble of carrying on with the war.

Most of us think that this was a good thing; Charmley clearly does not. "The posture of stern, heroic defiance of Germany," he points out, "could be purchased only by the most servile grovelling to the Americans," and as later events were to show, "far from securing Britain's independence, he had mortgaged it to America." The same shortsighted policy was to be pursued when, a year later,

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Churchill supported unconditionally the resistance of the Soviet Union: "In his determination to see Germany defeated, Churchill neglected to ask himself, until too late, what the result of the total destruction of German power would be upon the balance of power for which he had fought in the 1930s." Finally, with the Soviet Union dominating Eastern Europe and the United States calling the shots in the West, "it was hard to argue that Britain had won in any sense save that of avoiding defeat." All Churchill's fine words could not save the British Empire from extinction or preserve Britain herself as a great nation independent of the support of any foreign power.

Well of course they couldn't, and nobody with any sense has ever argued that they could. Britain had not been independent of allies since the beginning of the century. She had not fought a great continental war without allies ever—except disastrously between 1776 and 1783. In 1940 she found herself without allies; by 1942, partly by good luck, partly by good management, Churchill had put together the strongest alliance the world had ever seen. Britain's new partners were certainly stronger than she was, and had divergent war aims. After the war—as after every war—there would be major problems in sorting out their differences, and Britain had painfully to come to terms with her own shrunken position in the world. But Nazi Germany had been defeated, and that was more important than Charmley seems to think. And Nazi Germany might well not have been defeated if Churchill had not persuaded his fellow countrymen to carry on fighting against all odds, persuaded the United States at least to underwrite British independence, and given the Soviet Union his wholehearted support.

The implication throughout Charmley's book, though he never comes clean and states it, is that the reasonable conservatives like Chamberlain and Halifax were right, not only in their policy of appeasement in the 1930s, but in their inclination to seek terms from Hitler in 1940. But this is a view tenable only by someone who knows nothing about Hitler and the New Order he intended to impose upon a conquered Europe. Britain might have survived with at least part of its empire, but it would have been very much as Vichy France survived: as the agents of German power, its independence a sham.

In realizing this and preferring to take the gamble of standing alone in the hope, however forlorn, that the United States would one day come to his rescue, Churchill was not being unrealistic. Under the admittedly theatrical heroics there lay a very shrewd assessment of the world balance, one far shrewder than that of his Eurocentric opponents in the Conservative Party for whom the United States, even more than Czechoslovakia, was a faraway country of which they knew nothing. It was entirely due to Winston Churchill that Britain was to emerge from the Second World War not only undefeated but enjoying, in the United States and everywhere else in the world, a measure of respect and, occasionally, affection—perhaps a greater measure than she altogether deserved.

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Recent Books on International Relations

Political and Legal

ANDREW J. PIERRE

Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy. BY ALEXANDER GEORGE. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993, 162 pp. $24.95 (paper, $14.95).

This gem of a book should be of compelling interest to the many in the foreign affairs community who have an interest in both policy and theory. Only a seasoned scholar who has also networked in the policy arena, as has Alexander George, could have written it. *Bridging the Gap* is a well-chosen title. George addresses the values and needs of the two cultures, academia and government, in their respective searches for knowledge and action. He suggests what might be different types of policy-relevant knowledge by examining six strategies that the United States pursued toward Iraq in 1988-91. All but one of these were ineffective, he argues, due to the weak knowledge base underlying the strategy. The trick for analysts is not only knowledge as such, but its presentation in a policy-relevant manner to the decision-maker, who often must act on the basis of many still unfolding and unknown factors.

The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda. BY AMITAI ETZIONI. New York: Crown Publishers, 1993, 313 pp. $22.00.

This is a book for the 1990s. An eminent sociologist and political thinker, Amitai Etzioni senses the pervasive unease in our present society and calls for a new social movement based on the spirit and action of community. The "communitarian" approach he advocates involves mutual obligations between parent and child as well as moral education in schools. It is an appealing vision that seeks improvement in our social and political environment, emphasizing responsibilities to others as well as individual rights. Certainly, it is a far cry from the "me first" philosophy of the 1980s. Yet Etzioni's imaginative thesis falters when it comes to implementation.

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Here he calls for reforming American politics by reducing the influence of special interests, banning political action committees, and a variety of measures to reduce the corrupting flow of money in politics. This is most desirable, but the spread of "communitarianism" risks a slow start if it is depends on first transforming the political system.

National Identity. BY ANTHONY D. SMITH. Reno (NV): University of Nevada Press, 1991, 198 pp. $29.95 (paper, $12.95).

Nations Without Nationalism. BY JULIA KRISTEVA. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, 102 pp. $18.50.

We have entered a period of renewed nationalism and ethnic conflict in the post-Cold War world. But what exactly is nationalism? Anthony Smith, a British sociologist, is a longtime student of this question. His latest book, examining the nature, causes and consequences of national identity, could not be more relevant to our times. Nations and nationalism, he argues, are not simply political bodies and ideology, but cultural phenomena. They are multidimensional and encompass language, sentiments and symbolism. Thus the Basques, Kurds and Tamils form a clear national identity even without a state of their own, recognition of which contributes to turmoil and conflict. Julia Kristeva addresses the question from quite another perspective, that of a French psychoanalyst and linguistics expert. She writes about people's feelings of "otherness" or "strangeness." When confronted with an environment different from their own, they withdraw into their familiar ethnicity. Nationalism then becomes a form of "defensive hatred" and, in her thinking, is associated with jingoism, skinheads and extremes. In this short, very personal essay she appeals for a cosmopolitanism that transcends today's more virulent forms of nationalism.

The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process and American Foreign Policy. BY WILLIAM KOREY. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, 518 pp. $45.00.

This is a long, detailed and knowledgeable history of the Helsinki process, from the origins of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to the recent past. The author, who served for many years as Director of International Policy Research at B'nai B'rith, concentrates almost wholly on the human rights component of the process; the important economic and security dimensions will be the work of another author. He tells the story extremely well, having closely followed the issues through the years and been personally acquainted with many of the participants. Initially the United States was quite skeptical and played a passive role in the Helsinki process, Secretary of State Kissinger viewing it as either inconsequential or a Soviet ploy. But its value as an instrument with which to press for improved human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe eventually made for a turnaround in the American approach. How this came about is at the heart of this tale.

Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form. EDITED BY JOHN GERARD RUGGIE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, 474 pp. $60.00.

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Multilateralism—seeking cooperative approaches to international problems—has emerged as a key theme of the foreign policy of the Clinton administration. This book makes clear that the basic concept has been in existence for some time. Ruggie has long been a leading student of international institutions. The authors enter into a variety of theoretical debates that make an important academic contribution but will be of less interest to practitioners. A sequel might pay more attention to ad hoc arrangements for dealing with particular problems or issues. Especially in the security realm in the coming years, multilateral "coalitions of the willing" may be the best way to engage in preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping.

Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations. BY ARTHUR A. STEIN. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1993, 210 pp. $12.95 (paper).

The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism. BY BARRY BUZAN, CHARLES JONES AND RICHARD LITTLE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, 245 pp. $40.00 (paper, $15.50).

These two volumes attest to the vitality of current theorizing in international relations. In the first book, a nation's choice between international cooperation and conflict is seen as set by circumstances and, more importantly, by a range of decisions involving the struggle for advantage, willingness to enter alliances and therefore entanglements, and the like. The second, by a group of British scholars, is an erudite deconstruction of Kenneth Waltz's influential "neorealist" *Theory of International Politics*. There is much debate that only the careful reader of Waltz will appreciate, but that seems to be important within the theoretical world. Thus the last chapter states, "Structural Realism seeks to construct an ordering principle by which the previously dispersed 'islands' of international relations theory can be viewed as an 'archipelago.' "

"Reconstructing Nations and States," Summer 1993 issue of *Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Vol. 122, No. 3.* Cambridge (MA): American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993, $7.95.

Nationalism has always posed a problem for Western (liberal) intellectuals. Its utter irrationality confounds liberalism's belief in the rational, ordered nature of human beings. This fascinating collection of essays, by distinguished academics from America and Britain, suggests that this group of intellectuals at least has come to terms with the beast. They don't celebrate nationalism, of course, but recognize its power and appeal and address issues like minority rights within the framework of nationalism. There are no high-minded condemnations of nationalism here; in fact, one is struck by the tone of modesty throughout.

Like most edited volumes this one lacks much coherence and is of uneven quality. But some of the essays are outstanding, making it well worth serious attention. In particular, there are interesting theoretical essays by Liah Greenfeld and Michael Mann; a mischievous

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defense of self-determination by Tom Nairn; and two highly accomplished studies of particular, important countries—Stanley Hoffmann on France and Ashutosh Varshney on India.

FAREED ZAKARIA

Military, Scientific and Technological

ELIOT A. COHEN

War, Strategy and International Politics: Essays in Honor of Sir Michael Howard. EDITED BY LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, PAUL HAYES AND ROBERT O'NEILL. Oxford (UK): Clarendon Press, 1992, 322 pp. $69.00.

Sir Michael Howard is the preeminent military historian in the English-language world today. His magisterial works on (among other things) the Franco-Prussian War, British strategic history, and the Second World War, his lapidary essays on military theory and problems of contemporary security, and his co-translated and edited edition of Clausewitz's *On War* have earned him that reputation. This festschrift, unfortunately, does not quite do him justice. As the editors admit, the essays have no unifying themes, and those readers enthralled by "An English Country House at War: Littelcote and the Pophams" are unlikely to be taken with "Alanbrooke and Britain's Mediterranean Strategy, 1942-1944." The authors, a distinguished group, deal either with recondite matters of interest chiefly to specialists or with broad topics that require the authority and skill of, well, Sir Michael to come off well. The contemporary essays suffer further from what must have been a considerable gap between writing and publication: the Soviet Union still lives in these pages.

Among the writers Britons crowd out all but one foreigner (an Australian)—a pity, because many of Howard's colleagues and students hail from continental Europe, the United States and elsewhere, and because he is so very much an international figure. Nor does the reader encounter the themes suggested by Howard's professional labors, such as the role of official history or the relationship between theory and history in the study of military affairs. Ironically, perhaps, the volume's deficiencies set in relief the qualities that make Sir Michael so extraordinary a scholar.

Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament. 3 vols. EDITED BY RICHARD DEAN BURNS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993, 1,692 pp. $280.00.

These three slabs of an attractively bound and printed encyclopedia, edited by a professor of history at California State University, have a great deal to offer both the casual and the serious reader. Volume I consists of two groups of essays: "National and Regional Dimensions" and "Themes and Institutions." The former discusses the arms control experience of individual countries and collections of countries; the latter ranges more widely, discussing everything from the International Atomic Energy Agency to verification, the role played by the media, and transnational peace movements. The second volume is unevenly divided between case studies of arms control before and after 1945, and

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the third provides partial, and in some cases complete, texts of treaties on weapons limitation, rules of war, controlling the arms trade and the like.

Seventy-six authors do not, of course, make for even quality, but on the whole, the standard of scholarship and prose is high. Although some contributors look on arms control and disarmament as things good in themselves, the critics (Patrick Glynn, for example) have their day as well, and the encyclopedia's editor is nothing if not sober in his introduction. All in all, Burns has produced an invaluable resource for students, teachers and practitioners. He and the editors at Scribner's have managed to make authors combine erudition and clarity, and have provided cross-references, source notes and pointers to further reading that make the volumes a pleasure to use. An outstanding work.

The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century. BY AZAR GAT. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, 273 pp. $69.00.

One might have titled this *Makers of Modern Strategy: The Advanced Course.* Gat plunges into his subject in five uneven chapters dealing with positivism and romanticism, and French, German, naval and Marxist military thought. He has read widely, but some gaps stand out—Russian and American military (as opposed to naval) writers barely appear, and there is nothing on European thinking about colonial warfare. Gat knows his own mind and has little patience for authors who are "naive" (a favorite epithet) or in other ways not up to his standards of rigor. The volume often assumes that generals are the slaves of a handful of theorists and presents lengthy lists of historical "factors" to be sorted out by the hapless reader. Still, this intellectual forced march has some benefit for those who undertake it, because Gat presents a great deal of historical and theoretical material in a relatively brief compass. The cost of the book is absurdly high.

The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons. BY SCOTT D. SAGAN. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1993, 279 pp. $29.95.

Sagan informs his readers that he undertook this project believing that the chance of an accidental nuclear explosion was very low, and that he came to a thoroughly different conclusion. *The Limits of Safety* makes the chilling case that the United States (and, one must assume, the Soviet Union) came close more than once to some very nasty episodes. The book rests on two pillars: a great deal of research in public archives and the persuasive theory of a Yale sociologist, Charles Perrow, whose *Normal Accidents* makes the case that accidents are not the exception but the rule and that efforts to prevent them sometimes increase their likelihood. Readers will have to make their own judgments about just how dangerous the incidents Sagan describes really were, and the relative paucity of material after the 1960s certainly limits his argument. In the final analysis, no accident occurred that brought the two superpowers close to war. Still, his warnings

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about the dangers created by the nuclear arsenals of less sophisticated or safety-minded powers should discomfit academic proponents of stability through nuclear proliferation. The findings of *The Limits of Safety* will surely lend themselves to sensational stories in the press, but that is not the fault of the author, who has written an interesting and troubling book.

Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict. BY MARTIN VAN CREVELD. New York: The Free Press, 1993, 173 pp. $22.95.

A slender book, and more slender than it seems, because the first two chapters consist of an able, if unexceptional, potted history of war before 1945 and a disquisition on the impact of nuclear weapons on strategy and international politics. This leaves barely 60 pages to discuss nuclear weapons in Asia and the Middle East. The postcript makes the case that under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence (or rather umbrellas, more of which sprout up as countries acquire atom bombs), substate violence will continue to spread. A plausible case, but the author has made it elsewhere, at greater length and more convincingly.

The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953. BY SAMUEL R. WILLIAMSON AND STEVEN L. REARDEN. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, 224 pp. $45.00.

A book that is exactly what it seems—a good, short, reliable and straightforward account of how nuclear weapons became "America's first line of defense." Based on primary sources, this is an account of high-level decision-making and very much in the mold of traditional strategic history.

In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914. BY JOHN TETSURO SUMIDA. New York: Routledge, 1993, 480 pp. $19.95 (paper).

It is a historical commonplace that the construction of the HMS Dreadnought (laid down in 1905) heralded a revolution in naval affairs, a transformation of naval warfare rich with lessons for students of strategy at the end of this century as well. Alas, those of us who have long turned to Arthur Marder's wonderfully written histories of the Royal Navy for an account of the Dreadnought revolution must now consider this dense, superbly researched and definitive piece of scholarship. Sumida, a stubborn and meticulous researcher, does not have Marder's brio, but he does have the facts. The contemporary student of matters military will find this book worthy of perusal, if only because the author makes it painfully clear just how important financial and technical details are if we wish to understand what military organizations do and why they do it.

Voices Prophesying War: Future Wars, 1763-3749, Second Edition. BY I. F. CLARKE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, 268 pp. $25.00.

Clarke, who served in British intelligence during the Second World War and made a second career teaching English, surveys with amused irony many of the futuristic novels written over the last two centuries. The first edition of this book appeared in 1966. Its author has expanded it considerably to include a review of the "Third World War" genre of books that did so

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well in the 1980s. The type flowered, however, more than a century before, when Colonel George Tomkyns Chesney wrote *The Battle of Dorking*. Chesney's account of a German invasion of Britain, which was widely translated, created a good scare and caused a thrifty British government considerable annoyance.

Clarke roams over the wide variety of novels of this ilk, most of which, he believes, fell wide of the mark in predicting the future. Still, there were uncanny forecasts, including H. G. Wells' discussion of atom bombs, and Hector Bywater's *The Great Pacific War*, written in 1925. Often enough, the novelists made no greater mistakes than war offices. Clarke argues that the end of the Cold War has put the novel of future war in "a terminal condition," but he gives enough evidence of hopelessly rosy promises of world peace to make one think that the novelists will have plenty of catastrophes to imagine for years to come. An engaging review of a class of books that may have more to offer strategic analysts than they suspect.

Economic, Social and Environmental

RICHARD COOPER

Reconcilable Differences? The United States-Japan Economic Conflict. BY C. FRED BERGSTEN AND MARCUS NOLAND. Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1993, 271 pp. $19.95 (paper).

Despite the title, this book is mostly on Japan; it contains some discussion of U.S. macroeconomic policy, but nothing on U.S. trade policy and practices. There is much fascinating detail on the Japanese market and fine, even-handed analysis of issues raised in the U.S. policy debate on how to deal with Japan, on both macroeconomic policy and sectoral trade issues. The book offers a balanced strategy for the two governments to manage the relationship; it skillfully knocks down the worst ideas on the U.S. side. Inexplicably, however, it endorses "voluntary import expansion" with quantitative targets as a second-best component of a broader strategy without exploring fully the dangers of such a move for the world economy by the world's leading trade country, and without explaining clearly how ordinary Americans would benefit. In short, the authors fall into the current U.S. habit of assuming that the frustrations of some American firms in selling to Japan represent a serious problem for national policy, even if the remedy would put at risk more fundamental American economic or other interests. Nonetheless, this is a thoughtful, fact-filled book on a highly topical issue.

The Gnat Is Older than Man: Global Environment and the Human Agenda. BY CHRISTOPHER D. STONE. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1993, 341 pp. $21.95.

Despite the main title, this is a serious book by a professor of international law concerned with environmental issues. The book contains much interesting material on current international environmental issues such as deforestation, ozone depletion, toxic waste disposal and

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climate change, with special attention to the legal framework for dealing with them. It debunks much of the environmental hype that is designed to scare the public into action but also points out that hard evidence leaves plenty of cause for concern in some areas. The real contribution of the book is to examine the philosophical underpinnings of growing concern with the environment, address sympathetically the weaknesses in what could be called the environmentalist creed, and attempt to provide remedies for those weaknesses. It is a levelheaded, thoughtful and informative essay, despite its conclusory plea for a multidimensional, non-anthropocentric ethics based on our intuitions. The book is a useful introduction for environmentalists and non-environmentalists alike to the practical, philosophical and ethical complexities of many international environmental issues.

Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. BY D. J. PETERSON. Boulder (CO): Westview Press / Washington: RAND, 1993, 276 pp. $55.00 (paper, $19.95).

Drawing mainly on interviews and Soviet official papers and press reports, the author documents thoroughly the extensive and depressing environmental degradation of the Soviet Union. Environmentalists can take some comfort about their impact in the West and the improvements there of recent decades, when they survey this dismal picture. One of the few theoretical justifications for central planning in an industrial society, as compared to a decentralized economy based on private enterprise, is that it is able to take into account the "externalities" of waste disposal and thereby reduce air and water pollution. We see here the sharp contrast between theory and reality. The Soviet central planners basically ignored the externalities altogether except when public health was directly threatened (and often half-heartedly even then). The author also discusses the role of Soviet environmentalists in reducing the wholesale corruption of the environment and indirectly bringing down the communist system. The book is a very useful source of information.

Managing the World Economy: The Consequences of Corporate Alliances. BY PETER F. COWHEY AND JONATHAN D. ARONSON. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, 343 pp. $18.95 (paper).

The authors are fascinated by international corporate alliances, which while preserving the nationality of partners greatly complicate the practical implications that are thought to flow from nationality. They nicely document the growth of these alliances, with case studies of the automobile, semiconductor and international telecommunications industries. But their macroeconomic analysis is less successful. They characterize the U.S. and European approach to governing the post-1945 world economy in terms of six basic pillars that need to be altered as we approach the 21st century. They make many sensible points, such as the need for a global antitrust policy and bilateral trade discussions, but the case for a basic redesign of the governing principles, as opposed to continual constructive adaptation, is not made clear. It is not surprising that the evolution of the

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world economy has resulted in greater complexity than six simple pillars can handle satisfactorily. But the authors fail to recognize that their six pillars represent after-the-fact simplification that ignores the detailed complexities of the period from 1950 to 1980. We cannot ignore today's complexities in that way. History is always simpler than the present because we make it that way in order to comprehend it with less effort.

Economic Issues of Disarmament. EDITED BY JÜRGEN BAUER AND MANAS CHATTERJI. New York: New York University Press, 1993, 372 pp. $75.00.
Many chapters on a currently pertinent topic, but too much fruitless attention to whether defense spending is good or bad for growth. The conference on which this book is based was held before the collapse of the U.S.S.R., so a number of the papers now seem dated in this rapidly moving area.

Establishing a Central Bank for Europe: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the U.S. EDITED BY MATTHEW B. CANZONERI, VITTORIO GRILLI AND PAUL R. MASSON. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 307 pp. $49.95.
A book by academic specialists for academic specialists. Much of value here, but not readily accessible to those who will make the decisions in Europe.

Antidumping: How It Works and Who Gets Hurt. EDITED BY J. MICHAEL FINGER. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993, 267 pp. $39.50.
Case studies of antidumping laws and practices in Australia, Canada, the European Community and the United States, along with some history, analysis and general findings. Antidumping action has become the favored vehicle for protection, an unfair procedure against allegedly unfair trading practices.

Institutions for the Earth. EDITED BY PETER M. HAAS, ROBERT O. KEOHANE AND MARC A. LEVY. Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press, 1993, 448 pp. $37.50 (paper, $17.95).
Describes and evaluates institutional responses of the international community to transnational environmental problems. Scholarly chapters on ozone depletion, acid rain, Baltic and North Sea pollution, international oil pollution, international fisheries management, pesticide use and world population growth.

Trade and Protectionism. EDITED BY TAKATOSHI ITO AND ANNE O. KRUEGER. Chicago (IL): University of Chicago Press, 1993, 449 pp. $68.00.
Focuses on trading, investment and commercial policy practices of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, with chapters on U.S. trade interests and on regionalism. Contains high-quality empirical economics.

A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System. EDITED BY MICHAEL D. BORDON AND BARRY EICHENGREEN. Chicago (IL): University of Chicago Press, 1993, 675 pp. $75.00.
A review of the performance of the international monetary system from 1946 to 1971, with some discussion of implications for the future.

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The United States

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE

The Presidency of James Earl Carter. BY BURTON I. KAUFMAN. Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1993, 245 pp. $29.95 (paper, $14.95).

This is the first scholarly assessment of the Carter presidency based on the materials available in the Carter Presidential Library. Kaufman, a professor at Virginia Tech, gives a balanced and sympathetic account but is devastating—and convincing—in his final judgments. Apparently the more one learns about the Carter presidency, and the deeper into the internal documents of his administration one goes, the worse Carter looks.

Kaufman is especially critical of Carter's mismanagement of foreign affairs. He finds Carter "lacking in leadership, ineffective in dealing with Congress, incapable of defending America's honor abroad, and uncertain about its purpose, priorities and sense of direction."

There were some successes, including the Panama treaty and the Camp David accords that brought peace between Israel and Egypt, and Kaufman gives them appropriate space and analysis. But in response to the Iranian Revolution, Carter moved from blunder to blunder, culminating in the botched rescue attempt, which according to Kaufman "probably did more to undercut the Carter presidency than any other single event."

In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter exaggerated the threat and grossly overreacted; Kaufman charges that "pique rather than prudence" dictated his actions. The Olympic boycott was just silly. Still, one legacy—since forgotten—of Carter's reaction to Afghanistan was the 1980 arms buildup, begun by Defense Secretary Harold Brown and continued by the Reagan administration.

Kaufman discusses the pros (there were some) and cons (there were many more) of Carter's human rights policy, his never-very-clear policy toward the Sandinistas, and other aspects of his diplomacy, while maintaining his concentration on Iran and Afghanistan. Domestic policy and partisan politics are also covered. The work as a whole is characterized by sound judgments based on the record and will serve as a guide and inspiration for other, more detailed studies. Someday there will be an attempt at Carter revisionism; when it comes, it will have to deal with Kaufman's scathing summary: Carter was a president who was "long on good intentions but short on know-how," a leader who was "smart, caring, honest and informed" but who suffered from "self-righteousness, micromanagement and an inability to influence public opinion. Carter's was a mediocre, if not a failed, presidency." It should be added that Carter also suffered from rotten luck and that his successors are making him look a lot better than he did in 1981—which is why there will be a Carter revisionism.

Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-61. BY DAVID L. ANDERSON. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, 276 pp. $16.50 (paper).

"The Eisenhower administration simply postponed the day of reckoning in Viet-

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nam." This is the essential thesis of Professor Anderson's (University of Indianapolis) study, which carefully mines recently declassified National Security Council, State Department and other documents to reach the not very startling conclusion that in the 1950s Eisenhower failed to solve the problems of Vietnam for the 1960s and 1970s. Anderson's details on policy-making for Vietnam are fresh and instructive, but in his eagerness to challenge the so-called Eisenhower revisionists he overstates his case.

According to Anderson, "Eisenhower charted the course that President Lyndon Johnson followed to the fateful decisions of 1964 and 1965 to drop the bombs and land the Marines." Eisenhower "oversimplified and overcommitted" because he was "more skilled in tactics than in strategy." Anderson praises Eisenhower for resisting the pressure to intervene in 1954 to save the French at Dien Bien Phu, but criticizes him for supporting Ngo Dinh Diem from 1955 to 1961. "Prepared neither to retreat nor fight, the Eisenhower administration turned to nation building." What Anderson wishes Eisenhower had done he does not say. The only real alternative was to abandon Vietnam and all of Indochina in 1954, which was a political impossibility for a Republican president elected, in part, by drumming on the question, "Who lost China?" In short, this is a first-rate account of policy-making in Vietnam, 1955-61, weakened by an academic desire to criticize and stretch the evidence to blame Ike for the mistakes of Kennedy and Johnson.

Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War, and U.S. Political Culture. BY NOAM CHOMSKY. Boston (MA): South End Press, 1993, 172 pp. $14.00 (paper).

One of the few remaining Marxists, Noam Chomsky here undertakes to scold fellow leftists such as Oliver Stone for succumbing to the Camelot myth and asserting that JFK was assassinated by big business, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Mafia, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff (take your choice) because Kennedy intended to pull out of Vietnam. Chomsky rightly ridicules the notion of a Vietnam pullout but—typical of his past political assays—he sees dark, conspiratorial forces directing most actors on the public stage. In Chomsky's world view, presidents are puppets manipulated by America's economic managers (corporations and their lackeys in politics). Thus Kennedy had no freedom of choice but merely did as he was told.

Western Europe

FRITZ STERN

The European Rescue of the Nation-State. BY ALAN S. MILWARD. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, 477 pp. $45.00.

This is a major work, at once historical and analytical, tracing and interpreting the development of the European Community, emphasizing critical aspects such as the Belgian coal industry at the time of the Schuman Plan, the origins of the EC, the growth of the Common Agri-

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cultural Policy, and Britain's ambivalent involvement. The historical part is based on archival research and studded with statistics. The interpretative and controversial part deals with previous theories of European integration and insists on the relatively simple thesis implicit in the title: for the sake of survival the much more active national state after 1945 needed some varying degree of European coordination and eventually needed the Community as a protector against an ever-stronger Germany. The author, a well-known and practiced British historian, believes that European states will continue to need integration rather than yielding to nationalist blandishments. He sees Brussels as having relatively little power and deplores some of the conventional attacks on Brussels as threatening freedom. In one of the rare epigrams—a relief in a necessarily dense work—he says: "The freedom to swim in a tide of sewage, like the freedom to dine at the Ritz, is a somewhat abstract principle on which to ask people to condemn a political organization."

Roy Jenkins: A Life at the Center. BY ROY JENKINS. New York: Random House, 1991, 585 pp. $30.00.

Son of a coal miner and Labor Member of Parliament, Roy Jenkins rose to extraordinary heights in British life and politics: a tribute to his great talents and to a society that was hospitable to a generous dose of meritocracy. The acclaimed author of several political biographies, Jenkins applies the same literary skill and realistic insight to this splendid autobiography, which also tells the story of British politics from the end of World War II to Jenkins' term as president of the European Commission (1977-81) and his role in founding the Social Democratic Party. He provides superb sketches of the leading actors in Britain and abroad. A convinced Europeanist, a passionate and principled politician (who held several Labor cabinet posts, including the chancellorship of the exchequer), a writer and a man of the world, Jenkins has indeed been at the center of many stages, enjoying it and giving the reader vicarious and instructive pleasure.

Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization. BY RICHARD F. KUISEL. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, 296 pp. $30.00.

A fine study of French attitudes toward America and toward the presence of American culture, real and putative, in French life after World War II. The author, a well-known American historian of France, emphasizes how political, economic and cultural elements combined there to produce the violent anti-Americanism of the 1950s, on both the left and the right, if for different reasons. He sketches its gradual attenuation. There was fear of American political domination and revulsion from the American consumer society that had gradually made its way into French life by infiltration and emulation. To become modernized, as France did especially during the Gaullist period, implied a society of abundance: "The French response was as much adaptive as it was imitative." The book combines careful research into representative episodes with keen analysis and a pleasing style: an unpretentious contribution to important themes,

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instructive and remarkably topical.

Mission and Betrayal: Working with Franklin Roosevelt to Help Save Britain and Europe, 1940-1945. BY RENÉ DE CHAMBRUN. Stanford (CA): Hoover Institution Press, 1993, 221 pp. $18.95.

Chambrun, a direct descendant of Lafayette and elegantly connected in France and the United States, came here after the fall of France, a defender of Petain and of France's armistice. With F.D.R.'s approval he urged American audiences in the summer of 1940 to believe in Britain's ability to resist. That was his "mission"—the "betrayal" describes FDR's alleged reneging on a promise to arrange for the sending of food to unoccupied France. Chambrun, the son-in-law of Pierre Laval, casts Harry Hopkins, "the number one friend of Stalin in the United States," as the chief villain in the betrayal. Chambrun eventually returned to occupied Paris but, in retrospect, seems to have had blinders on; in a book that depicts high living on both sides of the Atlantic—champagne and oysters everywhere—he barely mentions the atrocities of the time. This is an insidious, unpersuasive piece of self-justification. It has some details of archival and anecdotal interest, but above all it is an unintended revelation of the vindictive obtuseness of a certain kind of pro-Vichy public figure.

Fascist Europe: The Rise of Racism and Xenophobia. BY GLYN FORD. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1993, 216 pp. $59.95 (paper, $19.95).

In 1984-85 the European Parliament appointed a Committee of Inquiry to study the rise of racism and fascism, and subsequently the European Parliament, Council and Commission adopted a Joint Declaration against Racism and Xenophobia. The present book grew out of the report of the 2nd Committee, finished in July 1990. The findings for all European countries are important and worrisome, with France and Germany as the countries most threatened by right-wing extremism, both because of its direct political effect and, more seriously, because of its influence on the traditional right. The European Parliament adopted the report, but little else has happened. A useful survey, even if the committee and especially the editor use the term "fascism" a bit loosely. Not every bloody-minded xenophobe is a fascist.

The European Challenges Post-1992: Shaping Factors, Shaping Actors. EDITED BY ALEXIS JACQUEMIN AND DAVID WRIGHT. Brookfield (VT): Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993, 464 pp. $79.95.

A book not to be read but mined. The editors assembled economic and social forecast reports by national research institutes of the 12 EC member states, and they compare these data with surveys of representatives of the corresponding business community. Useful statistics, ambitious projections and commendable efforts to combine economic with cultural data.

A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy. BY PHILIP H. GORDON. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1993, 255 pp. $35.00.

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In examining de Gaulle's views on French national security and his legacy, this book begins with a finely balanced study of de Gaulle, acknowledging the genuineness of his emotional commitment and his extraordinary political skill, which included his ability to convey the dictates of greatness to a people defeated and distracted by the wars in Indochina and Algeria. The author complements the biographical material with a good survey of Gaullist elements in subsequent defense policies. He sees special relevance for today, given that the post-Cold War world—with the reassertion of nation states, the end of ideology and the potential of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals—seems to resemble de Gaulle's vision. Well written and lucidly argued.

The German Expellees: Victims in War and Peace. BY ALFRED-MAURICE DE ZAYAS. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, 169 pp. $35.00.

The author has for years been concerned with the fate of millions of Germans who in the final stages of Hitler's war became victims—either by experiencing the initial Soviet onslaught on German territory, or as refugees caught in the "German Hiroshima" (his reference to the Dresden fire storm), or by expulsion from Czechoslovakia and territories assigned to Poland. The book, with a brief gesture toward the history of the German presence in some of these lands, is mostly based on eyewitness accounts of atrocities. De Zayas, an American activist trained in law and history, has written other, more substantial books on this chapter of wartime suffering. Notable and, to my mind, regrettable is the author's speculation with some measure of sympathy that in some 10 or 20 years a German government may wish to negotiate with Poland "for a partial revision of the Oder-Neisse frontier." Such a thought would only alarm the Poles, inflame surviving expellees and yet fail to benefit the original victims—almost all of whom would be dead by then.

Western Hemisphere

KENNETH MAXWELL

Fidel Castro. BY ROBERT E. QUIRK. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1993, 800 pp. $35.00.

Cuba After the Cold War. EDITED BY CARMELO MESA-LAGO. Pittsburgh (PA): University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993, 352 pp. $39.95 (paper, $16.95).

Robert Quirk, a professor of history emeritus at Indiana University, concludes his very long and well-written book on Cuba with the observation that Fidel Castro has ". . . become irrelevant. He had stayed too long . . . history had passed him by." But Fulgencio Batista said much the same thing in 1957, and Quirk, like Castro, seems at a loss to know how to conclude his work as it marches self-confidently toward the late 1980s, only to confront what Quirk sees as a mortal crisis caused by the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Quirk's book is very much a narrative history of the old school and as such provides a useful summary of Castro's rise to power and actions in government. But, as is characteristic of this genre, it presumes

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too much and delivers too little. Despite the title, this book is more the history of a regime than of an individual. Based almost exclusively on secondary sources, combined with the uneven and arbitrary snapshots that can be obtained from the occasional declassified document and a first-hand experience of Cuba that seems limited to watching Fidel Castro on television in the lobby of a tourist hotel in Havana, Quirk's book is almost totally devoid of explanatory analysis. For anyone seeking the sources of Castro's longevity in power or an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of his regime, Quirk has next to nothing to offer.

For a sober and detailed examination of the immediate background of the current situation in Cuba there is no better place to begin than with the Carmelo Mesa-Lago volume. This outstanding contribution looks at the impact of the collapse of Cuba's most important alliances and examines the reasons Cuba escaped the domino effect that led to the rapid demise of communism in Eastern Europe. As to the survival of the Castro regime, Mesa-Lago and Horst Fabian review several political and economic scenarios in the final chapter. All the authors agree that Cuba's current political-economic model is not viable in the long run. Mesa-Lago foresees a shift toward militarization and repression without significant economic change. But he also believes that if there is no peaceful transition to democracy, there will be a violent end to socialism in Cuba. Given the immobility of Washington's policy on Cuba, this is not a happy prediction for the future.

The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in Development Studies. BY ROBERT A. PACKENHAM. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1992, 400 pp. $42.50.

Robert Packenham here analyzes and contrasts various concepts of economic development and social and political justice within the Latin American context. He provides a fascinating, relentless and extensively documented look at the politicization of the American academic community and what he sees as its Marxist roots. This will not be a popular work among Packenham's colleagues, as it exposes many of the follies and hypocrisies within the Latin Americanist precinct. Also, it is worth noting that Packenham makes much of the role played by the Brazilian sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso in what he calls the "dependency movement." Cardoso was until recently Brazil's foreign minister, currently holds the finance portfolio and is a would-be candidate for president. It will be interesting to see how one of the founding contributors to the mind-set Packenham so roundly criticizes will deal with the new Latin American paradigms of free trade, open markets, privatization and a less intrusive state.

The Conscience of Worms and the Cowardice of Lions: Cuban Politics and Culture in an American Context. BY IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ. New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction Publishers, 1993, 81 pp. $24.95 (paper, $14.95).

Professor Horowitz could hardly be more sparse in his prose or pointed in his opinions. His provocatively entitled

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booklet is based on a series of lectures delivered to a presumably friendly audience at the University of Miami. It is intended as a tribute to those Cubans and Cuban-American scholars who keep alive the antitotalitarian spirit. He roundly castigates American academics for their blindness and hostility to those he sees as the friends of freedom. But it is not clear whether he believes by the "cowardice of lions" that the United States should have sought to overthrow Castro more actively than it did (and at what cost), and there is little here that might help define U.S. policy toward a post-Castro Cuba, which he sees as imminent. Given Professor Horowitz's long and distinguished engagement in Cuban affairs, his scholarship and the audience to which he was addressing himself, this is an opportunity lost.

Professor Horowitz argues convincingly that Castro, and by extension the Cuban revolution, has had a major influence on U.S. scholarship. Yet he reduces the bitter academic divisions about Cuba to a dispute among analysts, pundits and policymakers of Jewish origin (both Cubans and Americans). "Cuba provides a painful example," he writes, "of a continuing pattern: one group of American social scientists of Jewish extraction taking a strong leadership role in an effort to sanitize and sanctify yet another dictator promising moral redemption and economic rectification, and another group attempting to make plain the disastrous consequences for democratic outcomes of such a dictatorship." Curiously, he fails to include Abraham Lowenthal in his list, perhaps the most influential of the "dialogistas" at the intersection between the academy and policymakers over the past fifteen years. And this is, in any case, a myopic view based only on a checklist of the authors included in his own anthology, *Cuban Communism*. Professor Horowitz's observations on the linkage of ideology, scholarship and policy prescriptions, however, are worth pondering.

Reflections on Economic Development: Toward a New Latin American Consciousness. BY ENRIQUE V. IGLESIAS. Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 1992, 158 pp. $15.95.

Enrique Iglesias, president of the Inter-American Development Bank, provides a very effective overview of the economic consensus now emerging in Latin America. Iglesias sees a repudiation of doctrinaire excesses on both the right and the left, with an agenda of workable and realistic policies replacing both the Pinochet neoliberal model and the traditional state-dominated, protectionist model. The key elements of these new policies are concern over the size and effects of the transfer of resources needed to service foreign debt; the importance of combating inflation; the need to find imaginative solutions to problems of extreme poverty; the need for trade liberalization; and the necessity of reforming the state. This is a book of style, substance, and analysis, marking a major shift in thinking among Latin American economic policymakers.

Latin America's Turnaround: Privatization, Foreign Investment, and Growth. EDITED BY PAUL H. BOEKER. San Francisco (CA): Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1993, 190 pp. $14.95.

Paul Boeker's volume provides an opti-

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mistic view that a "turnaround" has occurred in Latin America and can be sustained. Focusing on questions of privatization, foreign investment and economic growth, he quotes approvingly several times in his introductory chapter the remarks of the impeached president of Brazil, Fernando Collor de Mello, including his comments in December 1989 that "the state is a giant. It is inefficient and it is corrupt." As we know now, President Collor knew only too well the truth of which he spoke. But until Brazil puts its house in order, the U.S. Congress passes NAFTA, the Argentine reforms are sustained into the next administration, and the United States avoids the temptations of protectionism, it is still too early to be confident that the brave new world Boeker and his colleagues see is truly here.

Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Republics

ROBERT LEGVOLD

Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire. BY DAVID REMNICK. New York: Random House, 1993, 576 pp. $25.00.

Remnick paints like Seurat. Rather than depict reality in straightforward analytical terms, he lets the shape of the Soviet Union's passing emerge from a mass of variously subtle and vivid dots of paint. The dots are the people he came to know during his assignment to Moscow as the *Washington Post*'s correspondent from 1985 to 1991. He offers no conceptual framework for understanding the demise or Gorbachev's ultimately counterproductive effort to prevent it. Instead he lets the system's defects speak for themselves: the corruption, the reckoning with the Gulag, the trivial self-seeking of the *apparat*, the failure of social safeguards (for example, against homelessness) and much more. Even these are not described and weighed in a formal sense. The scale and nature of the corruption emerges from the tale of the Remnicks' nanny, who to bury her mother had to bribe everyone from the scheduler of funerals to the grave digger and, in the end, pay a sum equal to three months' wages. At the other end of the spectrum stands the regional Uzbek party leader who lived in a vast estate with peacocks, lions, thoroughbred horses and concubines. Thus each of the dimensions of the problem and of Gorbachev's answer is revealed.

With relish Remnick sets aside his journalist's neutrality, letting his emotions show throughout the book. As a result some of the people who represent evil, such as the dotty woman who does not so much embody Stalinism as pine for the man, are more caricatures than characters. Other more serious players, like Yegor Ligachev, when Remnick does not have much time for them, emerge as but half themselves.

Because he is such a fine writer, Remnick's tales and portraits are superb, and his book, from beginning to end, is as absorbing and entertaining for the specialist as the general reader.

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Hope Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubcek. EDITED BY JIRI HOCHMAN. New York: Kodansha International, 1993, 354 pp. $27.50.

Even if he had not been at the center of the drama in 1968, Dubcek's story would be fascinating in itself. He was born, as he says, of "a pair of Slovak socialist dreamers who happened to have emigrated to Chicago" and who took him as a small boy to Kyrgyzstan for 12 years, and then to Gorky on the Volga for five years, returning to Slovakia in time for 1938. He recounts these experiences with a detail that must have been assembled at a much later age. After a brisk description of his rise within the Slovak Communist Party following the war, most of the book is saved for the events of 1967–68. He adds color to what we already know of the Prague Spring, but nothing particularly new. The point at which the memoir becomes truly engaging is after his reform (and, to a degree that seems surprisingly out of character, he makes the reform his) is crushed, and he and his closest colleagues are spirited off to Moscow like convicts to be browbeaten by Brezhnev and three other members of the Politburo.

Alternative Paths: Soviets and Americans 1917–1920. BY DAVID W. MCFADDEN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, 448 pp. $60.00.

The tale of the encounter between Woodrow Wilson's United States and Lenin's newly triumphant Bolsheviks has been told many times before, but mostly as part of broader accounts. McFadden zeroes in on the curious, halting first steps toward some kind of relationship, a confused process featuring the improvisations of a half-dozen semiofficial American representatives in a remote, turbulent land. He does not change our understanding of history in any fundamental way, but he does fill in the details, particularly on the U.S. side, and the specialist will find the account rich and useful.

Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia. BY WALTER LAQUEUR. New York: HarperCollins, 1993, 318 pp. $27.50.

In the detritus of the Soviet Union a variety of radical nationalist, sometimes reactionary, sometimes racist, sometimes antediluvian groupings have formed. Laqueur, in a highly readable, concise account, summarizes their points of overlap, their varied lineages (from parts of Slavophilism, the Orthodox Church and fascism or, more accurately, proto-fascism), and their political support. Since the book covers everyone and everything from Fyodor Dostoyevski to "Soyuz," the Soviet parliamentary group that fought Baltic independence, analytical fine lines get blurred and analytical depth is sacrificed. The book's strength is its sweep; no other study places the contemporary extremists on the Russian right in so broad a historical context.

Protestantism and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia. EDITED BY SABRINA PETRA RAMET. Durham (NC): Duke University Press, 1993, 441 pp. $60.00.

The last of a three-volume study of the Christian churches in the former socialist states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In this instance several of the authors make an effort to deal with events

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since the collapse of socialism, but mostly the essays deal with the struggle and accommodations of the various Protestant churches with the prior regimes. The authors are all experts on the churches they discuss, but by and large their commentaries are more descriptive than analytical. They provide a detailed running account of which churches did what and how seven East European states and the Soviet Union responded. They have a few things to say about why each side behaved as it did, but not to the degree that the place of the church between state and society is fully probed.

The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992. BY THOMAS M. NICHOLS. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1993, 259 pp. $32.50.

The subject is not new. The relationship between the Soviet military and the Soviet political class has been studied and disputed often before. Of the two basic schools—one that saw tension and conflict in the relationship and the other that insisted the underlying relationship was cozy and like-minded—Nichols chooses the first. His book has the merit of showing the pattern of disaffection and maneuvering on the part of military leaders throughout the history of the Soviet Union, all of which stands out more clearly when set against the ultimate contest in the Gorbachev era, a subject he treats at some length.

Nichols, however, does more than bolster the case of those who believe that Soviet officers have had their own view on matters of war and how to prepare and fight it, how to run the military, and how to judge the adversary and deal with him even in peacetime, and that they have often quarreled with politicians in trying to get their way. He subordinates all this to a more fundamental thesis: namely that the Soviet system unwittingly (through inventions like the notion of military doctrine) drew military leaders into politics after having successfully molded their minds according to the regime's ideology. The result was a military whose leadership had become ideologues (with party leaders the pragmatists) and, worse, a military up to its ears in the politics of defense and much of foreign policy. The author will be challenged on the thesis, first, because it is more asserted than demonstrated, and second, because he argues by extension that this is the dangerous nature of the military with which Yeltsin and the leaders of the other new states must contend.

Russia and Japan. EDITED BY TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA, JONATHAN HASLAM, AND ANDREW C. KUCHINS. Berkeley: University of California, International and Area Studies, 1993, 456 pp. $26.50.

A comprehensive examination of the Soviet/Russian relationship with Japan examining both sides' policies, drawing on many perspectives (Russian, American, British and Japanese) and featuring several dimensions (economic, political and security). The volume mixes seasoned specialists with younger scholars, all of whom, however, bring a fresh eye to this important but impacted relationship. Most of the authors devote the lion's

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share of their attention to the Soviet period, with some afterthoughts on trends since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Several selections, however, deal entirely with the new post-Soviet setting, and of these Robert Scalapino's essay on Russia's role in Asia, Sergei Goncharov's and Kuchins' piece on the domestic sources of Russian policy, Alexei Zagorskii's chapter on Russian security policy, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's concluding thoughts on future Russo-Japanese relations serve well to orient the reader in this new reality.

Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985-1991. BY COIT D. BLACKER. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, 239 pp. $16.95 (paper).

When Blacker wrote most of this book, he had meant it to be a broad, basic and accessible survey of how much the Soviet superpower adversary's approach to military power and national defense had changed. He had not meant to write a history. But so it turned out, and here the reader will find the first comprehensive account of one of the most stunning turnabouts in a great power's attitude toward arms and war in the twentieth century. Blacker has melded into a single, elegantly simple account all the strands: the changing concepts of security, the link to foreign policy, shifts in the approach to arms control, and the troubled civil-military relationship. Blacker's book is not the last word on why all the change took place. (He settles for the obvious but incomplete explanation: "The economy, stupid.") But he tells an important story that may have slipped by many of us in the hurricane of events.

In from the Cold: Germany, Russia, and the Future of Europe. EDITED BY VLADIMIR BARANOVSKY AND HANS-JOACHIM SPANGER. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1993, 321 pp. $49.95.

This is a book that should have been overtaken by events, because it was planned and largely written after the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe but before its collapse in the Soviet Union. Yet it has not, at least, in important respects. Written by German and Russian scholars who had long supported a fruitful, cooperative Soviet-German relationship, the book presumes an effective partnership between a post-imperial Soviet Union and the rest of Western Europe. Because the authors appear to have been right about Europe's new agenda and prescient in seeing the institutional changes this would require, the book still has value. Notwithstanding last-minute allusions to the post-1991 reality, however, what the authors have not been able to address are the implications of the former Soviet Union as part of the problem of European instability, not merely its solution.

The Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of War. BY SLAVENKA DRAKULIC. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1993, 146 pp. $19.95.

After the horror of events in the former Yugoslavia conveyed nightly by television, it takes the artist to seize and shake our numbed consciousness and carry it to some deeper level of meaning. Drakulic, a very talented essayist and writer of fiction, engulfs the reader, not by assault but by the ache, drawing him or her along on the

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descent into bewilderment, sadness, agony and the void. "I had thought that the death of the body was the worst thing that could happen in war: I didn't know that worse was the separation of self from the body, the numbness of the inner being, extinction before death, pain before pain." She is Croat, but with no passion about her newly enforced identity, and she writes as any man, woman, Serb, Muslim or Croat. She writes about what we cannot see in the newspapers no matter how much we read: about the sickening transformation in oneself, one's neighbor, one's community.

Middle East

WILLIAM B. QUANDT

Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush. BY HOWARD TEICHER AND GAYLE RADLEY TEICHER. New York: William Morrow, 1993, 418 pp. $23.00.

Forget the misleading title—this is a book about policymaking toward the Middle East in the Reagan administration, with brief reflections on what came before and after. Howard Teicher served on the National Security Council staff through much of this period, and has firsthand information on the foul-ups in Lebanon, the fight against terrorism and the Iran-contra affair, which essentially brought his career in government to an end.

Teicher feels that he was hounded from government service by those in the bureaucracy who resented his access to cabinet-level officers, who found him unwilling to go along with conventional wisdom, who were threatened by his creativity and who thought that a Jew could not deal objectively with the Middle East. Part of this book is a settling of scores, sometimes against unnamed adversaries—Arabists, bureaucrats—and sometimes against specific individuals such as Caspar Weinberger.

According to Teicher, he correctly foresaw the downfall of the shah, Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980 and nearly every other important Middle East development of the 1980s. The only time he admits to a lapse in judgment was in carrying out instructions from Robert McFarlane to ask the Israelis to provide money for the contras. This was the beginning of the path that led him to the infamous trip with McFarlane to Tehran to trade arms for hostages.

Unfortunately, the Teichers have decided to write a book for a general audience, which seems to mean no footnotes and "remembered" quotations instead of real words uttered by real people. This technique makes for a highly readable book, but it is impossible for serious scholars to check many of the assertions. By contrast, George Shultz's recent memoir, which covers the same period, is much more authoritative.

For all the interesting vignettes in this self-serving account, Teicher unfortunately succumbs to the same kind of finger-pointing that he deplores. For example, he is fierce in condemning nameless Arabists, but when he does in fact mention his real betes noires, they turn out to be people like Weinberger,

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hardly an Arabist, and sometimes Reagan himself, who could not bring himself to discipline his squabbling underlings.

The brief treatment of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is unsatisfactory, consisting of little more than saying that it was inevitable given all the mistakes of the previous decade.

Tradition et Révolution: L'enjeu de la Modernité en Algérie et dans L'Islam. BY REDHA MALEK. Paris: Editions Sindbad, 1993, 219 pp.

The author, currently Algeria's foreign minister and a member of the High Council of State, grapples with the question of how countries in the Islamic world can get their bearings in an era when old ideologies and one-party systems have been discredited. His harshest criticism is directed at those who seek to use Islam to mobilize people by offering false hopes that faith will bring solutions to deep-seated problems of society. Instead, he argues that Third World countries have no alternative but to become part of the modern world by relying on reason and rationality to adapt their historical experiences to the needs of the present. In his overview of the Algerian revolution, he argues that it was this ability to guide the revolution by reason that made it genuinely popular. Contesting views were debated and accommodated, and decisions were made by voting. One senses nostalgia for those heroic days in this difficult essay by a leading Algerian politician.

The United States and the State of Israel. BY DAVID SCHOENBAUM. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, 404 pp. $39.95 (paper, $16.95).

This is a broad overview of a much-discussed, much-written-about relationship. What Schoenbaum brings to the debate is an impatience with clichés, an encyclopedic knowledge of the written record, and a beyond-the-Beltway perspective. Essentially, he argues that the U.S.-Israeli relationship has always been complex and even difficult to manage, bordering on the unique in international affairs. It is rooted in a multiplicity of sources—values, interests, politics, lobbies, strategy. All of this makes good sense and is refreshingly free of propaganda for any particular point of view, but there is a cost. The book sometimes seems to lack thematic unity, to wander, and even the chronology gets confused at times as the author looks ahead, then darts back. Readers unfamiliar with much of this material may be a bit lost by the near stream-of-consciousness quality of some of the writing. The story comes to an end in early 1992, before Labor's return to power, which leaves the assessment of the chances for peace quite bleak. Still, a valuable contribution.

Peace with Security: Israel's Minimal Security Requirements in Negotiations with Syria. BY ZE'EV SCHIFF. Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993, 107 pp. $11.95 (paper).

Schiff has now done for the Golan Heights what he did for the West Bank and Gaza: spell out clearly and convincingly what Israel's minimal security needs are in the context of a peace settlement. The author is a respected military analyst, so his views carry weight. He supports the essential "land for peace" bargain of U.N.

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Resolution 242, insisting only that water sources be protected and that the Golan be effectively demilitarized. If these conditions are met, he favors evacuating Israeli settlements, which he deems to have no military value in any case. In contrast to the arrangements on the Egyptian-Israeli front, the Golan offers less room for creating a wide buffer zone, so the security arrangements will have to be fairly elaborate, including an actual Israeli military presence for a period of time. Although he favors an American role in helping to monitor any agreement, he does not want American forces on the ground. All in all, a very important monograph that can actually contribute to the ongoing negotiations.

Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946. BY LOUISE FAWCETT. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 227 pp. $54.95.

Historians of the Cold War now readily acknowledge the importance of the Azerbaijan crisis in fixing U.S. and Soviet attitudes and stances. This able case study relies on newly available archival material to broaden the picture of the crisis, placing needed emphasis on its Iranian dimensions and the three-way rivalry among the United States, the U.S.S.R and Britain. Still, one is left with questions about why the Soviets decided to back down—was it Truman's "blunt message," or was there ever such a message? And what would Truman have done if Stalin had called his bluff? Without access to Russian archives, the author can only conclude that Moscow handled the crisis badly. That may well be, but such a bland explanation does not quite satisfy. Important questions remain unanswered, but this still stands as the best study on the topic to date.

Le Sabre et le Turban: L'avenir du Maghreb. BY REMY LEVEAU. Paris: Editions François Bourin, 1993, 272 pp.

One of France's most respected specialists on North Africa has produced a fine study that examines the roots of the current political malaise in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Taking into account the specific national experiences of each country, Leveau sees as a common theme the contest between the army, as the real power behind the state, and Islamic political movements, which are increasingly able to mobilize those left out of political life. Neither of these forces will defeat the other; instead, different forms of accommodation are envisaged. He sees Islamic movements in the Maghreb today as somewhat analogous to communist parties in Europe in the 1930s. They will not come to power, but they will bring many of the disenfranchised into politics and affect the terms of political discourse. A thought-provoking book that gets beyond stereotypes of the "green menace" without harboring illusions about how the Islamists would likely behave if they did come to power.

After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East. BY ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1993, 811 pp. $65.00.

Those who came to know Tony Cordesman as military analyst for ABC during

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Desert Storm will know what to expect from this monumental book: a sober, authoritative style, endless data and a belief that the Middle East is probably destined to keep on arming and fighting without really resolving any of its major problems. The scope of this study is encyclopedic: from Morocco to Iran, including the Horn of Africa (but ignoring Turkey); each country and each conflict; inventories of conventional and nonconventional weapons; and the prospects for arms control and conflict resolution. Few will read from cover to cover, but many will want to have this hefty volume at hand for reference. Cordesman sees much military spending as enormously wasteful, but notes that most military casualties in the Middle East have been caused by low-technology, often "obsolete" weapons. Nonetheless, with petrodollars to spend, many countries of the region will keep on racing after the elusive goal of security through arms. One might think that the experiences of the shah's Iran and Saddam Hussein's Iraq might give pause to those who favor more spending on arms. But Cordesman provides no reason for hope in this regard. Desert Storm, if anything, has just whetted appetites for more and better.

The Economics of Middle East Peace. EDITED BY STANLEY FISCHER, DANI RODRICK AND ELIAS TUMA. Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press, 1993, 370 pp. $42.50.

For several years the Institute for Social and Economic Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government has been working with Arab and Israeli economists to see what the economic benefits of Arab-Israeli peace might be. This conference volume is the first major result of the institute's work, and it is a good first step. No one pretends that political issues in the Middle East can be dissolved through economic cooperation. Indeed, there is even considerable skepticism about the extent of possible regional development and the likely size of any "peace dividends." But reduced military expenditures, a more stable investment climate and some region-wide development efforts seem to hold out promises of contributing to the economic well-being of the area. The papers are uneven, but cover a wide range of topics and will be of interest to specialists. The mere fact that Israeli and Arab economists are engaging one another on this level of discourse is already an encouraging sign for the future.

Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution. BY JOHN FORAN. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1993, 452 pp. $44.95.

This ambitious study still has the feel of the doctoral dissertation that it was once. The author is eager to link developmental theory with the historical case of Iran, and to a large degree he succeeds. But the result will be heavy going for most readers. The value of this original work lies in its use of dependency theory and its conceptualization of the emergence of broad-based protest movements that can bring down governments but have difficulty replacing them. While the theoretical structure is overly weighty, it probably does illuminate more than it obscures. The discussion of the causes of the 1979 revolution is well done.

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Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974–1991. BY MADIHA RASHID AL MADFAI. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 279 pp. $54.95.

Many were surprised when King Hussein announced in 1988 that Jordan would no longer bear responsibility for negotiations concerning the West Bank. For so many years American diplomats in particular had assumed that Jordan was the most suitable address for dealing with the Palestinian issue. This book provides useful background for the king's decision to disengage, emphasizing the multiple frustrations that marked his dealings with the Reagan administration in particular.

The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World. EDITED BY BAHGAT KORANY, PAUL NOBLE AND REX BRYNEN. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, 322 pp. $49.95 (paper, $19.95).

Excellent essays by distinguished authors who bring together an interest in national security and the contemporary Arab world. The concept of security is treated in several ways: the traditional definition of defense against external aggression, the danger of internal social upheavals, and economic challenges. An important collection for understanding the problems of overarmed but still insecure countries just beginning to grapple with the problems of opening up political and economic systems.

The Gulf Crisis: Background and Consequences. EDITED BY IBRAHIM IBRAHIM. Washington: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1992, 354 pp.

The Persian Gulf crisis was such a dramatic event in the post-Cold War era that it was bound to be the subject of many conferences and instant histories. This volume is one of the better of its kind. Based on papers presented at a conference in mid-1991, the book covers the background of the crisis, the international response, the positions of regional actors and some of the economic consequences. A useful chronology is included.

The Politics of Change in the Middle East. BY ROBERT B. SATLOFF. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1993, 237 pp. $49.00 (paper, $14.95).

A collection of introductory essays by well-known authors that addresses questions of regime change and stability, among other issues of governance. The authors speculate at some length on how the long era of pseudo-stability in the Middle East might end, but there are no predictions here of inevitable revolution or of Islamic regimes necessarily coming to power. For all the region's limitations, continuity for a bit longer seems to be the dominant expectation.

Iran and the Arab World. EDITED BY HOOSHANG AMIRAHMADI AND NADER ENTESSAR. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, 264 pp. $49.95.

An oft-neglected topic is competently handled by a variety of authors. As Iran increasingly comes to be portrayed as a threat to many regimes in the Arab world, the analysis in this volume will provide useful background information.

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Asia and the Pacific

DONALD ZAGORIA

Cold War & Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War. BY ODD ARNE WESTAD. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, 260 pp. $50.00.

This volume is an impressive piece of historical scholarship on the origins of the Cold War in East Asia. Its primary importance stems from the interesting way in which it weaves together the policies and perceptions of the four key actors in the critical 1944-46 period: Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists, Mao Zedong's communists, Stalin's Russia and Truman's America.

The book demonstrates that the Cold War in East Asia predated the triumph of the Chinese communists or the Korean War. Already by August 1945 many high-ranking U.S. officials saw F.D.R.'s design for U.S.-Soviet cooperation in East Asia as outdated, viewed Soviet demands on China as aggressive, believed that the Chinese Communist Party was an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, and were acting to keep the Red Army out of Japan and to contain Soviet influence in China.

By mid-1946, the leaders of both the Soviet Union and the United States viewed the civil war in China as linked to the Soviet-American conflict of interest in Europe and the Middle East. In short, there was an early globalization of the U.S.-Soviet conflict. The author also has interesting things to say about Stalin's diplomacy, which he finds erratic and incoherent. Instead of seeking to overcome American suspicions by working out a cautious foreign policy designed to achieve limited goals, Stalin alternated between aggressive and conciliatory measures that increased U.S. wariness and Soviet isolation.

The Man Who Stayed Behind. BY SIDNEY RITTENBERG AND AMANDA BENNETT. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993, 476 pp. $25.00.

This is the story of an American idealist who spent his youth organizing local miners as a member of the American Communist Party, landed in China in the mid-1940s as a young GI with the U.S. Army, and then joined the Chinese Communist Party during the civil war with the Nationalists. Rittenberg spent 30 years in China, more than half of them in jail. He was first put in jail from 1949 to 1955 and again during the Cultural Revolution from 1967 to 1977.

Although this book has been accompanied by a good deal of hoopla about Rittenberg's alleged access to the inner circles of power, it is clear that he was never trusted by the Chinese communist leaders and that when he was not in jail he lived in a foreign ghetto of Western communists and fellow travelers who were kept away from most Chinese. Although there are occasional interesting tidbits of information, the book is devoid of any real analysis or insight. It is, however, a testimony to the extraordinary paranoia, xenophobia and self-destructive behavior that was rampant during the Maoist era.

If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait: The International Response. BY PARRISS H.

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CHANG AND MARTIN L. LASATER. New York: University Press of America, 1993, 200 pp. $46.50 (paper, $18.50).

Beijing has never ruled out the use of force against Taiwan. When the United States normalized relations with China in 1979, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which said that the U.S. decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rested upon "the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means."

But what if China at some point decides to use force against Taiwan in order to bring about reunification? What would be the U.S. and international reaction?

A group of experts were assembled at Penn State University in 1991 to consider this and related issues. One of the most thoughtful contributions is by Mark S. Pratt, a retired U.S. foreign service officer who headed the Taiwan desk and was American consul general in Canton. He makes two important points. First, Taipei cannot be complacent about being able to call on the United States in case of an attack from the mainland. But Beijing cannot conclude that there will be no U.S. military response. The purpose of the strong statements in the TRA was to keep force a U.S. option that any Chinese government would have to consider.

Second, precisely because the TRA places the United States in the middle of any efforts to deal with Taiwan's future, it does not make sense to cut off regular high-level dialogue with Chinese leaders. The United States, says Pratt, needs to continue to indicate to Beijing that it is prepared for China to play an increasingly important role in the world, and it should adopt a strictly neutral position on the Taiwan question, apart from sticking with its interest in a peaceful settlement.

The Black Hands of Beijing: Lives of Defiance in China's Democracy Movement. BY GEORGE BLACK AND ROBIN MUNRO. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993, 390 pp. $24.95.

This is a largely descriptive account of the lives of three of the leaders of the Chinese democracy movement who were jailed for their participation in the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. The authors provide some limited new sources of understanding of the origins and course of the democracy movement and help to place it in a meaningful analytical context.

"China in Transformation." Spring 1993 issue of *Dædalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Vol. 122, No. 2.* Cambridge (MA): American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993, 232 pp. $7.95.

This is an occasionally provocative, if uneven, collection of essays on a fascinating topic—the likely future ideological direction of China now that communism, the national glue for more than 40 years, is gradually losing its grip. The post-communist ideologies sprouting beneath the surface, as Edward Friedman points out, are not all open or tolerant, let alone liberal and democratic. As in the former Soviet Union, some are proto-fascist and chauvinistic. Friedman, a distinguished American sinologist, also

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argues that divisive forces are spreading just below the surface and that the longer the old guard delays political reforms, the stronger these divisive forces will grow.

Africa

GAIL GERHART

South Africa: The Struggle for a New Order. BY MARINA OTTAWAY. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1993, 250 pp. $34.95 (paper, $14.95).

This book is a masterful summation and analysis of the negotiating process underway in South Africa since 1990, sorting through the welter of organizations, issues and layers of conflict in a manner that clarifies without drastically oversimplifying. Until the collapse of the multiparty CODESA talks in mid-1992, little progress toward a national settlement had occurred, the author argues, primarily because the two main protagonists—the National Party and the African National Congress—remained convinced that their pre-1990 goals could still be achieved without substantial compromise. A particularly valuable chapter focuses on attempts to negotiate redistributions of power at the local government level.

Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa. BY GERHARD MARE. Atlantic Highlands (NJ): Zed Books, 1993, 125 pp. $17.50 (paper).

Commentators who may readily recognize the politically engineered quality of ethnic strife elsewhere in the world still tend to reduce such politics in Africa to mere "tribalism," thus obviating the need to dig deeper in search of the roots of conflict. This study by a South African sociologist analyzes the politicization of ethnicity in general terms, then digs with a vengeance into the particular case of ethnic mobilization around the identity of the "Zulu nation" in South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s, laying bare its basis in psychological manipulation and historical distortion. Ironically, until the country's rulers officially abandoned apartheid theories in 1990, progressive academics shied away from the study of ethnicity among blacks for fear of lending credence to the government's ideological definitions of reality. With that intellectual obstacle removed, we may now see more research on ethnic politics following this pioneering little book.

Individual Freedoms and State Security in the African Context: The Case of Zimbabwe. BY JOHN HATCHARD. Athens (OH): Ohio University Press, 1993, 209 pp. $19.95 (paper).

It will take more than the replacement of one-party regimes with multiparty regimes in Africa to ensure a transition toward democratic goverment. Another essential pillar of democracy must be legal systems that strike a proper balance between individual rights and the legitimate requirements of the state in promoting the public interest. Citing many relevant comparisons with other countries, this expert study uses the recent history of Zimbabwe to illustrate the promise as well as the pitfalls of constitutionalism in Africa. Using abuses of Zimbabwe's Emergency Powers Act as a focal point, the author exhaustively

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demonstrates that even a justiciable bill of rights as exemplary as Zimbabwe's posed little constraint on an executive that preferred to maintain a colonial state of emergency for a decade after independence in order to limit the protection of individual rights and afford itself the convenience of ruling by administrative decrees. On the brighter side, the independence and integrity of Zimbabwe's judiciary have shown that the rule of law is still an attainable goal in Africa. Appendices reproduce the Zimbabwe bill of rights and the key sections of the Emergency Powers Act.

Tanzania and the IMF: The Dynamics of Liberalization. EDITED BY HORACE CAMPBELL AND HOWARD STEIN. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1992, 212 pp. $34.00.

Tanzania earned a reputation for bold social and economic experimentation in the 1960s and 1970s, but its idiosyncratic version of African socialism was a calamitous failure in economic terms. In the mid-1980s the country reluctantly accepted an IMF-imposed structural adjustment program that compelled it to abandon its most cherished ideological principles. The eight authors of this volume (only one of whom is an economist) examine economic liberalization in Tanzania predominantly from a political perspective.

Assuming the role of champions of Tanzania's poor, they take a generally disdainful view of the country's public and private sector elites, as well as of the IMF and other representatives of foreign capital, all of whom are portrayed as locked in a zero-sum conflict with Tanzania's repressed and exploited workers and peasants. The analysis, while providing for the introduction of some useful historical data, leaves little scope for the development of constructive future alternative scenarios, as opposed to the "revolution" called for by one contributor (Shivji) and the nondependent industrialization advocated by another (Campbell)—both implausible solutions. That Tanzanians want democracy—or at least the better life that their political leaders promised them—seems certain; whether this group of their defenders would do well at the helm of Tanzania's ship of state seems more doubtful.

The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991. BY JEFFREY HERBST. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, 180 pp. $14.00 (paper).

A decade of adherence to a program of economic reforms prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank has made Ghana a test case for structural adjustment in Africa, revealing both the potential for African economic renewal and the highly problematic nature of the reform process, particularly in its political dimensions. This study argues that neither the multilateral lenders (who have wrongly assumed that economic progress would automatically generate political support for reforms) nor the governments undertaking reforms, including Ghana's, have given enough attention to the political strategies, vocabulary or institution-building necessary to ensure the durability of the economic changes underway. Unpopular measures such as devaluation may call for a measure of authoritarian

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control if they are to be successfully applied, but over the longer run market-based economies can only flourish in a democratic institutional context where the rule of law, press freedom and freedom of association prevail. For the sake of Africa's future, the author argues, a focus on the political essentials underlying effective growth strategies should take precedence over the emphasis on distributive issues and neo-imperialism stressed by critics of structural adjustment. Not the last word on this vital subject, but a stimulating dose of hard-nosed realism.

International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict. EDITED BY YAHIA H. ZOUBIR AND DANIEL VOLMAN. Westport (CT): Praeger Publishers, 1993, 258 pp. $55.00.

This informative and well-researched collection reviews and evaluates the diplomatic history of the disputed territory of western Sahara over the last two decades. The authors examine the roles played by Morocco and other Maghreb states as well as those of Spain, France, the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Nations and the Organization of African States. One chapter traces to mid-1991 the frustrating tale of unsuccessful efforts to hold a referendum in the territory. Most of the contributors support the independence movement led by the Polisario Front and are critical of American diplomacy and military backing for Morocco, whose claim to the territory has no foundation in international law.

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Letters to the Editor

America's Sword Remains Sharp

From *William E. Colby*

To the Editor:

In "Superpower Without a Sword" (Summer 1993), Alan Tonelson argues that planned reductions in the defense budget will so diminish U.S. capabilities that the nation should shrink its foreign policy goals to protect only its most direct interests.

This quasi-isolationism is based upon faulty premises. It would abandon the promise the end of the Cold War offers to the United States and mankind in general of creating a more stable world order. Tonelson's rationale—that the modest reductions in America's military suggested by the Clinton administration would leave the United States "without a sword"—is more than hyperbole. His analysis ignores plain facts. These reductions in no way repeat America's euphoric World Wars I and II demobilizations, which left it weak when new threats arose.

The new secretary of defense, Les Aspin, correctly started his analysis of U.S. force structure needs in the post-Cold War era with the Persian Gulf War. Such a conflict is typical of the military challenges facing the United States in the coming years, whether from a resurgent Iraq, an aggressive Iran or even a combined effort by both. Larger possible conflicts such as a Russian-Ukrainian battle, an Indo-Pakistani war or a whirlpool in the Balkans will not bring about a major American engagement.

Even Aspin's construction is larger than necessary. He foresees the need to rotate the personnel in a Persian Gulf force so as to permit it to remain in action over an extended period, an inconclusive situation the American people would not accept. He has stated that force levels must also be able to "win" an additional, simultaneous regional war such as one resulting from a North Korean attack on South Korea. But in that case, South Korea's tough 650,000-man army would certainly carry the major load with only minimal U.S. air and naval assistance—well within the capabilities of the reduced U.S. forces. A Russia with imperialist aims would be a real nightmare for the West as well as for Moscow's threatened neighbors. However, it would take years for the Russians to rebuild their much-depleted and demoralized forces. The United States would have more than enough time to build up its forces for a return to a Cold War posture if necessary (a chilling prospect in itself).

An examination of possible force structures for the new world demonstrates their adequacy for the challenges they might

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face. Of the 16 U.S. Army divisions available at the time, seven were used in Desert Storm. How many are needed under present conditions? Perhaps nine or ten, allowing a commitment of seven or eight with a reserve capability of two or three. Of the 14 naval carrier task forces then available, five were used in the Persian Gulf War (two more than the theater commander requested). How many are now needed? Perhaps eight—four in each ocean, two at sea and two in port—easily permitting a surge to five. The same proportions apply to the Air Force, although its transport capabilities should perhaps be kept higher, with reliance on reserves for a substantial portion of that task. The Marines' force levels might be increased, as planned, to provide the most mobile and immediately available force for rapid intervention, but it is not clear that a full three divisions-plus is necessary.

A minimum deterrence strategy could be adopted for nuclear capabilities, with about 100 nuclear weapons, a few missile-launched and a few bomber-carried. These would be sufficient to deter any threat from nuclear proliferation, lead the former Soviet republics to similar reductions, and encourage nonproliferation among those now contemplating acquiring such weapons (as the United States has urged in suspending nuclear tests). Cutbacks can also be made in superpower forces such as the submarine fleet and the B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers; advanced fighters are now unnecessary. Some requirements might actually rise or remain at present levels—such as those for sealift and prepositioning capabilities and the Special Operations Forces, which have proved their utility and have clear future missions—but these would have marginal budgetary impact.

These reductions offer opportunities for major savings beyond those gingerly advanced by the Bush and Clinton administrations. Several responsible defense analysts believe the savings could be on the order of half the defense budget for the later Cold War years.

While the American people do not wish to be world policeman on issues that do not affect their national interests, they are prepared to participate. But the world has been conditioned over the past 40 years to wait for American leadership. Apparently it is unable to move without U.S. guidance, as Bosnia has demonstrated. The solution to the problem is to be found in continued American political leadership, accompanied by the amassment of coalitions of forces and financial resources to carry out the missions required.

As a centerpiece for such efforts, the time has come to activate the U.N. Security Council's Military Staff Committee by manning it with effective military personnel to plan the communications, command structures, intelligence exchange and logistics preparations needed to field multinational forces. They would operate under the secretary general, as directed by the Security Council, against aggression and criminal actions by states or other parties challenging the conscience of mankind. The forces to be used should be earmarked by each of the member states so that they may engage in the necessary planning, training exercises and liason exchanges, and thus be prepared for action when called.

WILLIAM E. COLBY
Counsel to the Washington law firm of Donovan, Leisure, Rogovan & Schiller; Director of Central Intelligence, 1973-76

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KIEV & THE BOMB: UKRAINIANS REPLY

To the Editor:

John J. Mearsheimer's and Steven E. Miller's debate over Ukrainian nuclear disarmament signals a commendable attempt to move away from the search for simple solutions ("The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent;" and "The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Summer 1993). However, despite generally sound conclusions, the authors did not examine some important aspects of this issue.

The position in which some former Soviet republics find themselves is unique. Today international law permits no changes to the status of a state that inherits nuclear weapons legally.

Ukraine, as a legal heir to the former Soviet Union, has inherited the rights and obligations of its Soviet predecessor. According to existing international law, Ukraine has the exclusive right of ownership of the nuclear weapons on its territory. It can therefore legitimately be considered a nuclear state. At the same time, the definition of a nuclear state is established in only one document: the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which defines a nuclear state as one that built and tested nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices before January 1, 1967.

These are not the circumstances in which Ukraine finds itself today. Ukraine is not producing its own nuclear explosive devices. Without the resolution of these political and legal questions, it will be difficult to regulate disarmament even if states inheriting nuclear weapons want to disarm.

The START I treaty and its Lisbon protocol provide a good example of this confusion. According to Article 1 of the protocol, Ukraine, as a new owner of nuclear weapons, should accept the obligations of the former Soviet Union to destroy those systems deployed on Ukrainian territory. Article 5, however, obliges Ukraine to accede to the NPT as a nonnuclear state. A logical question thus arises: Whose nuclear weapons is Ukraine supposed to destroy in order to implement the terms of START I? Without a comprehensive analysis of these problems and a new international legal mechanism for their solution, nuclear disarmament may well cease.

The authors' scenario of a nuclear conflict between Ukraine and Russia seems highly improbable. Military theory generally considers nuclear weapons a means of deterring aggression. Since there can be no winner in a nuclear war, no state will dare resort to nuclear weapons. This caution applies in equal measure to Russia and Ukraine. Besides, taking into account their industrial potential, large-scale warfare between Ukraine and Russia—even without recourse to nuclear weapons—would threaten not only Europe but the whole world.

During the Cold War the risk of losing control over nuclear arsenals forced all politicians to treat those countries where nuclear weapons were based with extreme caution. Some experts believe that the international community would never have permitted the Yugoslav tragedy had nuclear weapons been based there. The recent U.N. Security Council statement on Sevastopol and Ukrainian territorial integrity supports this line of reasoning.

No matter who currently controls the launch button for the nuclear weapons deployed on Ukrainian territory, these weapons do defend Ukrainian sovereignty. Liquidating these weapons without adequate alternative means of deterring

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aggression would undermine national security and threaten Ukraine's very existence. Without new effective security guarantees for Soviet successor states, attempts at nuclear disarmament will grind to a halt.

The unreliability of existing collective security guarantees and the inadequacy of the NPT regime have brought 20 or so states to have nuclear weapons or to the threshold of acquiring them. The NPT has not been undermined solely by Ukraine's nuclear weapons. Without more effective restraints on the nuclear arms race, nuclear weapons will continue to spread elsewhere even if all those in the former Soviet empire have been destroyed.

Greater international incentives are also needed to encourage nuclear disarmament. The historically unprecedented agreement of states to destroy nuclear weapons they legally own has not been fully appreciated. Friendly pats on the back and promises of assistance, far from encouraging nuclear disarmament, are actually counterproductive.

YURIY I. KOSTENKO
Minister for the Protection of the Environment of Ukraine;
Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament

To the Editor:

Careful analysis of the articles of John J. Mearsheimer and Steven E. Miller allows us to hope that in the United States a crucial aspect of international security is at last beginning to be treated much more seriously.

At one time Ukraine voluntarily and without pressure declared its intention to become a nonnuclear weapons state. The main purpose of this declaration was to create a political and legal basis for leaving the Soviet Union. By renouncing nuclear arms Ukraine sought to achieve the top national security priority of any state—survival.

The disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and Ukraine's independence did not, however, free the country from fear. Influential Russian politicians, state officials, and even separate state bodies, including the Russian parliament consider Ukraine's independence a temporary phenomenon and pursue an openly hostile and illegal policy of territorial claims and interference in the country's domestic affairs with the purpose of undermining its internal stability. Until recently Western states showed little understanding of the situation and made it unequivocally clear that they would not interfere if Ukraine were attacked with conventional weapons.

Under these circumstances, the nuclear weapons inherited from the former U.S.S.R. are beginning to be viewed, and not only in Ukraine itself, as a substantial guarantee of security. Moreover, as public opinion polls have shown, the more Russia's illegal demands grow, the more Ukrainian legislators, political leaders and, most important, the public become pronuclear.

Ukraine's choice to renounce nuclear weapons should be supported by the nuclear states and the international community. This will require, at a minimum:

—clearly worded and legally binding normative guarantees of Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity against any illegal encroachments on the part of any state;

—the material resources and technical assistance needed to implement START I and the safe dismantlement and destruction of nuclear missiles and materials;

—the return of the final product of enriched uranium and plutonium from the warheads deployed on the territory of

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Ukraine, or appropriate compensation.

The possibility cannot be excluded of an agreement establishing international control of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal and/or its use as a component of an international nuclear deterrent system that could be subordinated to the U.N. Security Council.

According to international law, Ukraine owns the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. Ukraine is voluntarily giving up nuclear weapons that are an effective means of ensuring national security. At one time, U.S. alliance commitments and guarantees to Germany, Italy and Japan were essential to gain their acceptance of nonnuclear weapon status under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Ukraine's consent to the destruction of the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal has created even stronger grounds for international security guarantees.

Pressure and the hostile and illegal actions directed against Ukraine, as well as the dismissal of its just demands, will have negative consequences for all. In meeting the demands of Ukrainian public opinion and the electorate, Ukraine may be forced to revise its nuclear policy priorities.

VOLODYMYR VASYLENKO
Ukrainian Ambassador to Belgium

To the Editor:

Ukraine's political leadership has affirmed its intention to denuclearize the country in all its recent documents and speeches. But before that can take place, a number of problems must be solved.

Experts estimate that Ukraine needs roughly $2 billion to do away with its deadly inheritance. The United States has offered $175 million. This, of course, is not enough. Help from the world community is needed—perhaps even under the aegis of the United Nations, but above all from the nuclear powers. Negotiations should begin concerning this issue, and a special international nuclear disarmament foundation should be established.

Ukraine will require technical assistance in liquidating its intercontinental ballistic missiles, particularly their nuclear components and toxic fuel. Russia is best prepared to provide this assistance—having the necessary scientific expertise and facilities—with assistance from members of the nuclear club. If the dismantlement and destruction of nuclear warheads takes place beyond Ukraine's borders, Kiev should participate directly in the control of this process. Special agreements should govern the transfer of nuclear warheads for dismantlement and destruction and the return of their components for peaceful use—or suitable compensation.

In liquidating its nuclear weaponry, Ukraine has a right to reliable guarantees of its national security from other countries. These can be embodied in a legally binding treaty in which the nuclear states should pledge never to use nuclear or conventional weapons against Ukraine, never to resort to threats of force, to respect its territorial integrity and the inviolability of its frontiers, and to refrain from economic or other pressure in seeking to resolve any disagreements. All members of the U.N. Security Council—or at least the United States and Russia—should become guarantors of the agreement.

Ukrainians, on whose territory the Chernobyl accident occurred, recognize their grave responsibility to the peoples of the world not to permit the use of nuclear weapons on their soil or anywhere else. We

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hope that the world community will support the process of nuclear disarmament. At the same time, we hope that Ukraine will exchange the instruments of ratification for START I and the Lisbon protocol only after other states have fulfilled the conditions described above.

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet deliberations in June over START I have exposed differences of opinion among legislators. In light of Ukraine's strained relations with its neighbors, particularly with Russia, many deputies have expressed considerable doubt over whether Ukraine should quickly liquidate the components of its nuclear weapons. Of course they understand that Ukraine cannot make full use of this weaponry; the Ukrainian mentality, however, says that in this matter it is unwise to hurry.

The Russian Supreme Soviet's recent territorial pretensions concerning Sevastopol have further inflamed Ukrainian-Russian relations, demonstrating to the whole world the imperialist aims of certain political forces in Russia. But even in this situation Ukraine is seeking to deal with the territorial pretensions of its neighbor state in a civilized fashion, appealing for support to the world community and the norms of international law.

SERHIY PIROZHKOV
Director of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, Kiev
(Translated by Matthew Rendall)

UKRAINE'S POISON PILL

To the Editor:

Whatever the strength of Professor John J. Mearsheimer's general arguments in favor of a rejuvenated European balance of power, the technical, military and political aspects of his brief for an independent Ukrainian nuclear force contain errors of fact and interpretation. Ukraine currently has no nuclear weapons and cannot achieve or sustain a viable independent nuclear force based either on the ex-Soviet hardware on its soil or the nuclear weapons know-how that hardware implies. To argue otherwise encourages Ukrainians to believe their salvation resides in swallowing a poison pill: seizing Soviet-era weapons that offer no deterrent protection yet remain an incentive and excuse for action against Ukraine.

While Kiev has consistently claimed "ownership" and "administrative control," its nuclear weapons remain in the hands of Russian troops. Seizing physical control of the bombers, missiles and warheads—at the risk of provoking a Russian counteraction—is a threshold difficulty not addressed by Mearsheimer. Nor does he address how Ukraine will protect itself during the many months—perhaps years—required to bypass the several safeguards against unauthorized alteration or use of the weapons. Assuming, as Mearsheimer seems to, that these "technical barriers" can be readily finessed, others remain. Mearsheimer fails to explain how Ukraine is to convert three-stage, intercontinental rockets into the two-stage, theater-range rockets needed for a deterrent force against Russia, how it will reprogram the target coordinates for sites in European Russia on the long-range SS-24 and the variable-range SS-19 ballistic missiles, or how it will retain warhead accuracy while making these technically demanding alterations, which would require major redesign and testing.

Unless these problems are resolved, the warheads will land in Russia's Far East or

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further afield. This undermines the author's claim that a mere 13 missile warheads, surviving a first strike, could reach Russian cities and "leave Russia devastated." The huge bombers in Ukraine—Tu-95 H Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks—could fire their AS-15 cruise missiles at shorter ranges, but the bombers are not designed for this mission and are vulnerable to conventional air defense as soon as they are airborne. And Ukraine lacks reconnaissance satellites for gathering missile guidance data.

Mearsheimer states that "[d]ecapitating Ukraine's command and control system would be extremely difficult" and that "[a] direct attack against Ukraine's intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers would be no more promising." There never was an independent command and control system in Ukraine and, among the residue of the Soviet nuclear facilities in Ukraine, there is nothing that constitutes a complete or functional command and control system. The elements that do exist seem to remain largely in Russian hands or under the control of Moscow.

Furthermore, the nuclear weapons are located at just four sites and cannot be dispersed, owing to the need for missile silos and bomber hardstands (the Blackjacks and Bears are among the world's heaviest bombers). Strikes by conventional warheads mounted on cruise missiles like those used in the June attack on the Iraqi intelligence compound in Baghdad might well render these bombers and missiles inoperable.

The nuclear weapons in Ukraine are late-1970s technology, except for the SS-19, which was developed in the late 1960s and uses a toxic and corrosive storable liquid fuel. Maintaining and modernizing these weapons is beyond Ukraine's capacity. While many remnants of the Soviet nuclear weapons industrial infrastructure are in Ukraine, they lack the ability to fabricate some components (such as warhead simulators) needed for upkeep and four items crucial to modernization: a reprocessing plant to provide fissile material for warheads, a warhead test site, a missile test range, and communications and reconnaissance satellites.

A viable and credible military plan or strategy for using the weapons in Ukraine is hard to imagine. An attack on Russian cities, if it were possible, would subject Ukraine to radioactive fallout (on Arctic winds that cross European Russia, Ukraine and the Black Sea) and to retaliation by much larger Russian forces. In short, these weapons do not constitute, and cannot be refashioned as, a workable, survivable and believable independent nuclear force.

WILLIAM A. KINCADE
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TRADE POLICY: MYTHS OF ALTRUISM

To the Editor:

A persistent—and dubious—bit of popular wisdom about the Cold War years holds that the United States regularly granted unrequited trade benefits to allies and friends for political or security reasons.

The logic of this proposition is not easy to follow. One might suppose that an America that had committed its forces and a large portion of its national output to the defense of Europe and Japan would have sought in return especially favorable treatment at the trade negotiating table. Yet the standard view, echoed at the highest levels of the current administration, is that we did the opposite. Mickey Kantor, the current

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U.S. Trade Representative, told Congress, "The days when we could subordinate our economic interests to foreign policy or defense concerns are long over."

Jeffrey Garten's review essay ("Clinton's Emerging Trade Policy," Summer 1993) seems to accept this version of the matter. Likewise, Alfred E. Eckes ("Trading American Interests," Fall 1992) asserted that successive administrations in Washington "for diplomatic and security reasons . . . sacrificed thousands of domestic jobs to create employment and prosperity elsewhere in the noncommunist world."

Instead, postwar U.S. foreign trade policy can be best understood if we recognize that the 1930s breakdown of the international economic order left an enduring mark on American political thought. Few if any American presidents from Truman on have been avid readers of the economist David Ricardo. All, however, have understood that trade and international specialization can be wealth-producing and that an expanding exchange of goods and services across national borders will foster a world suited to American interests.

This is not to say that any president has been willing or able to ignore domestic constraints. Harry Truman was pretty clearly a dedicated free trader, but his administration insisted on writing into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade provisions to protect the farm price program. It was also during the Truman years that Congress wrote into law the peril point—which placed on the Tariff Commission the extraordinary task of determining to the percentage point the "safe" level of tariff reductions, product by product—and the escape clause, which had already been provided in GATT and by Truman's executive order. If Truman wished to give anything away, the obstacles to doing so were formidable.

President Eisenhower, whose instincts strongly favored free trade, was forced in 1955 to seek a sweeping GATT waiver for any present or future limitations on agricultural imports. At the same time, the United States insisted on modifying GATT to exclude agricultural products and other raw materials from the prohibition of export subsidies—actions it has come to regret.

The primary U.S. objective in the 1962 Kennedy Round of GATT was to achieve a 50 percent reduction in the European Economic Community's common external tariff, because the Community was seen as a threat to U.S. economic interests. Yet in 1961 the Kennedy administration negotiated a comprehensive import control regime for cotton textiles, in particular textiles from Japan, and imposed truly punitive duties on sheet glass and certain carpets and rugs coming mainly from our West European friends and allies.

President Johnson presided over the negotiation of an agreement that fixed quantitative limits on imports of European and Japanese steel, while President Nixon's first term was marked by a lengthy struggle to persuade Japan to extend the cotton textile agreement to goods made of wool and synthetic fibers. A fair measure of the Nixon administration's overriding concern for U.S. security ties with Japan was the threat to invoke a 1917 statute, the Trading with the Enemy Act, as the ultimate form of negotiating duress in the textile matter. Presidents Carter, Reagan and Bush took generally similar positions on trade policy. Each pushed ahead where possible, resisted protectionist pressures up to a point, and made

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concessions to domestic interests when that seemed the prudent political course.

Thus, over a span of nearly half a century, the consistent pattern was one of advance, hold the line, retreat. It is true that Japan and the United States would have been better off if Washington had insisted earlier and with greater vigor that Tokyo make more concessions in tariff negotiations and honor more fully the letter and spirit of its GATT commitments. While some of this may have been neglect, a consideration now mostly ignored is that the United States devoted almost constant efforts over the years to convincing Tokyo to put GATT-forbidden ceilings on U.S.-bound Japanese exports, not only textiles and steel and later autos and machine tools, but also a great number of lesser products. The United States was not as demanding of its European trading partners, in part because the European Community let us know that it had the will and ability to resist and retaliate.

Indeed, it has to be a misreading of the past to assert that a preoccupation with political and security relationships made a succession of American governments indifferent to the domestic importance of trade policy choices. If anything, it can be argued, the White House often has conceded more to protectionist constituencies than was necessary or has adopted remedies—quantitative controls, "voluntary" or otherwise—that have placed unduly heavy costs on American consumers and much of American industry.

Nonetheless, the United States has managed to maintain a respectable record of trade policy leadership, without which the world would today surely be a poorer place. If Washington now elects to abdicate that leadership, on the specious ground that the sensible elements of trade policy were no more than a Cold War aberration, then we shall have been bad historians and worse judges of the nation's interest.

PHILIP H. TREZISE
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; former Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

YUGOSLAVIA: INVITATION TO WAFFLE

To the Editor:

William Pfaff's article ("Invitation to War," Summer 1993) rightly states that the war in the former Yugoslavia could have been avoided by more resolute action on the part of the international community. And, I would add, a more principled one.

The breakup of Yugoslavia is a direct result of two ideological vacuums in world politics following the Cold War. First, anti-communism was not replaced by any consistent and unified Western policy. When communism collapsed, the West simply declared victory and pulled out.

Without guidance, the peoples of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union reverted to nationalism and religious fundamentalism. Pfaff correctly points out that the West has managed to overcome these passions and create liberal civil societies. This process was interrupted for 70 years in the East, and we cannot expect these countries to complete it in a year or two, especially without help. Many people from the former Yugoslavia wanted to preserve its multicultural, multiethnic structure and build a modern civil society. We were simply dismissed by the West as a weak and insignificant opposition, and as a consequence were overrun by nationalists. Even today our voices do not echo

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in Western corridors of power.

The second vacuum was the absence of principles in the new world order. In the old world order, the principles of self-determination and inviolability of borders were embedded in the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki accords. Both have been used utterly inconsistently throughout the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

If the West wanted a multicultural, multiethnic, liberal democratic civil society in the former Yugoslavia, it should never have recognized the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, and then Bosnia-Herzegovina. Recognition of these states, and de facto de-recognition of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, signaled that the Helsinki accords, which supposedly established the European borders forever, were being abandoned; border changes were permissible even without both sides' consent. But then the West turned around and prevented Serbs in Croatia and Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina from seceding. Today the West has abandoned the multiethnic civil society of Bosnia and accepted its partition into ethnic states. At the same time it is supporting the multiethnic society of Croatia, denying Serbs the right to secede and supporting the right to self-determination of Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia and Greece.

In this mess of conflicting principles it is no wonder that a solution to the Yugoslav conflict cannot be found.

BRANISLAV ANDJELIC
President, Serbian-American Alliance of New England

KURDS ARE TURKS TOO

To the Editor:

Graham E. Fuller's article ("Fate of the Kurds," Spring 1993) argues that Turkey should recognize the "long denied" separate identity of its Kurds and "move immediately toward a more liberal treatment of the Kurdish problem," according them greater autonomy within a Turkish-Kurdish federation.

Fuller's well-intentioned views are shared by some Turkish intellectuals and writers. But they do not seem to realize that a Kurdish state or federation might well turn against its creators. The openly expressed ultimate aim of major Kurdish leaders is the establishment of a Greater Kurdistan that would eventually swallow major areas of Turkey. Even this solution would not put an end to Kurdish ambitions. Kurdish nationalists might very well next demand an outlet to the Mediterranean.

Moreover, as Paul Henze, another RAND expert who favors a liberal solution, correctly points out, accepting the Kurds as an autonomous ethnic group would be anathema to the still-prevalent Atatürkist conception of modern Turkey—which has always striven to avoid ethnic and religious differentiation. Until recently, Turks lived peacefully with their compatriots of Kurdish descent in both the southeast and other regions of Turkey. A common history binds them together, in a writer's words, "as flesh and sinew." Intermarriages through several generations have wrought strong blood ties between Kurds and Turks. In some areas it is difficult to determine who is a Kurd and who is a Turk.

Western authors often claim that Turkish governments have denied the separate identity of the Kurds. In fact, Kemal

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Atatürk was well aware of the Kurds' separate identity and the problems this entailed. But a bloody war (1919-21) for the independence of the country had just been fought, and its integrity could not be jeopardized. The secessionist uprisings had to be stamped out and a single unified modern nation created by blending the various ethnic groups in the Turkish melting pot. This policy of assimilation successfully blended other ethnic groups such as Lazes, Circassians and Georgians, and millions of Kurds were totally assimilated without the use of force.

Accepting the "Kurdish reality," as recent Turkish governments have done in words and deeds, is one thing, and giving the Kurds a distinct identity with all of its ramifications is another. They fear, not without justification, that this would open a Pandora's box in a country where there are dozens of other ethnic groups and "realities." When experiments in federalism have recently ended disastrously in other areas, why should Turkey, also faced with religious dissension, now take the same risk of splintering?

ALTERMUR KILIÇ
Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of Radio, Television [Turkey]; former Deputy Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations

THE CASUAL USE OF CASUALTIES

To the Editor:

Andrew Bell-Fialkoff's description of Hungarian atrocities in Vojvodina in 1942 is a good example of how numbers tend to inflate in these matters ("A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing," Summer 1993). Bell-Fialkoff's figures are inflated by a factor of ten.

Indeed, the Hungarian military conducted a pogrom against Serbs and Jews in Novi Sad. It began as an overreaction to random shooting by Serbian and German villagers at Hungarian army patrols. The number of victims, however, did not exceed eleven hundred, although even a single one would have been too many. That this was not an official policy of the Hungarian government is proven by the fact that a subsequent investigation led to the conviction of the local commanders. Furthermore, the postwar Hungarian government handed over for trial the wartime army chief of staff, General Serenc Szombathelyi, to the Yugoslavs. He was convicted by the Yugoslav court and impaled.

Bell-Fialkoff's statement concerning the "uprooting" of 70,000 Serbs in Hungary is completely untrue. That part of Yugoslavia had been an integral part of Hungary until 1920. During the Turkish occupation after the battle of Mohács in 1526, most of the Hungarian population was eradicated. Serbs immigrated to the area during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, escaping the Turkish occupation. After the Turks were pushed out in 1699, the Hapsburgs repopulated the area with a kaleidoscopic selection of peoples from the empire. Queen Maria Theresa established the Serbs in Vojvodina "until such time that they can return to a Serbia free of Turks." In light of this historically multiethnic tradition, it would have been inconceivable for the Hungarian government to engage in "ethnic cleansing."

The next chapter of this sordid story is entirely missing from Bell-Fialkoff's article. In 1945 Marshal Josip Tito's returning partisans carried out a systematic "ethnic cleansing" of Hungarians. As Tibor Cseres

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describes in his well-documented book, *Titoist Atrocities in Vojvodina, 1944*, the Serbs murdered up to 40,000 Hungarian civilians. Since Tito was an esteemed friend and wartime ally, the Western press did not cover these atrocities at the time.

Also missing from his article is the ethnic cleansing of 120,000 Hungarians from northeastern Hungary by the Soviets. The area in question was the eastern tip of Czechoslovakia between the two world wars; now it is Carpatho-Ukraine. Under the policy of "collective responsibility," all Hungarian men between 18 and 60 years of age were deported to the Soviet Union. Sixty-six percent died in captivity. A tiny spark of hope for the rest of East-Central Europe: the Hungarian minority in Carpatho-Ukraine now enjoys broad cultural autonomy.

ANDREW L. SIMON
Professor Emeritus, University of Akron

To the Editor:

If "Yugoslavia's . . . is a war of histories" (William Pfaff, "Invitation to War," Summer 1993), then histories must not be treated casually. Therefore, it is important to correct Andrew Bell-Fialkoff's estimates of World War II victims in that country.

The Serb demographer and historian Bogoljub Kocovic, in a study that "does not discriminate between those who fell fighting against Fascism, and those Yugoslavs who died as a result of our own civil war," cites a total of 334,000 Serbs, 203,000 Croats and 27,000 Jews who perished in the Ustashi state (Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). A total of 151,000 Serbs, 4,000 Croats, and 26,000 Jews lost their lives in wartime Serbia.[1]

Similar figures have been independently arrived at by the Croat demographer Vladimir Zerjavic. Zerjavic found that in the Ustashi state, 295,000 Serbs, 170,000 Croats, and 19,000 Jews were lost. In Serbia, the same fate was met by 190,000 Serbs, 7,000 Croats, and 14,000 Jews.[2]

In 1964 the Yugoslav government undertook a systematic survey of World War II victims that was painstakingly documented.[3] Counting in the victims of ethnic Germans and quislings, the figures correspond closely to those of Kocovic and Zerjavic.

Thus, there is no evidence for Bell-Fialkoff's claims that "between 300,000 and 340,000 Serbs" were killed by the Ustashi between May and October 1941 and that "[a]ltogether about 750,000 Serbs ...were annihilated." Similarly, his estimate of 100,000 Croats killed by Serbs after the surrender in May 1945 implies that the Ustashi state suffered almost no military and civilian losses before surrender.

STANIMIR VUK-PAVLOVIC
Rochester, Minnesota

Andrew Bell-Fialkoff replies:

According to a memo by the right-wing Hungarian deputy Bajcsy-Zsilinsky (a

[1]Bogoljub Kocovic, *Zrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji,* London: Veritas Foundation Press, 1985.

[2]Vladimir Zerjavic, "The Losses of Yugoslav Population in the Second World War," *Geographical Papers* 8, pp. 83-107, Zagreb: University of Zagreb, Institute of Geography, 1991.

[3]The report has been classified in both Germany and Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs made it partly public in 1989. See Zeljko Kruselj and Duro Zagorac, "Sporna knjiga mrtvih," *Danas,* Zagreb, Nov. 11, 1989, pp. 24-25.

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member of the pro-Nazi Race-Protecting Party), in Zsablya alone about 1,400 people were killed; in Csurog, 1,800. At least six other communities were affected, including the town of Ujvidek, where 879 people were killed. So 15,000 victims does not seem excessive. Similar massacres occurred at Kamenets-Podolskiy. However, to Hungary's credit, there was a public outcry followed by an investigation and a trial with relatively stiff sentences for several commanding officers. (But I am puzzled by Professor Simon's assertion that General Szombathelyi was impaled; he was shot on November 4, 1946.) The 70,000 Serbs were expelled because they settled in Backa after it had been annexed by Yugoslavia. On the other hand, those who were allowed to remain were given the right to elect representatives to the parliament in Budapest, and the Orthodox bishop of Novi Sad was made a member of the Hungarian upper house.[1] The Austrian decision to allow Serbs to settle in the military frontier zone in the eighteenth century had no more relevance in 1942 than the Romans' decision to build Aquineum (Budapest). Titoist retribution in Vojvodina does not fall into the category of ethnic cleansing. Nor does the deportation of thousands of Hungarians from what is now Carpatho-Ukraine, deplorable as it may have been. Like Germans in Romania, enemy civilians were sent to the Soviet Union to rebuild what their armies had destroyed (German POWs were also extensively used). I want to thank Dr. Vuk-Pavlovic for additional information on the number of victims in Yugoslavia during World War II. I used the older figures because I distrust revisionist attempts to diminish such mass murder tragedies and I did not know that the Yugoslav government study (made public in 1989) seems to confirm lower figures. However, lack of documentary evidence or inability to find reliable witnesses does not necessarily disprove higher figures.

My Yugoslav casualty figures are not "casual." They are based on the traditionally accepted range of 1.5 million to 1.75 million. The 300,000-340,000 figure is given by Harry N. Howard. The figure of 100,000 killed in 1945 is supplied by Ivan Babic. Milovan Djilas put the total number at 20,000-30,000,[2] which seems too low; if Hungarian claims of 40,000 victims are true, 100,000 does not seem excessive.

[1]Randolph L. Braham, *The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1981, p. 211; Constantin Fotich, *The War We Lost: The Yugoslav Tragedy and the Failure of the West,* New York: The Viking Press, 1948, p. 138; Braham, *op. cit.,* pp. 1169-70; Fotich, *op. cit.,* p. 139; Muriel Heppell and Fred B. Singleton, *Yugoslavia,* New York/Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961, p. 169.

[2]R.A.C. Parker, *Struggle for Survival: The History of the Second World War,* Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 283; Fred Singleton, *Twentieth Century Yugoslavia,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1976, p. 86; Robert J. Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia,* Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1947, p. 466; Francis H. Eterovich and Christopher Spalatin, eds., *Croatia: Land, People, Culture,* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964; Milovan Djilas, *Wartime,* New York/London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977, p. 447.

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